装卸准备就绪通知书（NOR）
2011-05-10 16:28阅读：
'Laytime' is the term used to refer to the time
allowed to the charterers to load/discharge cargo in return for
payment of freight to the owners. If the charterers are unable to
load/discharge cargo within this allowed period, they will be
obliged to pay demurrage (liquidated damages for break of contract)
or detention ( unliquidated damages for breach of contract) to
compensate the owners for their loss of use of the vessel.
Naturally, most charter parties contain provisions which suspend
the running of laytime and/or demurrage in certain circumstances as
may have been agreed between the parties. In addition, neither
laytime nor demurrage will run if the loss of time is due to a
breach on the owners’ part.
It
is clearly important to determine when lay
time commences since this is the key to the division of
responsibility for the time spent at the load and/or discharge
port. Most charter parties require the owners to serve a notice of
readiness at load or discharge port stating that the vessel is
ready in all respects for cargo operations. Whilst the owners are
also usually required to serve various approximate and definite
notices of expected arrival at load or discharge port to enable the
charterers to make all necessary arrangement in time, the notice of
readiness constitutes the contractual step which is required to
trigger the commencement of laytime. Due to this, charterparties
usually contain provisions which stipulate a) when notice of
readiness may be contractually served and b) when laytime commences
once notice of readiness has been validly served (often a set
period after tender of the notice of readiness, although
commencement of laytime may be further suspended to make allowance
for weekends and other periods when the port is not
operative).
Requirements for a valid notice of readiness to
be served:
The vessel is an arrived vessel
;
The vessel is ready to receive or discharge the
cargo;
The notice of readiness is tendered to and
received by the proper person according to the charterparty
;
The notice of readiness is tendered in a
contractual way ;
The notice of readiness is tendered at a time
that is allowed by the charterparty.
a)
'Arrived ship'
Notice of readiness cannot be validly served
before the vessel qualifies as an 'arrived ship'. To be an 'arrived
ship', the vessel must have reached the place within the port where
notice of readiness may be served. This place is specified,
expressly or impliedly, by the charter party. Under a
port charter party, the vessel must reach the place
where vessels usually wait within the port unless, of course, she
is able to proceed directly to the load/discharge berth in which
case notice of readiness may be tendered as soon as she enters the
port. Under a berth charter party, the vessel must
reach the nominated load/discharge berth. These basic propositions
may be varied by the inclusion of specific provisions such as
'whether in berth or not' ('WIBON') or 'whether in port or not'
('WIPON'), although the meaning of the latter phrase has not yet
been determined by the Courts.
b)
'WIBON'/'WIPON' provisions
The effect of a 'WIBON' provision on the tender
of notice of readiness under a berth charter party was considered
by the House of Lords in the 'Kyzikos'?. The Kyzikos had been fixed
to carry a cargo of steel and/or steel products from Italy to
Houston. The charter was on the Gencon form and provided, inter
alia, as follows: 'Discharging port or place – 1/2 safe always
afloat, always accessible berth(s) each port …. Time lost in
waiting for berth to count as laytime …. Wipon/Wibon/Wifpon/
Wccon.' The vessel arrived at Houston to discharge. When notice of
readiness was tendered, and at all material times thereafter, the
berth was available. However, the vessel could not proceed to the
berth for three days because fog had closed the pilot station. The
owners argued that, by virtue of the 'WIBON' provision in the
charter party, a valid notice of readiness could be tendered as
soon as the vessel arrived at the customary waiting place within
the port of Houston and that the 'WIBON' provision effectively
converted the charter party into a port charter party. The
charterers argued that, at most, the phrase had the effect of
allowing a valid notice of readiness to be tendered at the
customary waiting place if the nominated berth was unavailable due
to congestion and not if it was available but could not be reached
for some other reason.
The House of Lords conducted an extensive review
of the relevant authorities and observed that the argument that a
'WIBON' provision converted a port charter party into a berth
charter party was based upon the following passage from the
judgement of Roskill L.J. in the 'Joanna Oldendorf'?
:
'The phrase 'whether in berth or not' was
designed to convert a berth charter party into a port charter party
and to ensure that under a berth charter party Notice of Readiness
could be given as soon as the ship had arrived within the
commercial area of the port concerned so that laytime would start
to run on its expiry. It has no proper place in a port charter
party'.
