美学经典选读1-3：《理想国》卷十（2）
2014-04-02 04:58阅读：
Yes, he said.
格：是的，我已经注意过了。
They are like faces which were
never really beautiful, but only blooming【妙龄，花季】; and now the bloom
of youth has passed away from them?
苏：它们就像一些并非生得真美，只是因为年轻而显得好看的面孔，如今青春一过，容华尽失似的。
Exactly.
格：的确象这样。
Here is another point: The
imitator or maker of the image knows nothing of true existence; he
knows appearances only. Am I not right?
苏：请再考虑下面这个问题：影像的创造者，亦即模仿者，我们说是全然不知实在而只知事物外表的。是这样吗？
Yes.
格：是的。
Then let us have a clear understanding, and not be
satisfied with half an explanation.
苏：让我们把这个问题说全了，不要半途而废。
Proceed.
格：请继续说下去。
Of the painter we say that he will
paint reins【缰绳】, and he will paint a
bit【马嚼子】?
苏：我们说，画家能画马缰和嚼子吧？
Yes.
格：对。
And the worker in leather and brass【黄铜】will make
them?
苏：但是，能制造这些东西的是皮匠和铜匠吧？
Certainly.
格：当然。
But does the painter know the right form of the bit and
reins? Nay, hardly even the workers in brass and leather who make
them; only the horseman【骑手】who knows how to use them—he knows their
right form.
苏：画家知道缰绳和嚼子应当是怎样的吗？或许，甚至制造这些东西的皮鞋和铜匠本也不知道，而只有懂得使用这些东西的骑者才知道这一点吧？
Yes.
格：完全正确。
And the excellence or beauty or truth of every
structure, animate or inanimate, and of every action of man, is
relative to the use for which nature or the artist has intended
them.
苏：于是一切器具、生物和行为的至善、美与正确不都只与使用——作为人与自然创造一切的目的——有关吗？
True.
格：是这样。
Then the user of them must have the greatest experience
of them, and he must indicate to the maker the good or bad
qualities which develop themselves in use; for example, the
flute-player will tell the flute-maker which of his flutes is
satisfactory to the performer; he will tell him how he ought to
make them, and the other will attend to his
instructions?
苏：因此，完全必然的是：任何事物的使用者乃是对它最有经验的，使用者把使用中看到的该事物的性能好坏通报给制造者。例如吹奏长笛的人报告制造长笛的人，各种长笛在演奏中表现出来的性能如何，并吩咐制造怎样的一种，制造者则按照他的吩咐去制造。
Of course.
格：当然。
The one knows and therefore speaks with authority
about the goodness and badness of flutes, while the other,
confiding in【信赖】him, will do what he is told by
him?
苏：于是，一种人知道并报告关于笛子的优劣，另一种人信任他，照他的要求去制造。
True.
格：是的。
The instrument is the same【乐器是同一种乐器】, but about the
excellence or badness of it the maker will only attain to【获得】a
correct belief; and this he will gain from him who knows, by
talking to him and being compelled【迫不得已】to hear what he has to say,
whereas the user will have knowledge?
苏：因此，制造者对这种乐器的优劣能有正确的信念（这是在和对乐器有真知的人交流中，在不得不听从他的意见时的信念），而使用者对它则能有知识。
True.
格：的确是的。
But will the imitator have either? Will he know from
use whether or not his drawing is correct or beautiful? Or will he
have right opinion from being compelled to associate with another
who knows and gives him instructions about what he should
draw?
苏：模仿者关于自己描画的事物之是否美与正确，能有从经验与使用中得来的真知吗？或者他能有在与有真知的人不可少的交往中因听从了后者关于正确制造的要求之后得到的正确意见吗？
Neither.
格：都不能有。
Then he will no more have true opinion than he will
have knowledge about the goodness or badness of his
imitations?
苏：那么，模仿者关于自己模仿得优还是劣，就既无知识也无正确意见了。
I suppose not.
