[转载]Groundless Beliefs
2014-04-13 18:49阅读：
Groundless Beliefs
Groundless Beliefs
By A. E. Mander
In future we are going to
follow the practice—until it
becomes a habit—of classifying
propositions according to their
grounds. Of every statement we
come across, we shall ask: “How
do we know that? What
reason have we for believing
that? On what ‘ground’ is that
statement based?” Probably we
shall be astonished at the
number of propositions met with
in everyday life which we
shall find it necessary to class
as groundless. They rest upon
mere tradition, or on somebody’s
bare assertion unsupported by
ever a shadow of proof
…
今后，我们将按根据对各种观点进行分类——直至养成一种习惯。对于我们所遇到的每一种说法，我们都应该问：“我们是如何知道的？我们有什么理由相信它，这一说法有什么‘根据’？”我们大概会吃惊地发现，在日常生活中我们所见到的大量说法可以归类为毫无根据的说法。这些说法仅仅根据传统，或者根据某人毫无证据的断言……
It may be a belief which
we originally accepted as a
result of simple “suggestion,”
and we have continued to hold
it ever since. It has now
become one of our regular habits
of thought. Perhaps
somebody-somewhere-sometime told us a
certain thing, and quite uncritically,
we accepted and believed it.
Perhaps it was way back
in our early childhood—before we
had even developed the power
of questioning anything that might
be told to us. Many of
our strongest convictions were
established then; and now, in
adult life, we find it
most difficult even to question
their truth. They seem to
us “obviously” true.
我们最初作为一种简单的“建议”而接受的事物可能会成为一种观点，并且我们继续持有这种观点。现在，这种观点已成为我们的一种思维习惯。也许某人于某时、某地告诉我们某件事，我们便不加鉴别地接受并相信了它。这种做法或许可以追溯到我们的童年时代——即我们对所告知的事物提出质疑的能力尚未得到开发之前。我们的许多根深蒂固的信念都是那时确立的。现在长大后，我们发现很难对这些信念的真实性提出质疑，在我们看来这些信念“显然”都是正确的。
But if the staunchest Roman
Catholic and the staunchest
Presbyterian had been exchanged when
infants, and if they had
been brought up with home
and all other influences reversed,
we can had very little
doubt what the result would
have been. It is consistent with
all our knowledge of psychology
to conclude that each would have
grown up holding exactly the
opposite beliefs to those he
holds now … and each would
then have felt as sure of
the truth of his opinion
as he now feels—of the truth
of the opposite opinion. The
same thing is true, of course,
of many beliefs other than
those of a religious nature.
If we had grown up in a
community where polygamy or
head-hunting, or infanticide, or
gladiatorial fighting, or dueling, was
regarded as the normal and
natural thing—then we should have
grown up to regard it as
“obviously” natural and perfectly moral
and proper. If an English
baby had been adopted and
brought up in a German home,
and had grown up with no
knowledge that his parents were
English, all the sentiments and
beliefs of that person would
be “German” and not “English.”
Many of our beliefs—many of
our most deeply-rooted and fundamental
convictions—are held simply as a
result of the fact that
we happen to have been “brought
up” to them.
不过，如果在婴儿时期把最虔诚的罗马天主教徒和长老会教义信徒予以交换，然后使他们在相反的家庭与影响下长大，所能得出的结果是毋庸置疑的。我们可以根据所掌握的心理学知识得出结论，两人长大后会持有与现在恰好相反的观点……然后，每个人就像他现在一样，感到自己的观点正确无疑——其实是对方的观点。当然，在宗教信仰以外的其他许多观点中情况也是如此。如果我们生长在一个把多配偶制、割去敌方头颅作为战利品、杀害婴儿、格斗或者决斗当成是平常而又自然的事情的社会中——那么我们长大后就会认为这些做法“显然”是自然的、完全合乎道德规范的，也是很正常的。如果一个英国婴儿被一个德国家庭收养并抚育成人，长大后完全不知道他的父母是英国人，他的全部思想感情与观点就会是“德国式”的而不是“英国式”的。我们的许多观点——我们许多最根深蒂固的基本信念——是由我们成长的社会文化传统所决定的。
Of course we do not cease,
when we cease to be
children, to adopt new beliefs
on mere suggestion. We continue
doing it, more or less
unconsciously all our lives; hence,
to take only the most
striking examples, the enormous
influence of newspapers and the
effectiveness of skilful advertising.