The House of Lords felt, however, that these
observations applied only if no berth was available for the vessel
on her arrival at the port and not if a berth was available but the
vessel was prevented from proceeding to it by bad weather. The long
line of authority on the use of the phrase 'WIBON' in berth charter
parties dealt exclusively with the problem of congestion in ports,
and not with bad weather preventing the vessel from proceeding to a
vacant berth.
On
this basis, The House of Lords held that the phrase had for a long
time been treated as shorthand for 'whether in berth (a berth being
available) or not in berth (a berth not being
available).
As
indicated above, the 'WIPON' provision does not appear to have been
tested in the Courts. It seems reasonable to suppose, nevertheless,
that this will be interpreted in a similar fashion so as to allow
notice of readiness to be tendered as soon as the vessel reaches
the customary waiting place for the port in the case of congestion
within the port even if this is outside port
limits.
c)
'Ready in all respects'
Even if the vessel has reached the place within
the port which is required by the charter party, notice of
readiness cannot be served unless she is also physically and
legally ready in all respects to load or discharge the cargo. It is
possible to accelerate the tender of a valid notice of readiness by
the inclusion of a 'whether customs cleared or not' ('WCCON') or a
'whether in free pratique or not' ('WIFPON')
provision.
Tender of notice of readiness before the vessel
is an arrived ship and/or ready in all
respects.
In
the 'Mexico I'? , the English Court of Appeal
reaffirmed the proposition that a notice of readiness, which is
invalid when tendered because the vessel is not an arrived ship
and/or ready to load or discharge, does not automatically become
valid when these requirements are subsequently
satisfied.
The 'Mexico I' was chartered to carry a part
cargo of 5,000 tonnes of bagged maize to Angola with the owners
retaining the right to complete with other cargo. The maize cargo
was partially overstowed by the owners’ own cargo and 500 tonnes of
alubia beans which they had agreed to carry for the charterers
under a separate contract. The ship arrived at the discharge port
on 20th January and tendered notice of readiness the following day
by telex, although the maize cargo was not totally freed from
overstowed cargo until 1025 hours on 6th February. Discharge of the
maize cargo did not begin until 1435 hours on 19th February. The
owners conceded that the notice of readiness was defective when
tendered, but argued that it automatically triggered laytime when
the ship subsequently became ready to discharge the maize cargo at
1025 hours on 6th February. The Court of Appeal disagreed, holding
that the master should have tendered a fresh, valid notice at that
time to start laytime running, and that an invalid notice of
readiness could not operate as a delayed-action device to trigger
laytime.
The owners also argued that the charterers were
bound to acknowledge that the invalid notice of readiness triggered
laytime as soon as the ship became ready to discharge, because they
had accepted the invalid notice. This argument was based upon the
following alternative propositions:
a)
the charterers had expressly or impliedly surrendered their right
to enforce the strict terms of the contract (waiver);
or
b)
the charterers could not rely on the strict terms of the contract
because these terms had been varied by agreement of the parties, as
evidenced by a mutual course of dealing (variation of contract);
or
c)
the charterers were estopped from enforcing the strict terms of the
contract because both parties had acted in reliance upon a mutually
shared assumption that their legal relationship operated in a
different manner (estoppel by convention).
The Court found that the charterers had initially
accepted the invalid notice of readiness only because they had
relied upon the master’s implied assurance that the ship was ready
to discharge the maize cargo. The Court also found that the
charterers had not expressly or impliedly accepted that laytime
began once the ship was ready to discharge the maize cargo. Thus,
none of the grounds put forward by the owners was established. The
Court did not, however, have to decide when laytime commenced
because the charterers conceded that it had commenced as soon as
discharge commenced. If the charterers had not made this
concession, the Court might have decided that, in the absence of a
fresh valid notice of readiness being tendered by the owners,
laytime had never commenced.
