德国人节省、储蓄,因此积累了很多外汇储备,和海外资产。德国人落得什么呢?
2008年的美国次贷危机和后来的欧盟危机(希腊、西班牙危机等)几乎消灭了德国人的海外资产。
比较一下中国人。眼下的第三世界国家债务危机(与新冠的直接关系不大)会不会消灭中国人的海外资产呢?
这是FT专栏作家Martin Wolf 在评论一本新书时的问题。这本书 Trade Wars Are Class Wars. By Matthew Klein and Michael Pettis.
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Now consider Germany. Since the end of the post-reunification boom of the 1990s and the labour market liberalisation of the 2000s, corporate profits have been high and domestic corporate investment weak. Remarkably, “[German] consumption did not grow at all between 2001 and 2005.” Domestic spending fell far behind trade-fuelled income. The German government has, until Covid-19, also run a very tight budget. As a result, a gigantic and persistent current account surplus — excess savings, in other words — emerged.
Until 2008, the excess savings of Germany and several other smaller European countries (such as the Netherlands) were offset by unsustainable credit and spending booms in countries such as Greece, Ireland and, above all,
2008年的美国次贷危机和后来的欧盟危机(希腊、西班牙危机等)几乎消灭了德国人的海外资产。
比较一下中国人。眼下的第三世界国家债务危机(与新冠的直接关系不大)会不会消灭中国人的海外资产呢?
这是FT专栏作家Martin Wolf 在评论一本新书时的问题。这本书 Trade Wars Are Class Wars. By Matthew Klein and Michael Pettis.
......
Now consider Germany. Since the end of the post-reunification boom of the 1990s and the labour market liberalisation of the 2000s, corporate profits have been high and domestic corporate investment weak. Remarkably, “[German] consumption did not grow at all between 2001 and 2005.” Domestic spending fell far behind trade-fuelled income. The German government has, until Covid-19, also run a very tight budget. As a result, a gigantic and persistent current account surplus — excess savings, in other words — emerged.
Until 2008, the excess savings of Germany and several other smaller European countries (such as the Netherlands) were offset by unsustainable credit and spending booms in countries such as Greece, Ireland and, above all,