Much of what passes as such
is not, strictly, thinking at
all. It is the mere
“parroting” of ideas picked up
by chance and adopted as
our own without question. Most
people, most of the time, are
mere parrots. But as we
leave childhood, we tend to
accept only such new ideas as
fit in with the ideas we
already hold; and all conflicting
ideas seem to us “obviously”
absurd.
当然，我们长大后也不会停止仅仅根据建议接受新观点。我们在一生中或多或少不断无意识地接受新观点，仅举几个最明显的例子，如报刊的巨大影响与诱人的广告效应等。严格说来，许多流传的观点根本不是思想，不过是鹦鹉学舌般的重复而已，只不过是凭偶然拾人牙慧，便不加质疑地据为己有的想法而已。多数人在大多时候不过是鹦鹉学舌者。不过，我们长大后往往只接受那些与自己所持观点相一致的新想法，所有与其发生冲突的观点在我们看来“显然”是荒谬的。
Propositions that are accepted simply
because “everybody says so,”
must be classed under the
same heading. The dogma may not
be that of any particular
individual: it may be a dogmatic
statement which has been passed
from one person to another,
from generation to generation, perhaps
for hundreds—perhaps for thousands—of
years. It may be part of
the tradition belief of the
people or the race. In
that case, it is part of
our social inheritance from some
period in the past. But
we should fully face the fact
that beliefs which are merely
inherited from the past must
have originated at a time when
men knew much less than
they know today. So the fact
that a belief is “old” is
no argument in its
favour.
仅仅由于“大家都这么说”而予以接受的观点必须被归于同一类。这种信条可能不是某个特定个人的观点：可能是一个人传给另一个人，一代又一代流传下来的一种教条的观点，大概已流传了几百年——或许数千年了。这种信条可能已成为一部分人或种族的传统观点的一部分。在这种情况下，它是我们从过去某一历史阶段继承下来的社会遗产的一部分。不过，我们应该面对这样一种事实，即我们仅仅从过去继承下来的观点一定源于人类的认识能力远不及今天的某一时期。因此，一种观点“古老”并不是对其有利的论点。
We need especially to be on
our guard when we come
across propositions which seem
to be “obviously” true.
当遇到某些似乎“显然”正确的观点时，我们需要格外地警觉。
When we find ourselves entertaining
an opinion about which there
is a feeling that even to
enquire into it would be absurd,
unnecessary, undesirable, or wicked—we
may know that that opinion is
a non-rational one.
当我们发现自己持有一种观点，认为对它质疑是荒谬的、没必要的、不合时宜的或者是邪恶的——我们可以认为这种观点是非理性的。
When we are tempted to say
that any general truth is
so “obvious” that it would
be absurd even to question it,
we should remember that the
whole history of the development
of human thought has been
full of cases of such
“obvious truths” breaking down when
examined in the light of
increasing knowledge and reason. For
instance, for ages nothing could
have seemed more obvious, more
utterly beyond question that the
proposition that slavery was
natural, reasonable, necessary, and
right. Some kinds of men
were “obviously” “slaves by
nature.” To doubt it was
impossible.
当我们想说任何普遍真理都是“明显”的，甚至对其提出疑问都是荒谬的时候，我们应该记住，在人类思想发展的整个历史过程中充满了这种“明显的真理”现象，经过人类不断增长的知识与理性的检验，这些“真理”不攻自破。例如，几个世纪以来人们认为奴隶制是自然的、合理的、必要的，也是正确的，似乎没有比这更明显、更不容置疑的观点。某些人种“显然”是“天生的奴隶”，而质疑这一观点是不可能的。
Again for more than two thousand
years, it was “impossible to
conceive” the planets as moving
in paths other than circles. The
circle was “obviously” the
perfect figure; and so it was
“natural” and “inevitable” to
suppose that the planets moved
in circles. The age-long struggle
of the greatest intellects in
the world to shake off that
assumption is one of the
marvels of history.
再者，2000多年来人们“不可能想象到”行星的运行轨迹除了正圆以外能有其他运行轨道。而正圆“显然”是完美的图形，因此人们认为行星按正圆轨道运行是“自然的”、“不可避免的”。世界上最伟大的学者们经过长期斗争否定了这一假设，这也是人类历史上的一大奇迹。
It was formerly “obvious” that
the heart—and not the brain—was
the organ of consciousness. To
most people today it seems
equally “obvious” that we think
with our brains. Many modern
persons find it very difficult
to credit the fact that
men can even have supposed
otherwise. Yet—they did.
