一个投资者的成长——读巴菲特的信(7)

2011-10-20 10:58阅读:

一个投资者的成长——读巴菲特的信(7)

Barrons

灵感的枯竭

作为一个投资者,到了1968年,巴菲特的投资灵感已经枯竭。在1968年给合伙人的信中,已经很难找到让人豁然开朗的语句。终于,面临危机的巴菲特在1969年5月决定解散合伙基金。

Everyone makes mistakes.

At the beginning of 1968, I
felt prospects for BPL performance looked poorer than at any time in our history. However, due in considerable measure to one simple but sound idea whose time had come (investment ideas,like women are often more exciting than punctual), we recorded an overall gain of $40,032,691.

每个人都会犯错。

在1968年初,我感觉巴菲特合伙基金的业绩看起来比历史上任何时候都要差。但是,由于一个简单而可靠的投资想法起了显著的作用(投资想法如同女人,常令人激动,却很少准时),我们的整个盈利达到了4千万美金。

(1968年给合伙人的信)

解散合伙基金

巴菲特解散合伙基金的决定不仅是由于当时市场的状况,更是其个人诉求。在全身心投入18年后,巴菲特面临着人生与投资的双重平台期,需要对自己的人生与事业做出重大调整。

To My Partners:

致我的合伙人:

About eighteen months ago I wrote to you regarding changed environmental and personal factors causing me to modify our future performance objectives.

大约18个月前,我给你们写信,讲了由于环境改变和个人因素,致使我修改我们未来的业绩目标。

The investing environment I discussed at that time (and on which I have commented in various other letters) has generally become more negative and frustrating as time has passed. Maybe I am merely suffering from a lack of mental flexibility. (One observer commenting on security analysts over forty stated: “They know too many things that are no longer true.”)

随着时间的推移,当时我提到的投资环境(我在其他多封信中也多次提到)已经进一步恶化并令人沮丧。也许我只是受困于头脑缺乏灵活性。(有一个观察者对40岁以上的证券分析师的评论是:“他们知道过多已经不再正确的事情。”)

However, it seems to me that: (1) opportunities for investment that are open to the analyst who stresses quantitative factors have virtually disappeared, after rather steadily drying up over the past twenty years; (2) our $100 million of assets further eliminates a large portion of this seemingly barren investment world, since commitments of less than about $3 million cannot have a real impact on our overall performance, and this virtually rules out companies with less than about $100 million of common stockat market value; and (3) a swelling interest in investment performance has created an increasingly short-term oriented and (in my opinion) more speculative market.

但是,对我来说:(1)在过去20年里,侧重量化因素的分析师的投资机会逐渐枯竭,已经完全消失。(2)我们1亿美元的资产规模进一步排除了本来就贫瘠的投资世界的一大部分。因为任何少于3百万美元的投资都无法对整体业绩产生真正的影响。这实际上就排除了市值低于1亿美金的公司。(3不断增加的对投资业绩的兴趣催生并加剧了注重短期和(在我看来)投机的市场。

The October 9th, 1967 letter stated that personal considerations were the most important factor among those causing me to modify our objectives. I expressed a desire to be relieved of the (self-imposed) necessity of focusing 100% on BPL. I have flunked this test completely during the last eighteen months. The letter said: I hope limited objectives will make for more limited effort. It hasn't worked out that way. As long as I am “on stage”, publishing a regular record and assuming responsibility for management of what amounts to virtually 100% of the net worth of many partners, I will never be able to put sustained effort into any non-BPL activity. If I am going to participate publicly, I can't help being competitive. I know I don't want to be totally occupied with out-pacing an investment rabbit all my life. The only way to slow down is to stop.