格：显然是的。
The imitative artist will be in a brilliant state of
intelligence about his own creations?
苏：因此诗人作为一种模仿者，关于他所创作的东西的智慧是最美的了。
Nay, very much the reverse【恰恰相反】.
格：一点也不是。
And still he will go on imitating without knowing what
makes a thing good or bad, and may be expected therefore to imitate
only that which appears to be good to the ignorant
multitude【无知的大众】?
苏：他尽管不知道自己创作的东西是优是劣，他还是照样继续模仿下去。看来，他所模仿的东西对于一无所知的群众来说还是显得美的。
Just so.
格：还能不是这样吗？
Thus far then we are pretty well agreed that the
imitator has no knowledge worth mentioning of what he imitates.
Imitation is only a kind of play or sport, and the tragic poets,
whether they write in Iambic【短长格】or in
Heroic verse,18 are imitators in the highest
degree?
苏：看来我们已经充分地取得了如下的一致意见：模仿者对于自己模仿的东西没有什么值得一提的知识。模仿只是一种游戏，是不能当真的。想当悲剧作家的诗人，不论是用抑扬格还是用史诗格写作的，尤其都只能是模仿者。
Very true.
格：一定是的。
,
And now tell me, I conjure【恳求】you, has not imitation
been shown by us to be concerned with that which is thrice removed
from the truth【我们呈现的这种模仿品，不是与真实隔着三层的那种东西习惯吗】?
苏：说实在的，模仿不是和隔真理两层的第三级事物相关的吗？
Certainly.
格：是的。
And what is the faculty【力量，本事】in man to which
imitation is addressed?
苏：又，模仿是人的哪一部分的能力？
What do you mean?
格：我不明白你的意思。
I will explain: The body which is large when seen near
appears small when seen at a distance?
苏：我的意思是说：一个同样大小的东西远看和近看在人的眼睛里显得不一样大。
True.
格：是不一样大的。
And the same objects appear straight when looked at out
of the water, and crooked when in the water; and the
concave【凹】becomes convex【凸】, owing to the illusion about colors to
which the sight is liable. Thus every sort of confusion is
revealed【呈现】within us; and this is that weakness of the human mind
on which the art of conjuring【戏法】and of deceiving by light and
shadow and other ingenious devices imposes, having an effect upon
us like magic.
苏：同一事物在水里看和不在水里看曲直是不同的。由于同样的视觉错误同一事物外表面的凹凸看起来也是不同的。并且显然，我们的心灵里有种种诸如此类的混乱。绘画所以能发挥其魅力正是利用了我们天性中的这一弱点，魔术师和许多别的诸如此类的艺人也是利用了我们的这一弱点。
True.
格：真的。
And the arts of measuring and numbering and weighing
come to the rescue of the human understanding—there is the beauty
of them—and the apparent greater or less, or more or heavier, no
longer have the mastery over us, but give way before calculation
and measure and weight?
苏：量、数和称不是已被证明为对这些弱点的最幸福的补救行为吗？它们不是可以帮助克服“好像多或”，“好像大或小”和“好像轻或重”对我们心灵的主宰，代之以数过的数、量过的大小和称过的轻重的主宰的吗？
Most true.
格：当然。
And this, surely, must be the work of
the calculating and rational principle in the
soul?
苏：这些计量活动是心灵理性部分的工作。
To be sure.
格：是这个部分的工作。
And when this principle measures and certifies【证明】that
some things are equal, or that some are greater or less than
others, there occurs an apparent
contradiction【似是而非的矛盾】?
苏：但是，当它计量了并指出了某些事物比别的事物“大些”或“小些”或“相等”时，常常又同时看上去好像相反。
True.
格：是的。
Then that part of the soul which has an opinion
contrary to measure is not the same with that which has an opinion
in accordance with measure?
苏：但是我们不是说过吗：我们的同一部分对同一事物同时持相反的两种看法是不能容许的？
True.
格：我们的话是对的。
And the better part of the soul is likely to be that
which trusts to measure and calculation?
