忘记主宰世界吧，印度不会很快赶上中国
2023-09-10 17:14阅读：
这些如果都是很大的假设，即使对那些敢于预测半个世纪后情况的人来说也是如此。而大量数据表明，印度将走出一条更为平淡的发展轨迹。
印度需要连续多年优异的经济增长才能开始在经济重要性上与中国相匹敌，而任何奇迹般的想法或者“中国+1”的投资战略都不可能加快这一进程。
21世纪可能不是印度的世纪，但几乎可以肯定是亚洲的世纪。华盛顿需要接受这一点，也许新德里也需要接受这一点。
Forget world domination, India won't catch up with China
any time soon
-Even the most India-positive forecasts expect it to spend half a
century to overtake the US economically, to take second place
behind China
-India's policymakers should focus instead on opening up their
economy and recognising that it can still be a huge driver in the
global economy
David Dodwell
Last year, as Prime Minister Narendra Modi celebrated 75 years of
India's independence from British rule, he called on the nation to
'dominate the worl
d'. Earlier this week, once again at the Red Fort, he evoked 'Amrit
Kaal' – a crucial era when the gates of opportunity open.
His 'reform, perform, transform' mantra involves dreaming big. He
was possibly dreaming of those halcyon days up to 1870 when India
and China counted as the world's two largest and most powerful
economies.
But a dream does not make a plan. And in the nine years since Modi
came to power, his plans to propel India to the top table of the
world’s most powerful economies remain largely that – plans.
Harvard University’s Graham Allison reminded us in a recent Foreign
Policy report that about a decade ago, the late Singapore leader
Lee Kwan Yew had said India would never catch up with China and
would always remain “the country of the future”. Lee said: “Do not
talk about India and China in the same breath” – throwing the
gauntlet down to those who see India biting at China’s heels and
cheer India on in hopes of hobbling China’s ascent.
To be fair to Modi, his government’s economic performance is
respectable after decades of stagnation and disappointment. India’s
gross domestic product has grown by about 6 per cent every year on
average since 2014, reaching an all-time high of 9.1 per cent last
year – impressive in light of the upheavals of the Covid-19
pandemic and recession in many parts of the world.
But a wide range of structural reforms are needed if India is to
escape the shackles of its economic past. These include the grip of
caste, bureaucratic friction, impenetrable tax rules, still-chronic
protection of local business magnates and import tariffs that are
among the world’s highest.
Any country rising from such a low base must recognise that it will
take many decades to achieve anything the late Lee would regard as
parity with China – and that this is nothing to be ashamed of.
Goldman Sachs predicted last month that by 2075, China would become
the world’s largest economy (US$57 trillion), with India (at
US$52.5 trillion) overtaking the US (at US$51.5 trillion).
Columbia University’s Arvind Panagariya has similar projections,
calculating recently in Time magazine that if India’s real GDP grew
at 8 per cent a year into the 2040s and 5 per cent after that, and
if the US continues to grow on average by 2 per cent a year, India
would overtake the US in 2073.
These are big “ifs”, even for those brave enough to make forecasts
a half-century away. And huge bodies of data point India towards a
more humdrum trajectory. According to Allison in Foreign Policy,
back in 2000, China and India had economies worth less than US$2
trillion each. It took China five years to pass the mark and India
14 years. Last year, India’s economy was worth US$3.4 trillion – a
fraction of China’s US$18.3 trillion.
It will take many years of stellar economic growth for India to
begin matching China in economic importance, and no amount of
miraculous thinking or “China plus one” investment is likely to
accelerate that.
Also, many other important economic indicators remain problematic.
India accounted for about 1 per cent of global manufacturing in
2000, compared with 7 per cent for China. By last year, India’s
share had grown to 3 per cent against China’s 31 per cent. In 2000,
India accounted for just 1 per cent of the world’s exports, and
China 2 per cent. By last year, China accounted for 15 per cent of
global exports against India’s share of 2 per cent.
India enthusiasts celebrate the youthfulness of India’s population,
but ignore the reality that this is a problem rather than an
advantage when they are poorly educated or even illiterate. To
accommodate them, India must produce an estimated 90 million new
jobs before 2030.
Allison reminds us that China produces twice as many STEM-qualified
(in science, technology, engineering and mathematics) graduates as
India, spends almost three times the percentage of its GDP on
research and development, and produces 65 per cent of the world’s
artificial intelligence patents (vs India’s 3 per cent).
As Bloomberg noted in April: “India is far behind China in key
aspects important for manufacturing that include infrastructure,
bureaucracy, attention to detail and even a sense of
urgency.”
Talk of ‘Indian century’ is a dangerous myth masking real
issues
Supporters of India in search of a “hobble China” narrative have
been encouraged by companies such as Apple and its main Taiwanese
manufacturer Foxconn, which have made tentative steps to build
investments in India, but ignore the challenges they have faced,
and the reality that China remains their main manufacturing
base.
They have ignored the withdrawals of companies like the Royal Bank
of Scotland, Harley-Davidson and Citibank, and the many other
companies with plans on hold. They have tended to celebrate the
deliberate obstacles to prospective investment in China, even where
China is a natural partner and the benefit of collaboration is
huge.
Rather than harbouring dreams of dominating the world, India’s
policymakers would benefit us all by opening up their economy and
recognising that even if India does not surpass China, it can still
be a huge driver in the global economy. China and India together
account for one third of the world’s population, one third of the
global consumer class, and a quarter of all consumer spending in
purchasing power parity terms.
The 21st century may not be India’s century, but it is almost
certainly Asia’s. Washington needs to come to terms with that, and
perhaps New Delhi does too.
David Dodwell is CEO of the trade policy and international
relations consultancy Strategic Access, focused on developments and
challenges facing the Asia-Pacific over the past four decades