The decision in 'The Mexico I' was applied by the
English Commercial Court in the 'Agamemnon'4. The 'Agamemnon' was
chartered on the Gencon form for a voyage from one good and safe
berth Baton Rouge to one good and safe berth Brisbane. The relevant
terms of the charterparty were as follows:
'Time lost in waiting for berth to count as
loading or discharging time .…' (clause 8);
'If the loading/discharging berth is not
available on vessel’s arrival at or off the port of
loading/discharging or so near thereto as she may be permitted to
approach, the vessel shall be entitled to give notice of readiness
on arrival there with the effect that laytime counts as if she were
in berth and in all respects ready for loading/discharging .…'
(clause 32) and
'Time to count whether in berth or not, whether
notice accepted or not .…' (clause 33)
The master gave notice of readiness at the South
West Pass, which was a customary waiting area for vessels wishing
to enter the Mississippi river to proceed to one of the up river
ports. Baton Rouge has its own anchorage is abut 170 miles from the
South West Pass. The Court of Appeal held that a notice of
readiness given before the vessel arrived at the Baton Rouge
anchorage was not a valid notice and the subsequent arrival of the
vessel at the Baton Rouge anchorage could not validate
it.
Tender of notice of readiness at a
non-contractual time when the vessel is an arrived ship and ready
in all respects
As
indicated above, voyage charter parties frequently provide that
notice of readiness must be tendered within office hours or some
other specified period. It is also common for masters to tender
notice of readiness on arrival even if this means that the notice
of readiness is tendered outside the period specified in the
governing charterparty. In the 'Petr Schmidt'5 the English Court of
Appeal had an opportunity to consider the validity of a notice of
readiness tendered outside the hours stipulated by the charter at a
time when the vessel was ready in all respects and in the place
provided for by the charterparty. The 'Petr Schmidt' was chartered
on an amended Asbatankvoy form charterparty. Clause 30 provided
that 'notice of readiness at loading and discharging port is to be
tendered within 06.00 and 17.00 hrs. local time'. Clause 6 of the
charterparty provided, inter alia, that 'laytime …. shall commence
upon the expiration of six (6) hours after receipt of such notice
or upon the vessel’s arrival in berth .…
whichever first occurs'. The master tendered
notice of readiness at the load port and both discharge ports
outside the period specified in clause 30. On each occasion, the
vessel was an arrived ship and was physically and legally ready to
load or discharge.
The Court of Appeal held that a notice of
readiness which is tendered at a non-contractual time in respect of
a vessel which is an arrived ship and is in all respects ready to
load or discharge is valid. However, the Court also ruled that,
although valid, such a notice of readiness could only become
effective to trigger the commencement of laytime under clause 6 at
the earliest moment it could have been contractually tendered under
clause 30.
Conflict between notice of readiness provisions
and 'reachable on arrival' clauses in berth
charterparties
In
the 'Laura Prima'6, the House of Lords considered the meaning of
the words 'reachable on arrival' in the context of a charterparty
on the Exxonvoy 1969 form. The vessel was chartered for a voyage
from one safe berth in Libya to two safe ports in Italy. The
charterparty provided, inter alia, as follows:
'6. Notice of readiness. Upon arrival at
customary anchorage at each port of loading .… the master .… shall
give the charterer .… notice .… that the vessel is ready to load .…
cargo, berth or no berth, and laytime .… shall commence upon the
expiration of 6 hours after receipt of such notice or upon the
vessel’s arrival in berth whichever first occurs. However, where
delay is caused to vessel getting into berth and after giving
notice of readiness for any reason over which charterers has no
control, such delay shall not count as used
laytime.'
and
'9. Safe berthing – shifting. The vessel shall
load .… any safe place or wharf, or along side vessels .… reachable
on her arrival, which shall be designated and procured by the
Charterer .…'
The vessel arrived at her loading place in Libya
and tendered notice of readiness but was unable to proceed to a
loading berth since all possible berths were occupied by other
vessels. This remained the situation for almost two weeks. The
charterers sought to rely on clause 6 to prevent the running of
laytime on the grounds that the delay in berthing was beyond their
control. The owners countered this argument by pointing out that
the charterers were in breach of clause 9 as they had not procured
a berth which was reachable on arrival of the vessel. The House of
Lords held that clause 9 did prevail over clause 6 and that clause
9 therefore required the charterers to nominate a berth which was
reachable on the vessel’s arrival. If the vessel was unable to
proceed to the berth on arrival charterers were in breach of their
obligations under the charterparty and could not rely on the
exception to laytime contained in clause 6. In delivering his
judgment, Lord Brandon said;
'
'Reachable on arrival' is a well-known phrase and means precisely
what it says. If a berth cannot be reached on arrival, the warranty
is broken unless there is some relevant protecting exception … The
berth is required to have two characteristics: it has to be safe
and it has also to be reachable on arrival.'