苏：心灵的那个与计量有相反意见的部分，和那个与计量一致的部分不可能是同一个部分。
Certainly.
格：当然不能是。
And that which is opposed to them is one of the
inferior principles of the soul?
苏：信赖度量与计算的那个部分应是心灵的最善部分。
No doubt.
格：一定是的。
This was the conclusion at which I was seeking to
arrive when I said that painting or drawing, and imitation in
general, when doing their own proper work, are far removed from
truth【与真实相去甚远】, and the companions and friends and associates of a
principle within us which is equally removed from reason, and that
they have no true or healthy aim.
苏：因此与之相反的那个部分应属于我们心灵的低贱部分。
格：必然的。
苏：因此这就是我们当初说下面这些话时想取得一致的结论。我们当初曾说，绘画以及一般的模仿艺术，在进行自己的工作时是在创造远离真实的作品，是在和我们心灵里的那个远离理性的部分交往，不以健康与真理为目的地在向它学习。
Exactly.
格：一定是的。
The imitative art is an inferior who marries an
inferior, and has inferior offspring.
苏：因此，模仿术乃是低贱的父母所生的低贱的孩子。
Very true.
格：看来是的。
And is this confined to the sight only, or does it
extend to the hearing also, relating in fact to what we term
poetry?
苏：这个道理只适用于眼睛看的事物呢，还是也适用于耳朵听的事物，适用于我们所称的诗歌呢？
Probably the same would be true
of poetry.
格：大概也适用于听方面的事物。
Do not rely, I said, on a
probability derived from the analogy【类比】of painting; but let us
examine further and see whether the faculty with which poetical
imitation is concerned is good or bad.
苏：让我们别只相信根据绘画而得出的“大概”，让我们来接着考察一下从事模仿的诗歌所打动的那个心灵部分，看这是心灵的低贱部分还是高贵部分。
By all means【无论如何也该这么办】.
格：必须这样。
We may state the question thus:—Imitation imitates the
actions of men, whether voluntary or involuntary【自主或者不自主的】, on
which, as they imagine, a good
or【16】bad
result has ensued【由此而生】, and they rejoice or sorrow accordingly. Is
there anything more?
苏：那么让我们这么说吧：诗的模仿术模仿行为着——或被迫或自愿地——的人，以及，作为这些行为的后果，他们交了好运或恶运（设想的），并感受到了苦或乐。除此而外还有什么别的吗？
No, there is nothing else.
格：别无其它了。
But in all this variety of circumstances is the man at
unity with himself—or rather, as in the instance of sight there was
confusion and opposition in his opinions about the same things so
here also is there not strife and inconsistency in his life? Though
I need hardly raise the question again, for I remember that all
this has been already admitted; and the soul has been acknowledged
by us to be full of these and ten thousand similar oppositions
occurring at the same moment?
苏：在所有这些感受里，人的心灵是统一的呢，或者还是，正如在看的方面，对同一的事物一个人自身内能在同时有分歧和相反的意见那样，在行为方面一个人内部也是能有分裂和自我冲突的呢？不过我想起来了：在这一点上我们现在没有必要再寻求一致了。因为前面讨论时我们已经充分地取得了一致意见：我们的心灵在任何时候都是充满无数这类冲突的。
And we were right, he said.
格：对。
Yes, I said, thus far we were right; but there was an
omission【遗漏】which must now be supplied.
苏：对是对。不过，那时说漏了的，我想现在必须提出来了。
What was the omission?
格：漏了什么？
Were we not saying that a good man, who has the
misfortune【厄运】to lose his son or anything else which is most dear
to him, will bear the loss with? more equanimity【镇静】 than
another?
苏：一个优秀的人物，当他不幸交上了恶运，诸如丧了儿子或别的什么心爱的东西时，我们前面不是说过吗，他会比别人容易忍受得住的。
Yes.
格：无疑的。
But will he have no sorrow, or shall we say that
although he cannot help sorrowing, he will moderate【节制】his
sorrow?