1967109日的信中,我提到,个人考虑是致使我修改我们投资目标的最重要因素。我表达了希望不再(我自己强加的)必须100%集中在巴菲特合伙基金。在过去18个月,我彻底没有通过这一测试。在信中,我曾经说我希望有限的目标将导致有限的努力。但现实并不如我想象那样。只要我在投资的“台上”,定期发布记录,承担管理几乎是很多合伙人100%净值的资金的责任,我将永远不能把精力持续的投入巴菲特合伙基金以外的活动中去。如果我参与公开活动,我无法不争强好胜。我知道我不想一生都完全沉迷于与投资的兔子赛跑。慢下来的唯一方式就是停止。

Therefore, before yearend. I intend to give all limited partners the required formal notice of my intention to retire.

所以,在年底前,我将给所有的有限合伙人发出必须的正式通知,告知我有意退休。

19695月给合伙人的信)

Quite frankly, in spite of any factors set forth on the earlier pages. I would continue to operate the Partnership in 1970, or even 1971, if I had some really first class ideas. Not because I want to, but simply because I would so much rather end with a good year than a poor one. However. I just don't see anything available that gives any reasonable hope of delivering such a good year and I have no desire to grope around, hoping to 'get lucky' with other people's money. I am not attuned to this market environment and I don't want to spoil a decent record by trying to play a game I don't understand just so I can go out a hero.

非常坦率的讲,除了前面说的因素,如果有真正一流的投资想法,我本来想继续运营合伙基金到1970年,甚至是1971年。并不是因为我想继续运营,而是我更想用好的一年而不是差的一年来结束。但是,我根本看不到任何能有希望产生好的一年业绩的机会,而我并不想胡乱尝试,用他人的钱去碰运气。我不适合目前的市场环境,而且我不会为了逞能而尝试做我不懂的事情,我不想破坏一个良好的记录。

19695月给合伙人的信)

Some of you are going to ask, 'What do you plan to do?' I don't have an answer to that question. I do know that when I am 60, I should be attempting to achieve different personal goals than those which had priority at age 20. Therefore, unless I now divorce myself from the activity that has consumed virtually all of my time and energies during the first eighteen years of my adult life, I am unlikely to develop activities that will be appropriate to new circumstances in subsequent years.

你们中的有些人将会问“你计划去做什么?”对此我没有答案。我肯定知道的是,当我60岁的时候我将尝试达到不同的人生目标,这些人生目标与我二十多岁时优先考虑的事情不同。所以,除非我现在脱离投资活动,否则我将无法发展适合以后新情况的新的活动。因为投资这项活动完全占据了我作为一个成年人的第一个18年。

19695月给合伙人的信)

结束语

到1969年解散合伙基金,巴菲特已经走完了作为一个投资者的第一段历程。人生的问题,投资的停滞,让他不得不重新思考,彻底改变。

当我们再次读到巴菲特写给伯克希尔·哈撒韦股东的信,巴菲特已经由一个简单的股票投资者蜕变为一个实业家和投资者,并逐渐脱离了导师格雷厄姆的光环,发展了自己独特的投资理念与投资体系。


2010-10-15 18:53:54
1feng911来自互联网
博主并没有将1969年的信完全翻译出来,我不同意博主在此对巴菲特情理合伙基金的解释,我认为最主要的解释是美国十年期国债利率已经从3%上涨到6.5%至7%的水平,这使得股票的投资相对于债券没有明显的优势,如他所说,这个时候已经很难找到大量的能够和他的基金规模相匹配的低估的股票,这个时候他需要思考,也需要全面的转向,所以其后他慢慢的转变为以保险为主的,以保险的浮存金作为资金来源的并购加股票投资的方式这是我的思考

我觉得巴菲特之前的格雷厄姆式投资已经走到了一定的极限。他必须在投资思路上有所突破。这个突破需要长时间的思考与实践,如果还是每日全身心投入运营合伙基金,巴菲特将没有时间静下来思考。并不是国债利息让他停止,或者投资标第太小,而是他的投资方法走到了头。巴菲特之后的投资规模更大,市场也曾经上上下下,债券利率也曾经高涨,但他一直在投资。除了保险的浮存金,还有他投资理念的彻底转变。从某种意义上说,他后来更像一个精于投资的实业家。