'The Laura Prima' was later applied in the 'Sea
Queen'7(berth not reachable due to unavailability of tugs) and the
'Fjordaas'8 (berth unavailable due to bad weather). The fact that
the principle established by the Laura Prima applies when a berth
is not reachable on arrival for any reason and not just congestion
was thus affirmed by these two judgments. This was clearly
demonstrated by London arbitration No. 16/98 (LMLN ). In this case,
the vessel was chartered on an amended Asbatankvoy form
charterparty which contained clauses 6 and 9 which were identical
to those quoted above from the Laura Prima charterparty. Additional
clause 13 also provided as follows:
'Suspension of Running Time Clause: Time shall
not count as laytime, or if on demurrage as demurrage, when spent
or lost: (a) for and on an inward passage moving from anchorage to
first berth, including awaiting tugs, pilot .… until the vessel is
securely moored at the berth .…'
When the vessel arrived at the discharge port on
31st December, the berth to which she had been consigned was
vacant. On the previous day, another vessel chartered by the same
charterers had arrived at the port and they wished her to berth
first for commercial reasons. Bad weather initially prevented the
other vessel from berthing on 31st December and she was unable to
berth as no tugs were available due to holidays until 2nd January.
The other vessel berthed on 2nd January and sailed on 3rd January.
The first vessel then berthed. The Tribunal was asked to consider
if time ran from 31st December or from 2nd January. The charterers
contended that a berth had been available upon arrival and that the
proximate cause preventing berthing was not congestion (as in the
'Laura Prima') but adverse weather and the unavailability of tugs.
The Tribunal held that the 'Laura Prima' applied not only when
congestion meant that the berth was not reachable on arrival but
also when the berth was not reachable on arrival for any other
reason (as in the 'Sea Queen' and the 'Fjordaas'). Accordingly, the