苏：现在让我们来考虑这样一个问题：这是因为他不觉得痛苦呢，还是说，他不可能不觉得痛苦，只是因为他对痛苦能有某种节制呢？
The latter, he said, is the truer
statement.
格：后一说比较正确。
Tell me: will he be more likely to struggle and hold
out against his sorrow when he is seen by his equals【同样的人】, or when
he is alone?
苏：关于他，现在我请问你这样一个问题：你认为他在哪一种场合更倾向于克制自己的悲痛呢，是当着别人的面还是在独处的时候？
It will make a great difference whether he is seen or
not.
格：在别人面前他克制得多。
When he is by himself he will not mind saying or doing
many things which he would be ashamed of any one hearing or seeing
him do?
苏：但是当他独处时，我想，他就会让自己说出许多怕被人听到的话，做出许多不愿被别人看到的事来的。
True.
格：是这样的。
There is a principle of law and reason in him which
bids【命令】him resist, as well as a feeling of his misfortune which is
forcing him to indulge【放纵】his sorrow?
苏：促使他克制的是理性与法律，怂恿他对悲伤让步的是纯情感本身。不是吗？
True.
格：是的。
But when a man is drawn in the opposite directions, to
and from the same object, this, as we affirm【证实】, necessarily
implies two distinct principles in him?
苏：在一个人身上同时关于同一事物有两种相反的势力表现出来，我们认为这表明，他身上必定存在着两种成分。
Certainly.
格：当然是的。
One of them is ready to follow the guidance of the
law?
苏：其中之一准备在法律指导它的时候听从法律的指引。不是吗？
How do you mean?
格：请作进一步的申述。
The law would say that to be patient【忍耐】under suffering
is best, and that we should not give way to impatience【不耐烦】, as
there is no knowing whether such things are good or evil; and
nothing is gained by impatience; also, because no human thing is of
serious importance, and grief stands in the way of that which at
the moment is most required.
苏：法律会以某种方式告知：遇到不幸时尽可能保持冷静而不急躁诉苦，是最善的。因为，这类事情的好坏是不得而知的；不作克制也无补于事；人世生活中的事本也没有什么值得太重视的；何况悲痛也只能妨碍我们在这种情况下尽可能快地取得我们所需要的帮助呢！
What is most required? he asked.
格：你指的什么帮助呢？
That we should take counsel【咨询】about what has happened,
and when the dice【骰子】 have been thrown order our affairs in the way
which reason deems【断定】best; not, like children who have had a fall,
keeping hold of the part struck and wasting time in setting up a
howl【嚎叫】, but always accustoming the soul forthwith【即刻】to apply a
remedy, raising up that which is sickly and fallen,
banishing【消除】the cry of sorrow by the healing
art.
苏：周密地思考所发生的事情呀！就像在（掷骰子时）骰子落下后决定对掷出的点数怎么办那样，根据理性的指示决定下一步的行动应该是最善之道。我们一定不能像小
孩子受了伤那样，在啼哭中浪费时间，而不去训练自己心灵养成习惯：尽快地设法治伤救死，以求消除痛苦。
Yes, he said, that is the true way of meeting the
attacks of fortune.
格：这的确是面临不幸时处置不幸的最善之道。
Yes, I said; and the higher principle is ready to
follow this suggestion of reason?
苏：因此我们说，我们的最善部分是愿意遵从理性指导的。
Clearly.
格：显然是的。
And the other principle, which inclines us to
recollection of our troubles and to lamentation【悲悼】, and can never
have enough of them, we may call irrational, useless, and
cowardly?
苏：因此，我们不是也要说，一味引导我们回忆受苦和只知悲叹而不能充分地得到那种帮助的那个部分，是我们的无理性的无益的部分，是懦弱的伙伴？
Indeed, we may.
