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转载：SINGAPORE PLACES ITS BETS

2014-06-12 07:16阅读：

http://blog.sina.cn/dpool/blog/u/1630930344

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SINGAPORE PLACES ITS BETS

CASINOS,FOREING TALENT AND

REMAKING A CITY-STATE


Introduction

Few countries have witnessed such rapid changes to their physical landscape, economy and society within the space of a decade, as has Singapore. Since the late 1990s, Singapore experienced the sort of changes driven by technology and economic necessity that have at once excited and unsettled its citizens. In wanting to “remake” itself so as to stay relevant in a highly competitive, globalised world, Singapore may have unleashed forces that could irrevocably change the nature of the country and its people. Within the space of a decade Singaporeans have heard of the need for their country to be a knowledge-based economy(KBE
), a “Renaissance city of Asia”, the “Monaco of the East”, and many other things in-between. The “remaking” of the country has thus run the gamut of being at the forefront of cutting-edge technology, to embracing highbrow arts and culture, to indulging in the glamour and glitz of high-end gambling, and the far less glamorous and glitzy aspects of that vice.
The most curious thing about these aspirational objectives is that every time Singapore has “remade” itself, it has assumed a new identity without actually discarding its previous identities. In consequence, Singapore has become a country with multiple identities; it has attempted to be all things to everyone. It could well be that by assuming multiple identities Singapore is essentially hedging its bets, instead of placing all its chips on a single identifying characteristic that would allow it to coast through the 21st century as a successful state. Should one aspiration fail, Singapore can always claim that it was never reliant on it for its economic survival, as it has an economy that is diverse and multifaceted in nature.
The many changes that were part of the “remaking” of Singapore came on the back of the Asian economic crisis of 1997-98. That crisis made it imperative for Singapore to come up with new initiatives that would cushion the domestic economy from the deleterious effects of another economic downturn prompted by external developments. The April 2005 announcement, that Singapore would allow two casinos as part of “integrated resorts”, seemed like one such initiative.
By dint of fate, the construction of the two resorts proceeded directly into the global economic headwinds of 2008-09, as the Singapore economy experienced yet another shock, this time from a US-originated financial crisis. On the one hand, it seemed that the integrated resorts project was rather ill-timed. On the other, it is arguable that the apparent regularity of financial crises provided justification for the on-going search for continued diversification of the Singapore economy. In fact, as job retrenchments began to mount in all sectors of the Singapore economy during 2008-09,the job recruitment drives by the two casino operators in advance of the phased opening of Marina Bay Sands and Resorts World Sentosa (both expected in and around the first quarter of 2010), provided welcome relief for several thousand job-seekers. That seemed to be the obvious upside of the integrated resorts project, even in advance of their actual opening.
It can be argued that allowing casino gambling via integrated resorts was the most significant change to emerge from all the “remaking” that Singapore has embarked on in recent years. The significance lies not merely in the economic impact. The announcement by the Government in April 2005 to have casino gambling generated a great deal of surprise from many quarters for reasons other than the likely effect this would have on the economy. The fact of the matter is that, though gambling is a favourite pastime of many Singaporeans, the ruling People’s Action Party had for many years deliberately put at arms length the high-end form of this vice-casinos. This was because of the many ramifications casinos could have on Singapore society and, not least, the Singapore brand name internationally - a name associated with an upright, albeit (in the opinion of some) bland, image. The decision to allow the establishment of two casinos an part of integrated resorts was therefore a reversal of a four-decade-long policy. Although the Government was clear about the benefits that would accrue to the economy from the resorts, while also being cognisant of the social costs, the people of Singapore were less clear about the issue. The country was essentially divided between proponents and opponents of casino gambling. The divisiveness of this issue in public discourse is noteworthy and deserves detailed examination in its various dimensions.
The issue of allowing casinos within a densely populated city-state is, therefore, given a suitable degree of breadth of coverage and depth of analysis in this book. Arguments for and against the integrated resorts, and the potential for the resorts achieving their objective of increasing tourist dollar receipts as Singapore repositions its economy, to one that is more service-oriented are given extensive analysis. The casino resorts may be said to be the sharpest manifestation of the move to a more service-oriented economy. By that very fact, four out of six chapters are devoted to examining various aspects of the IR project in their economic and social dimensions. Examples are drawn from other jurisdictions where casino gambling has been introduced, to provide a comparative perspective and some possible lessons that may be germane to the Singapore context. That is one of the methodologies employed in this book. The main methodology, however, is to look at themes and concepts that put conventional thinking to the test, instead of providing a descriptive, chronological account, which would serve little purpose. In all cases, being agnostic, instead of having preconceived notions, is the best way to approach any policy that is likely to have a significant socioeconomic impact.