owners’ claim succeeded in full.
装卸准备就绪通知书（NOR）
装/卸准备就绪通知书（Noticeof
Readinese，N.O.R.、NOR或N/R），是船舶到达装/卸港口后，船长代表船舶出租人，向承租人或其代表（通常是港口船舶代理人）递交的、表明该船舶已到达装/卸港，并在必要的船舱、船机、起货机械和吊货工具等所有与装／卸货有关的方面，均做好了准备的书面通知。
有效递接的装/卸准备就绪通知书，是散杂货租船中计算船舶装卸货时间的起算依据，对出租人和承租人合理划分经济利益和责任具有重要意义。通知书的递接，在租船合同中都应详细订明。
显然，如此重要的文件，在递交和接受时，都是由双方的代表完成的。但在实际操作中，由于这样那样的原因，通常情况下船长也好，船舶代理也罢，是得不到租船合同样本的，船长、船代只是从航次指令（Voyage
Instruction）和代理委托（Agency
Apponintment）中的部分相关条款了解通知书的递接条件。出于对各自利益的保护，这样的条款往往与租约当中的相关条款不尽相同，甚至尽可能地朝着对各自有利的方向示明，以免船长或代理在操作过程中损害到雇佣方或委托方的利益。
这样，就会出现一个无奈的局面，船长会在船舶一抵达港口报告线或抛锚后，无论船舶是否真地在各方面都已做好了必要的准备，便在第一时间通过各种可能的方式向港口的船舶代理人递交所谓的装/卸准备就绪通知书，通知书的递交时间通常就是船舶抵锚地的时间，甚至是船舶抵达港界线的时间（Endof Sea
Passage，E.O.S.P.）。而事实上，船舶代理人不可能在船舶联检手续或船舶检疫尚未完成的情况下就接受该通知书，故而该通知书应视为无效通知书。如何使这份无效的通知书不至于完全失去作用？常见的做法是，在订立合同时即明确，“虽然预先递交的装/卸准备就绪通知书无效，但从船舶各方面做好准备后开始自动生效，无须再递交新的装／卸准备就绪通知书”。另外，也可以要求船长每隔一定的时间就递一份NOR，其中必有一份满足条件并生效。
以上是正常情况下的惯例做法，似乎无可厚非。但是结合我国口岸的实际情况，仍然会有操作上的一些问题。
我国口岸从1995年起根据国务院74号令正式取消了国际航线船舶进出口岸的“联检手续”（Joint
Inspection，也称“四方联检”），改为由船舶代理携带相关的手续表格及证书分别到海关、边防、卫检、港监等单位办理船舶进出口手续，“联检手续”一词事实上已经作古。国外来的船舶在国内第一挂港首先要接受船舶卫生检疫，除定期班轮可以在首航次之后办理电讯检疫外，其他船舶尤其是不定期船，都必须在检疫锚地接受检疫后，方可安排靠泊。另外，“三检（商检、卫检、动植检）合一”后，空船的船舶验舱、进口动植物产品的采样检疫等，除个别特殊情况如抢潮水进港外，CIQ（检验检疫局）都要求在锚地进行。若依前所述，此等船舶都要依赖代理的尽早安排和检验检疫机构的及时出检，特别是后者，相对较难控制。例如，遇到恶劣天气，风浪较大，交通船出航困难或锚地待检船舶较多时，就有可能造成船期上的延误。如果船长在并未真正做好装卸货准备的情况下就已递交NOR，以上的延误就有可能使船方在不用承担任何滞期责任的前提下，从容地做好装卸货的准备，从而使出租人免责。
此时，装卸时间的起算，又要因具体情况而异。如果是因为天气原因造成的延误，上述等待的时间就要根据合同具体订明的计算方法执行，通常是双方各承担一半；如果是因为锚地待检船舶较多或港口拥塞，等待的时间就只能由承租人承担了。船舶代理人应严格根据委托的要求接受NOR，并根据实际情况做好装/卸时间事实记录（Laytime
Statement of Facts
SOF），事实记录中船期延误的时段更要清楚无误地注明详细原因，以备日后双方计算装/卸时间时作为依据。由此也能看出船舶代理人工作的责任重大，因为不同的原因会产生不同的计算结果，从而导致不同的利益划分。
--装卸时间起算的条件和递交准备就绪通知书
一般来说，如果租船合同中没有特别的约定，装卸时间的起算需要满足三个条件：（1）船舶必须抵达租船合同中规定的地点；（2）船舶必须在各个方面准备就绪，适合装卸作业；（3）在需要时，船东必须向租船人递交准备就绪通知书。在实践中，船长往往一到港就递交准备就绪通知书，这就产生了一个问题：如果船长给出了一份准备就绪通知书，租船人当时或者以后发现那时候船舶并没有准备就绪，而后来船舶在各个方面都准备好了，就像在The Mexico
1， The Agamemnon， The Petr
Shmidt， Glencore
Grain Limited v. Goldbeam
Shipping Inc.， The Happy
Day
等案中已经发生过的一样，那么，这样的一份准备就绪通知书是否有效？这一直是个争议不休的话题。