格：是的，我们应该这么说。
And does not the latter—I mean the
rebellious【反叛的】principle—furnish a great variety of materials for
imitation? whereas the wise and calm temperament【气质，秉性】, being
always nearly equable, is not easy to imitate or to appreciate when
imitated, especially at a public festival when a
promiscuous【杂乱的】crowd is assembled in a theatre. For the feeling
represented is one to which they are strangers.
苏：因此，我们的那个不冷静的部分给模仿提供了大量各式各样的材料。而那个理智的平静的精神状态，因为它几乎是永远不变的，所以是不容易模仿的，模仿起来也是不容易看懂的，尤其不是涌到剧场里来的那一大群杂七杂八的人所容易了解的。因为被模仿的是一种他们所不熟悉的感情。
Certainly.
格：一定的。
Then the imitative poet who aims at being popular is
not by nature made【就其天性而言】, nor is his art intended, to please or
to affect the rational principle in the soul; but he will prefer
the passionate and fitful temper, which is easily
imitated?
苏：很显然，从事模仿的诗人本质上不是模仿心灵的这个善的部分的，他的技巧也不是为了让这个部分高兴的，如果他要赢得广大观众好评的话。他本质上是和暴躁的多变的性格联系的，因为这容易模仿。
Clearly.
格：这是很明显的。
And now we may fairly take him and place him by the side of
the painter, for he is like him in two ways: first, inasmuch as his
creations have an inferior degree of truth—in this, I say, he
is【17】like him;
and he is also like him in being concerned with an inferior part
of the soul; and therefore we shall be right in refusing to admit
him into a well-ordered State, because he awakens and nourishes and
strengthens the feelings and impairs【损害】the reason. As in a city
when the evil are permitted to have authority and the good are put
out of the way, so in the soul of man, as we maintain, the
imitative poet implants【植入】an evil constitution, for he indulges
the irrational nature which has no discernment【洞察力】of greater and
less, but thinks the same thing at one time great and at another
small —he is a manufacturer of images and is very far removed from
the truth.
苏：到此，我们已经可以把诗人捉住，把他和画家放在并排了。这是很公正的。因为像画家一样，诗人的创作是真实性很低的；因为像画家一样，他的创作是和心灵的低贱部分打交道的。因此我们完全有理由拒绝让诗人进入治理良好的城邦。因为他的作用在于激励、培育和加强心灵的低贱部分毁坏理性部分，就像在一个城邦里把政治权力交给坏人，让他们去危害好人一样。我们同样要说，模仿的诗人还在每个人的心灵里建立起一个恶的政治制度，通过制造一个远离真实的影像，通过讨好那个不能辨别大和小，把同一事物一会儿说大一会儿又说小的无理性部分。
Exactly.
格：确实是的。
But we have not yet brought forward the
heaviest count in our accusation:—the power which poetry has of
harming even the good (and there are very few who are not harmed),
is surely an awful thing?
苏：但是，我们还没有控告诗歌的最大罪状呢。它甚至有一种能腐蚀最优秀人物（很少例外）的力量呢。这是很可怕的。
Yes, certainly, if the effect is what you say.
格：如果它真有这样的力量，确是很可怕的。
Hear and judge: The best of us, as I conceive, when we
listen to a passage of Homer, or one of the tragedians, in which he
represents some pitiful hero who is drawling out his sorrows in a
long oration, or weeping, and smiting【捶打】his breast—the best of us,
you know, delight in giving way to sympathy, and are in
raptures【狂喜】at the excellence of the poet who stirs our feelings
most.
苏：请听我说。当我们听荷马或某一悲剧诗人模仿某一英雄受苦，长时间地悲叹或吟唱，捶打自己的胸膛，你知道，这时即使是我们中的最优秀人物也会喜欢它，同情地热切地听着，听入了迷的。我们会称赞一个能用这种手段最有力地打动我们情感的诗人是一个优秀的诗人的。
Yes, of course I know.
格：我知道，是这样的。
But when any sorrow of our own happens to us, then you
may observe that we pride ourselves on the opposite quality—we
would fain【乐意】be quiet and patient; this is the manly part, and the
other which delighted us in the recitation【背诵】is now deemed to be
the part of a woman【Plato and his society were undoubtedly
patriarchal】.