For Singapore, it is apparent that only by embracing-instead of forestalling-change, no matter how unsettling it may be for its population( as in the reversal of the longstanding ban on having casinos), can the island- nation keep the spectre of failure at bay. That seems to be uppermost in the policy of a government ever conscious of Singapore’s small size and, therefore, its narrow room for manoeuvre. It should be stressed that in absolute terms, by most metrics Singapore is a great success story. In comparative terms, in relation to its neighbours in Southeast Asia, Singapore is an even greater success story. None in Southeast Asia can match the degree of security, efficiency and incorruptibility that Singapore offers its people and foreign nationals who choose to live and work in the city-state. Singapore has therefore carved out a niche for itself within Southeast Asia. When foreign direct investments from multinational corporations or the wealth of the ultra-rich scans Southeast Asia for a suitable home, almost by default Singapore is their initial choice. But Singapore can no longer rely on its performance in relation to its Southeast Asian neighbours to see it through to the next stage of its development. In a globalised world the competition is global in nature. More to the point, an Asian city-state cannot possibly compete on equal terms with one of the main sources of competition-Asian giants, in the form of China and India.
The ascendancy of the two Asian behemoths-with their critical mass of population-is changing the geoeconomic and geopolitical landscape of the Asia Pacific region. Instead of competing with these behemoths in areas where they have a clear comparative advantage, the smarter move by Singapore has been to attempt to leverage or capitalise on their growing economic strength and potential. This has been done in a multipronged fashion. At one level, Singapore Government-linked corporations have funnelled hundreds of millions of dollars in, for example, the Chinese property and Indian technology sectors. Singapore investment dollars have also flowed into other areas of growth potential in both China and India, and in smaller-sized emerging economies, of which a significant on is Vietnam. On another level, Singapore has attempted to entice skilled Chinese and Indian nationals to work, live and take up permanent residency in the city-state. Some proportion have also applied for, and been given, Singapore citizenship. This relatively liberal policy to attract foreign talent has also been extended to citizens of other countries, thus creating a more diverse population-ethnically, linguistically and culturally. Besides economic rationale, this policy to attract large numbers of foreign talent has been one way Singapore has attempted to counteract the effects of a falling birth-rate among Singaporeans and an attendant rapidly aging population. It has also been an attempt by the Government to increase the overall resident population, with a set target of 6.5 million, or a 50% increase on the 2005 figure, to be reached at or around the year 2050. A population with greater critical mass has obvious economic, among other, advantages.
To many Singaporeans, the Government’s foreign talent policy and the goal of expanding the resident population have been controversial. The arrival of foreign nationals to the city-state has not been gradual, but instead has been at a rapid pace, being compressed into a short span of time. This has already generated a degree of social tension with Singaporeans, even as the resident population at 4.99 million (in June 2009) is still well short of its target of 6.5 million. The reasons for such tension will be examined in detail in Chapter 6. Even as foreign talent has arrived in Singapore in droves, some Singaporeans have decided to seek their livelihood and happiness outside their country of birth. This phenomenon, added to the heavy stress on economic development, which is perceived in some quarters as having been elevated above all else, and is almost a cause unto itself, has changed the very character of Singapore from what it was during the first three decades of its independence (1965-95). This is so much so that the questions arises in the minds of some whether Singapore is a “nation-state” in both the letter and spirit of the term, or whether Singapore has evolved to being purely an economic entity in its functionality and character.
To some of those Singaporeans who have become estranged from their country, the answer is obvious. To the man others who have an abiding attachment to Singapore, the future holds great promise. Whatever the situation, Singapore, having assessed the risk and rewards, has played its cards in the cutthroat global economic game. Now, all that remains is the test of time to see whether the gamble pays off.

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