在最近的The Happy Day一案中，
Potter大法官重申了普通法对递交准备就绪通知书的要求：“在缺乏合同或习惯的情况下，普遍法并不要求船东对租船人给出卸货准备就绪通知书，然而，在通常需要准备就绪通知书的情况下，通知书的适当内容依租约的条款而定。在缺乏任何特别的附加要求的情况下，应该认为：（i）船舶到达地点（例如，某个特定的港口，区域或泊位），在此地点，按照租约条款，她能递交准备就绪通知书,（ii）船舶准备好履行要求的货物作业。”通常，准备就绪通知书由船长递交给租船人或者他的代理人，船长没有必要在准备就绪通知书上面签字。如果船长没有给予租船人准备就绪通知书，但是能够证明通过别的渠道租船人已经知晓船舶已到达并准备就绪的话，那也没什么大碍，但是在实践中，通常人们不去冒这种风险，船东会要求船长每隔几个小时就向租船人递交一份准备就绪通知书。在形式上，准备就绪通知书可以是口头的，也可以是书面的。也可以用信件、电报、传真、电话、电子邮件等方式给出准备就绪通知书。租约有时会规定在递交过准备就绪通知书之后6个小时、12个小时才开始计算装卸时间，以给租船人一定的准备时间。除非另有约定，租船人可以使用这段时间而不影响装卸时间的开始。
---不成熟准备就绪通知书的困境： The Happy
Day一案
如果准备就绪通知书在船舶尚未准备就绪时发出，那么它是否会在船舶准备就绪时自动生效呢？近年来这一直是个令人关注的问题。过去人们认为，一旦后来船舶准备就绪了，先前的准备就绪通知书就产生效力，装卸时间随之开始，船长并不需要再去递交准备就绪通知书。这一理论源自二十世纪六十年代的The
Massialia一案。在该案中，Diplock法官认为一旦船舶准备就绪的条件得到满足，那么先前的准备就绪通知书就产生效力，就像它“苏醒”了一样。在实践中这种观点流行了近三十年，然而从一开始起，它就受到权威人士的怀疑，在写作第17版Scrutton on
Charterparties时，编辑者McNair爵士和Mocatta法官说他们没能找出Diplock法官所说的“权威观点”源自何处。
1．The Mexico
1一案
一直要到1990年的The Mexico
1一案，这种观点才被上诉法院的Mustill大法官推翻。在该案中，Mexico
1号于1985年1月1日抵港卸货，当天递交了准备就绪通知书，实际上直到2月6日船才准备就绪。在争议中，船东引用了以往的例子，认为只要在2月6日准备就卸，1月1日的准备就绪通知书就开始生效。在上诉法院，Mustill大法官不同意Diplock法官在The
Massialia一案中的观点。首先，他明确指出The
Massialia的先例存在问题，在这一案件之前，并没有任何可以查得到的先例支持这种看法。接着，他指出准备就绪通知书对于卸货非常重要，而不是一份可有可无的文件：“在我看来，合同绝对清晰地规定了必须采取何种步骤以开始装卸时间，并且，我认为不能说采取了错误的步骤可以被视为采取了正确的步骤，在此，今天普遍的做法是双方规定给出准备就绪通知书以触发租船人的义务，他们这么做想必有一些理由。”最后，他指出基于该案的事实，没有发现可以适用弃权、禁反言或者协议修改的地方，租船人的确接受了准备就绪通知书，但这是基于船长通过递交准备就绪通知书默示保证船舶准备就绪的结果，因此这种接受毫无价值，Mustill大法官判决，“除非发生了别的事情”，装卸时间应从卸货作业实际开始之时起算。
The Mexico
1一案确立的规则随后被Thomas法官在The
Agamemnon 一案中采用。The Mexico
1一案的判决船东们带来了巨大的冲击，显然，废弃一个适用了三十年的先例确实给航运实务界带来了很多不便。在最近的几个案件中，船东们和他们的律师一直在提出种种理由试图说服高等法院和上诉法院改变法律规则。
2.The Petr
Shmidt一案
近来的The Petr Shmidt
一案涉及到在工作时间外递交准备就绪通知书的时间引起的争议，从中我们可以发现早发的准备就绪通知书理论的影响。在该案中，租约明确规定装卸时间从租船人收到准备就绪通知书6个小时之后开始计算，另外规定准备就绪通知书应当在当地时间0600时到1700时之间递交给租船人。事实上，船长在装货港当地时间0100时用电报方式递交了准备就绪通知书，在卸货港递交准备就绪通知书则是在当地时间1800时。租船人对此提出异议，他们说准备就绪通知书不是在合同约定的时间内递交的，因而是无效的。最后，上诉法院从整体上解释了合同。法官们认为这种看法不仅与实际相冲突，也会带来荒谬的结果，难道船长一直要等到天明，等到租船人上班了才能递交准备就绪通知书？他们判决，由于在合同约定之外的时间通过电报给出的准备就绪通知书信息会在租船人于次日0600时一开始工作时就被他们收到，因此这两份准备就绪通知书就相当于在次日0600时递交给了租船人，准备就绪通知书的效力不因它们的发出时间而受影响。