苏：然而，当我们在自己的生活中遇到了不幸时，你也知道，我们就会反过来，以能忍耐能保持平静而自豪，相信这才是一个男子汉的品行，相信过去在剧场上所称道的那种行为乃是一种妇道人家的行为。
Very true, he said.
格：是的，我也知道这个。
Now can we be right in praising and
admiring another who is doing that which any one of us would
abominate【憎恶】and be ashamed of in his own
person?
苏：那么，当我们看着舞台上的那种性格——我们羞于看到自己像那样的，——而称赞时，你认为这种称赞真的正确吗？我们喜欢并称赞这种性格而不厌恶它，这样做是有道理的吗？
No, he said, that is certainly
not reasonable.
格：说真的，看来没有道理。
Nay, I said, quite reasonable from one point of view.
苏：特别是假如你这样来思考这个问题的话。
What point of view?
格：怎样思考？
If you consider, I said that when in misfortune we feel
a natural hunger and desire to relieve our sorrow by weeping and
lamentation, and that this feeling which is kept under control in
our own calamities【灾祸】is satisfied and delighted by the poets; —
the better nature in each of us, not having been sufficiently
trained by reason or habit, allows the sympathetic element to break
loose【不受约束】because the sorrow is another's; and the spectator
fancies that there can be no disgrace to himself in praising and
pitying any one who comes telling him what a good man he is, and
making a fuss about his troubles; he thinks that the pleasure is a
gain, and why should he be supercilious【骄傲】and lose this and the
poem too? Few persons ever reflect, as I should imagine, that from
the evil of other men something of evil is communicated to
themselves, And so the feeling of sorrow which has gathered
strength at the sight of the misfortunes of others is with
difficulty repressed in our own.
苏：你请作如下的思考。舞台演出时诗人是在满足和迎合我们心灵的那个（在我们自己遭到不幸时被强行压抑的，）本性渴望痛哭流涕以求发泄的部分。而我们天性最优秀的那个部分，因未能受到理性甚或习惯应有的教育，放松了对哭诉的监督。理由是：它是在看别人的苦难，而赞美和怜悯别人——一个宣扬自己的美德而又表演出极端苦痛的人——是没什么可耻的。此外，它认为自己得到的这个快乐全然是好事，它是一定不会同意因反对全部的诗歌而让这种快乐一起失去的。因为没有多少人能想到，替别人设身处地的感受将不可避免地影响我们为自己的感受，在那种场合养肥了的怜悯之情，
到了我们自己受苦时就不容易被制服了。
How very true!
格：极为正确。
And does not the same hold also of the ridiculous?
There are jests【玩笑】which you would be ashamed to make yourself, and
yet on the comic stage, or indeed in private, when you hear them
you are greatly amused by them, and are not at all disgusted at
their unseemliness【不得体】;—the case of pity【不妥之事】is repeated;—there
is a principle in human nature which is disposed to【倾向于】raise a
laugh, and this which you once restrained by reason, because you
were afraid of being thought a buffoon【傻瓜】, is now let out again;
and having stimulated the risible【可笑的】faculty at the theater, you
are betrayed unconsciously to yourself into playing the comic poet
at home.
苏：关于怜悯的这个论证法不也适用于喜剧的笑吗？虽然你自己本来是羞于插科打诨的，但是在观看喜剧表演甚或在日常谈话中听到滑稽笑话时，你不会嫌它粗俗反而觉得非常快乐。这和怜悯别人的苦难不是一回事吗？因为这里同样地，你的理性由于担心你被人家看作小丑，因而在你跃跃欲试时克制了的你的那个说笑本能，在剧场上你任其自便了，它的面皮愈磨愈厚了。于是你自己也不知不觉地在私人生活中成了一个爱插科打诨的人了。
And the same maybe said of lust and anger and all the
other affections, of desire and pain and pleasure, which are held
to be inseparable from every action—in all of them poetry feeds and
waters the passions instead of drying them up; she lets them rule,
although they ought to be controlled, if mankind are ever to
increase in happiness and virtue.