人们从前“显然”认为心脏——而不是大脑——是意识的器官，而今天多数人同样“显然”认为我们用大脑思考。许多现代人发现很难相信人们曾有过另一种假设。但是——人们的确得出过错误的假设。
That the earth must be flat,
formerly seemed so obvious and
self-evident that the very suggestion
of any other possibility would
have been—and was—regarded as a
joke.
以前人们似乎认为，地球一定是平的这一事实是显而易见且不言自明的，而提出其他种可能的建议会——实际上曾经——被认为是开玩笑。
It was for two thousand years
“taken for granted” as “obvious”
that a heavy weight must
fall faster than a light one.
An assumed or dogmatic
proposition which had been universally
accepted as “obvious;” and
which, when challenged, was
supported by reference to a
dogma of Aristotle. Until
Galileo actually demonstrated the
contrary, nothing could have seemed
more beyond possibility or
doubt.
一个重物体的落地速度一定会比轻物体的落地速度快，2000年来这种观点被认为是“显而易见”且“不容置疑”的。一种假设成教条的观点已作为“明显”的事实被普遍接受，一旦面临挑战，便从亚里士多德的有关教条中获得支持。直到伽利略证明事实与其完全相反，人们才认识到，任何可能性都会存在，都是可以质疑的。
Propositions which are accepted blindly,
without question on the grounds
of mere assumption or dogma,
need to be frankly recognized
as such. Progress in human
thought seems to consist mainly
in getting rid of such
ideas.
我们可以坦率地说，以上所提到的观点都是盲目地不加质疑，仅靠假设或教条的判断而接受的观点。人类的思想进步看来主要在于摒弃这些盲目接受的思想。
Other beliefs are held through
self-interest. Modern psychology leaves
us no room for doubt on
this point. We adopt and cling
to some beliefs because—or
partly because—it “pays” us to
do so. But, as a rule,
the person concerned is about
the last person in the world
to be able to recognize
this in himself. Indeed, he
would probably be highly indignant
if told of what anyone
familiar with modern psychology can
recognize plainly. It would be
quite wrong to attribute all
opinions—even political opinions—to
self-interest. But it would be
equally wrong to deny that this
is one potent factor.
出于自身利益考虑，人们还坚持其他观点，现在心理学对这一点深信不疑。我们之所以接受并且坚持某些观点的原因是——或者部分原因是——这样做对我们“有好处”。不过，在一般情况下出于自身利益持有某种观点的人最不愿承认这一点。的确，如果有人告诉他，熟悉现代心理学的人能够很容易就看出这一点，他可能会暴跳如雷。如果把所有的观点——甚至政治观点——都归结于一己私利，那就大错特错了。但是，否认私利是一个重要而有说服力的因素也是同样错误的。
“Self-interest” is to be understood
first in the ordinary sense,
as referring to a man’s
way of earning his livelihood
and acquiring wealth. But we
may extend the term to
cover also his interest in
social position; popularity with
his fellows; the respect and
goodwill of those whose respect
and goodwill he values. It
covers his interest in his own
career, in whatever prestige he
enjoys as one of the leaders—or
at least as a valued
supporter—of some movement or
institution, some religious body, some
other kind of society or
group. There is many a
man who is unconsciously compelled
to cling to a belief
because he is a “somebody”
in some circle—and if he were
to abandon that belief, he
would find himself nobody at
all.
从一般意义上来说，“自身利益”首先应该被理解为一个人谋生与获取财富的一种方式。然而，“自身利益”这个词的意思可以引申到包括一个人的社会地位，在同事中的声望，以及他所重视的来自他人的尊重与友善。它还可以涉及一个人在事业中的利益，他作为某一运动或机构、某一宗教团体或其他社会团体的领导者之一，或者是至少作为受到重视的支持者所享有的名望。许多人无意识地被迫坚持某种观点，因为他是某个圈子里的“重要人物”——如果他放弃这一观点，就会成为无足轻重的小人物。
Putting it broadly, we should
always suspect any of our
opinions when we recognize that
our happiness depends, directly or
indirectly, upon our continuing
to hold them—when we might lose
anything, material or otherwise,
by changing our opinion.