2．Glencore Grain
Limited v. Goldbeam Shipping
Inc.一案
在随后的Glencore Grain Limited v. Goldbeam Shipping
Inc.一案中，Moore-Bick法官则坚持认为准备就绪通知书不可或缺：“广为人知的是，在这种租约下，准备就绪通知书是为了开始计算装卸时间而给出的，而不仅是提供给租船人那些在大多数情况下他们已经知道的信息，这样，给出准备就绪通知书就代表了分配装卸作业延误风险的约定机制中的一个基本步骤。这类步骤在合同履行中是否是基本的步骤，应视双方的约定而言，如果双方规定必须给出一份通知书以便使合同中别的条款进入运作，那么我怀疑根据诸如此类的准备就绪通知书无益（futility）的理由，它能否被省略掉。”
影响更大的是最近由上诉法院刚刚判决的The Happy
Day一案。
3． The Happy
Day一案
在该案中， Happy
Day号载了二万三千吨小麦，在一份经过修正的泊位租约下，从奥德萨到科琴卸货，1998年9月25日1630时她到达港口外面，由于错过大潮她未能立即进入港口，船长当时递交了准备就绪通知书，趁着次日的早潮她进入港口并在1315时靠泊，船长没有另外给出准备就绪通知书，卸货从9月29日0800时开始。争议在于：（1）是否必须提交一份有效的准备就绪通知书？（2）如果是的话，那么装卸时间从什么时候开始？仲裁人认为租船人有责任就他们对一份无效的准备就绪通知书做出的保留或拒绝进行举证。在高等法院，Langley法官引用了Mustill大法官在The Mexico
1一案中的判决：“在给出准备就绪通知书之后，除非发生了别的事情，否则一份无效的准备就绪通知书不能自动变得有效，装卸时间应从实际装卸时开始”，他判决除非船长给出一份有效的准备就绪通知书，否则装卸时间根本不开始计算，船东不仅得不到滞期费，还要给租船人速遣费。这一判决立即遭到了普遍的反对和批评。在上诉法院，同样是基于对The Mexico
1一案的判决的理解，Potter大法官得出了完全相反的结论。他在判决书中宣布协议修改、弃权和禁反言原则，可能适用于目前这种情况。
禁反言和弃权是英国合同法中的两个重要概念，最早源自衡平法(equity)。禁反言的作用在于当某人作出某种表示（representation）、行为（conduct）、或者承诺（promise）后，法律禁止他对这些表示、行为、或者承诺加以反悔，以保护那些对他的表示、行为、或者承诺产生信赖利益的他人。 禁反言的效果就像一份合同的效果一样，它使得某人被自己说过的话所约束，而不能随便反悔。一般认为，要构成禁反言，必须能够证明：（1）该说明含有对事实的陈述；（2）陈述者意图使该陈述被依赖；（3）声称禁反言的一方在事实上依赖了该陈述并对其造成了损害。在判决书的另一处，Potter大法官指出：“协议禁反言的效果是排除一方对假定的事实或法律的否认，如果允许他们违背这一假定会带来不公平的话，适用这一理论，需要存在基于同一个双方同意的假定之上的某种双方明示行为。”
弃权原则涉及到一方对合同权利的明确放弃。如果合同一方知晓另一方违约或意欲违约，却作出某种明确的行为表示他不加反对或者同意时，那么他可能构成弃权，从而导致他暂时地或者永久地丧失原有的某项合同权利。Potter大法官认为没有证据表明可以在本案中适用禁反言理论。不过，在判决书的附论部分，他特别提到在某些情况下，协议修改和禁反言理论可能适用于类似争议。最后，Potter大法官指出，根据仲裁人发现的事实情况，租船人或者收货人既没有明确地对那份无效的准备就绪通知书提出拒绝，又没有明确地提出保留，也没有要求船长在装卸时间开始之前再提交一份准备就绪通知书，因此，这里“发生了别的事情”，当卸货作业开始时，租船人已经放弃了这一权利（即要求一份有效的准备就绪通知书），装卸时间应从实际卸货作业开始时起算，他判决船东胜诉，Arden大法官和Denis
Henry爵士完全同意他的看法。
尽管在处理因递交准备就绪通知书而产生的争议时，The Mexico 1
一案仍然是最为重要的、决定性的判例。但是，比起The Petr
Shmidt一案，在The Happy
Day一案中法院更进了一步。可以说，在The Happy
Day一案中船东获得了更为有利的法律地位。在该案中适用弃权原则的效果是使得租船人在接收准备就绪通知书时，如果他对船舶到达或者准备就绪存有疑问的话，他必须明确地对准备就绪通知书提出保留、加以拒绝或者要求船长再给他一份准备就绪通知书，否则装卸作业一旦开始，他就不能声称准备就绪通知书的效力影响装卸时间的起算了，因为从那时起他已经放弃了对一份无效的准备就绪通知书的信赖，这就像一份有效的准备就绪通知书已经在那时给出一样。