苏：爱情和愤怒，以及心灵的其它各种欲望和苦乐——我们说它们是和我们的一切行动同在的——诗歌在模仿这些情感时对我们所起的作用也是这样的。在我们应当让这些情感干枯而死时诗歌却给它们浇水施肥。在我们应当统治它们，以便我们可以生活得更美好更幸福而不是更坏更可悲时，诗歌却让它们确立起了对我们的统治。
I cannot deny it.
格：我没有异议。
Therefore, Glaucon, I said, whenever you meet with any
of the eulogists【赞颂者】 of Homer declaring that he has been the
educator of Hellas【the classical name for
Greece】, and that he is profitable for education and
for the ordering of human things, and that you should take him up
again and again and get to know him and regulate your whole life
according to him, we may love and honor those who say these
things—they are excellent people, as far as their lights extend;
and we are ready to acknowledge that Homer is the greatest of poets
and first of tragedy writers; but we must remain firm in our
conviction【信念】that hymns【颂词】 to the gods and praises of famous men
are the only poetry which ought to be admitted into our State. For
if you go beyond this and allow the honeyed muse to enter, either
in epic or lyric verse, not law and the reason of mankind, which by
common consent have ever been deemed best, but pleasure and pain
will be the rulers in our State.
苏：因此，格劳孔啊，当你遇见赞颂荷马的人，听到他们说荷马是希腊的教育者，在管理人们生活和教育方面，我们应当学习他，我们应当按照他的教导来安排我们的全部生活，这时，你必须爱护和尊重说这种话的人。因为他们的认识水平就这么高。你还得对他们承认，荷马确是最高明的诗人和第一个悲剧家。但是你自己应当知道，实际上我们是只许可歌颂神明的赞美好人的颂诗进入我们城邦的。如果你越过了这个界限，放进了甜蜜的抒情诗和史诗，那时快乐和痛苦就要代替公认为至善之道的法律和理性原则成为你们的统治者了。
That is most true, he said.
格：极其正确。
And now since we have reverted to【重新回到】the subject of
poetry, let this our defense serve to show the reasonableness of
our former judgment in sending away out of our State an art having
the tendencies which we have described; for reason
constrained【迫使】us. But that she may not impute to us any
harshness【粗鄙无礼】or want【缺乏】of politeness, let us tell her that there
is an ancient quarrel between philosophy and poetry; of which
there are many proofs, such as the saying of 'the yelping hound
howling at her lord,' or of one 'mighty in the vain talk of fools,'
and 'the mob of sages circumventing Zeus,' and the 'subtle thinkers
who are beggars after all'; and there are innumerable other signs
of ancient enmity【敌意】between them. Not withstanding this, let us
assure【保证】our sweet friend and the sister arts of imitation, that
if she will only prove her title to exist in a well-ordered State
we shall be delighted to receive her—we are very conscious of her
charms; but we may not on that account betray the truth. I dare
say, Glaucon, that you are as much charmed by her as I am,
especially when she appears in Homer?
苏：到此，让我们结束重新讨论诗歌以及进一步申述理由的工作吧。我们的申述是：既然诗的特点是这样，我们当初把诗逐出我们国家的确是有充分理由的。是论证的结果要求我们这样做的。为了防止它怪我们简单粗暴，让我们再告诉它，哲学和诗歌的争吵是古已有之的。例如，什么“对着主人狂吠的爱叫的狗”；什么“痴人瞎扯中的大人物”；什么“统治饱学之士的群盲”；什么“缜密地思考自己贫穷的人”，以及无数其它的说法都是这方面的证据。然而我们仍然申明：如果为娱乐而写作的诗歌和戏剧能有理由证明，任一个管理良好的城邦里是需要它们的，我们会很高兴接纳它。因为我们自己也能感觉到它对我们的诱惑力。但是背弃看来是真理的东西是有罪的。我的朋友，你说是这样吗？你自己没有感觉到它的诱惑力吗，尤其是当荷马本人在进行蛊惑你的时
候？
Yes, indeed, I am greatly charmed.