从广义上说，当我们认识到我们的幸福与否直接地依赖于能否继续坚持自己的观点——当我们改变自己的观点就会失去一切，失去包括物质或其他方面的利益时，我们便应该总是质疑我们的观点了。
Somewhat similar is the acceptance
of an opinion through the
desire—probably not recognized by the
person concerned—to justify his
own nature, his own position,
or his own behaviour. The coward
can so easily adopt a
philosophy which seems to
justify cowardice—though, of course,
“cowardice” is not the name
he gives it! The lazy and
bungling person can adopt a
set of opinions which prove
to his satisfaction that “the
grapes are sour”—the “grapes”
being the rewards that more
energetic and competent men can
win.
另一种类似的情况是有些人出于证明自己的性格、立场或行为的愿望而接受某一种观点，也许当事人不承认这一点。懦夫很容易接受一种似乎要证明怯懦的哲学——当然，“怯懦”不是他起的名称！懒惰又笨拙的人可以接受一套观点来自我满足地证明“葡萄是酸的”——而“葡萄”则是那些更加精明能干的人所能获得的奖赏。
Many groundless opinions are held
through sentimental associations. The
thought is associated with
memories—pleasant or unpleasant as
the case may be—of particular
persons who held similar opinions.
It is found that many a
man who in childhood was hostile
to his father, in after
life is always prejudiced
against whatever opinions his father
used to express. And conversely
in the case of one who
has pleasant recollections of his
father, his mother, a teacher
perhaps, or some other person
who played a big part in
his early life.
许多毫无根据的观点出自于情感方面的联想。思想与记忆相关——美好或痛苦的记忆——这些记忆涉及某些特定的人，他们持着同样的观点。人们发现，许多童年时代对父亲产生敌意的人在以后的生活中对其父亲曾经表达过的一切看法怀有偏见；与之相反，一个对父亲、母亲、老师或者对他的童年有过重大影响的某个人怀有美好记忆的人则会与他们持相同的观点。
In adult life, as we have
often observed, a bitter quarrel
may change a man’s opinion
entirely. Antagonism to a man
usually produces some antagonism
to his opinions; and the
bitterness felt against the man
usually spreads to the idea
for which he stands. What keen
satisfaction we find in
belittling the opinions, or
attacking the opinions, of somebody
of whom we are jealous,
or of somebody against whom we
bear a grudge! But, on
the other hand, it is
equally true that friendly feelings
to a man have an effect
in disposing us to feel
friendly to his views.
正如我们经常能够看到的一样，在成年人生活中大吵一场会完全改变一个人的观点。对一个人怀有敌意常常会导致对他的观点产生抵触，痛恨这个人常常会牵涉到他所表达的想法。倘若我们嫉妒某人，或与他积怨很深的话，我们会从轻视他的想法或者攻击他的观点中获得多么强烈的满足感呀！然而，从另一方面来说，对某个人的友好情感会使我们更容易接受他的观点。
Other opinions again are determined
by what we may best call
Fashion. To take on example:
how largely our opinions on the
merits of certain authors, or
poets, or composers, are dictated
merely by fashion! But the
effect of fashion is very
much wider than that: we trace
it almost everywhere, in every
field of thought. We tend very
strongly to feel and to
believe as others are feeling
and believing. Not all others,
perhaps; but others of our
own set.
此外，其他观点取决于我们最好称之为时尚的东西。例如，我们在多大程度上赞赏某些作者、诗人或作曲家仅仅取决于时尚。不过，时尚的影响远不止这一点：我们在任何地方、任何思想领域都能追寻到时尚的踪迹。我们有一种强烈的愿望来使自己与其他人具有同样的感受，相信同样的观点。也许并不是所有其他人，而是那些与我们属同一类型的人。
But we do not, as a rule,
continue all our lives changing
our sentiments and opinions with
every change of fashion. Sooner
or later our minds become
fixed. Many a man holds
his opinions today—because they
happened to be in fashion
ten, twenty, thirty, forty, or
fifty years ago.
但是，一般来说我们一生中不会随着每次时尚的变化而改变我们的情感与观点，我们的思想迟早会固定化。许多人坚持自己今天的观点——因为碰巧10年、20年、30年、40年或50年前时兴过这些观点。
Once an opinion is accepted,
whatever be the cause of
its acceptance, it has a
strong tendency to persist. Every
time we think along a
particular thought-pattern, makes it
easier for us to think the
same way again. It is
quite legitimate to speak of
“habits” of thought. The “brain
path” becomes so well worn;
the pattern of brain-centres becomes
so well connected up by
continual use, that the never
current finds a route of
practically no resistance, and
so it always takes almost
exactly the same course.
一旦某种观点为人所接受，不论接受它的原因何在，都极易坚持下去。每当我们按照一种特定模式进行思维时，这种模式使我们更易于用同一种方式思考问题。谈到思维“习惯”是完全合乎逻辑的。“思路”变得十分陈旧，神经中枢的模式由于不断使用而相互连接起来，因此，神经流找到了一条实际上没有阻力的路线，便几乎总是走同样的路。
We all know the person who
has a string of stock
anecdotes. We all know too
the person who has certain stock
arguments and opinions which he
expresses, almost in the same
words, whenever he receives the
“cue.” We all know men
and women whose minds work like
gramophones. Put them on to
the “record” about the good
old days; or about prohibition;
or about the wicked capitalist;
or about the lazy and
improvident workers; or about the
country going to the dogs;
or about the modern girl; or
some long, tedious anecdote
about what I said to him,
and what he said to me,
and I said … and he
said … and then I told
him straight…! All we have to
do is to start him
off—and nothing on earth can
stop him—until the “record” has
run out!
我们都认识某位总讲一连串陈旧故事的人。我们也都认识那个一旦收到“暗示”，就几乎总是用同样的话语表达着某些陈腐的观点和看法的人。我们都知道一些大脑工作起来像留声机一样的男子和女人。让他们放关于过去好日子的“录音”，放关于20世纪二三十年代的禁酒时期的录音，关于罪恶的资本家们的录音，关于懒散而又目光短浅的工人们的录音，关于走向衰落的国家，关于时髦的女郎，或是关于我对他说的，他说给我的话，我说……他说……然后我又直接告诉他……这些冗长乏味的陈年琐事……的录音！我们能做的就是让他无休止地说下去——无论什么也无法阻止他——一直到录音全部放完为止！
The same thing is true of
opinions and beliefs of all
kinds. After they have been
held a certain length of time,
they become, as it were,
so stamped in by continual
use that it is almost impossible
now to change them. While
we are young, we are
continually taking in new ideas,
altering our thought-patterns, “making
up our minds” afresh. As we
grow older, we become less
and less able to accept
any new idea which will not
fit in with our existing
thought-pattern. Thus we become,
in James’s term, Old Fogeys.
Sometimes our thought-patterns set
while we are still quite young.
In a few rare cases they
remain open or alterable even
into old age. An Old Fogey
may have become such at
seventeen—or seventy. “I am
almost afraid to say so (says
James), but I believe that
in the majority of human beings
Old Fogeyism begins at about
the age of twenty-five.”
各种观点与观念也是如此。它们在保留了一段时间后，可以说，由于不断使用已深深地印在人们的脑海，几乎无法改变。我们年轻时不断吸收新思想，改变我们的思维模式，并重新“做出决定”。随着年龄增长，我们越来越难以接受与现存的思维模式不一致的任何新思想。因此，用詹姆斯的术语来说，我们变成了老顽固。有时候，我们还年轻时思维模式就已经定型了。有些人的思维模式是开放的，可以改变的，直至年老，但这种情况极为罕见。一个老顽固可能是在17岁或70岁形成的。“我几乎不敢这样说（詹姆斯语），但是，我相信，在大多数人中思想守旧大约从25岁时就开始了。”
Yet when full allowance has been
made for all these non-rational
factors in the determination of
opinion, there remains—not in
all minds, not in most
minds, but in some—a desire to
discover the facts: to think
things out in a clear and
rational way; to get at the
truth at all costs, whatever
it may turn out to be!
For such minds this … is
written.
然而，充分考虑了决定观点的所有这些非理性因素之后，还——并非在所有人思想中，也不是在多数人思想中，而是在某些人思想中——存在着一种发现事实真相的愿望，希望以一种清晰的、理性的方式思考问题，不惜任何代价去探索真理，也不管真理对我们的观点有利还是不利！本文正是为这些人的思想而作。