格：的确是的。
Shall I propose, then, that she be
allowed to return from exile, but upon this condition only— that
she make a defense of herself in lyrical or some other meter?
苏：那么，当诗已经申辩了自己的理由，或用抒情诗格或用别的什么格律——它可以公正地从流放中回来吗？
格：当然可以。
And we may further grant to those of her defenders who
are lovers of poetry and yet not poets the permission to speak in
prose on her behalf: let them show not only that she is pleasant
but also useful to States and to human life, and we will listen in
a kindly spirit; for if this can be proved we shall surely be the
gainers—I mean, if there is a use in poetry as well as a delight?
苏：我们大概也要许可诗的拥护者——他们自己不是诗人只是诗的爱好者——用无韵的散文申述理由，说明诗歌不仅是令人愉快的，而且是对有秩序的管理和人们的全部生活有益的。我们也要善意地倾听他们的辩护，因为，如果他们能说明诗歌不仅能令人愉快而且也有益，我们就可以清楚地知道诗于我们是有利的了。
Certainly, he said, we shall be
the gainers.
格：我们怎样才能有利呢？
If her defense fails, then, my dear friend, like other
persons who are enamored of 【醉心于】something, but put a restraint
upon themselves when they think their desires are opposed to their
interests, so too must we after the manner of lovers give her love
of poetry which the education of noble States has implanted in us,
and therefore we would have her appear at her best and truest; but
so long as she is unable to make good her defense, this argument
of ours shall be a charm to us, which we will repeat to ourselves
while we listen to her strains【音乐】; that we may not fall away into
the childish love of her which captivates【俘虏】the many. At all
events we are well aware that poetry being such as we have
described is not to be regarded seriously as attaining to the
truth; and he who listens to her, fearing for the safety of the
city21which is within him【心中之城】, should be on his guard
against her seductions and make our words his
law.
苏：不过，我的好朋友，如果他们说不出理由来，我们也只好像那种发觉爱情对自己不利时即冲破情网——不论这样做有多么不容易——的恋人一样了。虽然我们受了我们美好制度①的教育已养成了对这种诗歌的热爱，因而我们很乐意能听到他们提出尽可能有力的理由来证明诗的善与真。但是，如果他们做不到这一点，我们就要在心里对自己默念一遍自己的理由，作为抵制诗之魅力的咒语真言，以防止自己堕入众人的那种幼稚的爱中去了。我们已经得以知道，我们一定不能太认真地把诗歌当成一种有真理作依据的正经事物看待。我们还要警告诗的听众，当心它对心灵制度的不良影响，要他们听从我们提出的对诗的看法才好。
Yes, he said, I quite agree with
you.
格：我完全同意。
Yes, I said, my dear Glaucon, for great is the issue
at stake, greater than appears, whether a man is to be good or bad.
And what will any one be profited if under the influence of honor
or money or power, aye, or under the excitement of poetry he
neglected justice and virtue?
苏：亲爱的格劳孔，这场斗争是重大的。其重要性程度远远超过了我们的想像。它是决定一个人善恶的关键。因此，不能让荣誉、财富、权力，也不能让诗歌诱使我们漫不经心地对待正义和一切美德。
Yes, he said; I have been convinced by the argument, as
I believe that anyone else would have been.
格：根据我们所作的论证，我赞同你的这个结论。并且我想别的人也会赞同你的话的。
苏：但是，你知道，我们还没有论述至善所能赢得的最大报酬和奖励呢。
格：你指的一定是一个无法想像的大东西，如果还有什么别的比我们讲过的东西大的话。
苏：在一段短短的时间里哪能产生什么真正大的东西呀！因为一个人从小到老一生的时间和时间总体相比肯定还是很小的。
【END】
