日本欲对华经济“脱钩”并非易事
2023-10-18 19:49阅读：
制造业、技术和金融领域的深度经济合作与日中之间长达数十年的政治和领土争端尴尬地并存。这促使日本借助“政经分离”原则发展与中国的经济关系。
考虑到不断加剧的美中战略竞争以及日本确保自身“核心利益”的长期目标，日本越发担心其经济依赖中国。
在经济上与中国接触的“政经分离”原则正在让位于日本首相岸田文雄的新“经济现实主义”外交。
要想消除有关政治因素对日本经济安全影响的担忧，政策手段包括选择性地将供应链多样化以远离中国、企业回流、友岸外包和国家技术研发等。
逐渐放弃“政经分离”使得东京方面担心日本难以抵御经济胁迫和供应链武器化的影响。
日本的政治领导人已经投入大量战略和金融资源，通过选择性地使供应链多样化和减少对中国的依赖来加强经济安全。计划包括采用经济安全方面的补充预算，比如打造先进半导体的国内生产基地。补充预算的重点是促进国内投资，以支持供应链并且鼓励其多样化。
尽管存在政治和安全上的复杂因素，但相互依赖的经济关系在很大程度上仍然没有受到影响，还在不断加深，而且高度互补。中国作为日本商品和服务的主要市场是无可替代的。日本企业在中国进行了大量投资，尤其是在汽车、电子和机械等领域；中国也是日本企业低成本商品和零部件的主要来源地，这一作用使得价格保持了低水平，增强了日本产品在全球市场的竞争力。
中国在稀土的开采和出口等方面占据主导地位。如同能源和其他矿产资源一样，日本缺乏国内稀土金属资源，依赖进口。开发新矿既困难又昂贵，而且除了中国以外，几乎没有什么可行的替代供应方。最近与加拿大的计划在财政上并不可行。
发展稀土的替代来源，不仅需要开采和加工矿石，还需要发展可以在产品中使用这些原材料的下游产业。虽然日本拥有强大的高科技产业，但发展使用稀土的新产
业需要时间和大量投资，而这可能无法满足当前市场的需求。
加强经济安全以及形成抵御经济胁迫和其他形式经济动荡的韧性将会很困难。它将要求岸田和未来的政府开发新的稀土矿和加工设施，同时要达到一系列环保标准，以确保活动的安全和可持续。
Kishida's Diplomacy Pushes Back On Seikei Bunri –
Analysis
By Stephen Nagy
Deep economic cooperation in the areas of manufacturing, technology
and finance has coexisted awkwardly with decades-long political and
territorial disputes between Japan and China. This has led Japan to
develop economic relations with China through a policy that
separates politics and economics or seikei bunri.
Amid intensifying US–China strategic competition, China’s track
record of economic coercion and its long-term objectives to secure
its own ‘core interests’, Japan has become more concerned about its
economic reliance on China.
The seikei bunri principles for engaging with China economically
are giving way to Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida’s new
‘economic realist’ diplomacy. Policy approaches to address concerns
about the impact of politics on Japan’s economic security include
selective diversification of supply chains away from China,
reshoring, friend-shoring and national technological
development.
The drift away from seikei bunri has raised concerns in Tokyo about
Japan’s vulnerability to economic coercion and the weaponisation of
supply chains.
Political leaders in Japan have already committed significant
strategic and financial resources to enhancing economic security
through selectively diversifying supply chains and reducing
reliance on China. Initiatives include the adoption of
supplementary budgets for economic security, such as securing
domestic production bases for advanced semiconductors.
Supplementary budgets have focused on promoting domestic investment
to support supply chains and encourage their diversification.
Despite the political and security complexities, the mutually
dependent economic relationship remains largely intact, is
deepening and highly complementary. There is no replacing China as
Japan’s major market for goods and services. Japanese companies
have invested heavily in China, particularly in the automobile,
electronics and machinery sectors. China is also a major source of
low-cost goods and components for Japanese companies. This role has
kept prices low and enhanced the competitiveness of Japanese
products in global markets.
To decouple the Japan–China economic relationship would require
untangling the complex and multifaceted mutual dependency that
defines it.
After taking office in October 2021, Kishida positioned economic
security as a major focus of his administration based on assessment
of the challenges associated with China’s rise. In the wake of
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine — with its impact on downstream energy
and food security — Kishida warned that ‘East Asia could be the
next Ukraine’.
Tokyo is promoting reshoring, urging Japanese businesses to migrate
their production back to Japan from China or to explore new
production bases in Southeast Asia, India and other countries. The
government has introduced policies to support companies that are
considering reshoring, including subsidies, tax breaks and
regulatory reforms.
Tokyo has also highlighted the importance of diversifying supply
chains, particularly for key components and materials such as rare
earth metals. The Japanese government has been investing in
alternative sources of rare earth metals, such as recycling and
developing new mines in other countries. Japan is also exploring
the use of new materials that can replace rare earth metals.
Tokyo has encouraged collaboration to enhance economic ties and
agendas under the umbrella of the ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific’. The
G7 Foreign Ministers’ statement on 18 April 2023 — which stressed
that ‘resilient supply chains should be built in a transparent,
diversified, secure, sustainable, trustworthy and reliable manner’
— exemplifies this.
Japan has also emphasised the importance of strengthening domestic
industries. This includes the development of new industries and
technologies expected to decrease Japanese vulnerability to China
and deepen its economic security.
A critical component for Japanese businesses is semiconductor
materials. Despite being a major producer of semiconductors, Japan
continues to rely on imports of key materials from other countries,
including China. To mitigate this vulnerability, Tokyo has directly
courted the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company, among
others, to relocate to Japan. It has also been investing in the
development of next-generation semiconductors and encouraging its
companies to move up the value chain to reduce their dependence on
imports.
China continues to enjoy a monopoly over rare earth metal
extraction and exports that makes Japan and other states vulnerable
to rare earth supply chain weaponisation. This exposes signature
Japanese industries including electronics, automobiles and
renewable energy to possible coercion.
As with energy and other mineral resources, Japan lacks domestic
sources of rare earth metals and is reliant on imports. Developing
new mines is difficult and expensive and there are few viable
alternatives to China as a supplier. Recent initiatives with Canada
remain financially unviable.
Developing alternative sources of rare earth metals requires not
only the extraction and processing of ores, but also the
development of downstream industries that can use the metals in
products. While Japan has a strong high-tech industry, developing
new industries that use rare earth metals takes time and requires
significant investment which may not meet the demands of the
current market.
Enhancing economic security and creating resilience against
economic coercion and other forms of economic instability will be
difficult. It will require Kishida and future administrations to
develop new mines and processing facilities for rare earth metals
while meeting a range of environmental standards to ensure
activities are conducted safely and sustainably.
Developing new mines and processing facilities for rare earth
metals will require careful planning, consultation and
collaboration with stakeholders, including local communities,
environmental groups and government agencies. The Kishida
administration is starting this process, working with Australia and
African states, such as Namibia, in joint ventures.
Japan’s efforts to reduce its dependence on China reflect a desire
to enhance economic security and reduce vulnerability to
geopolitical risks and uncertainties. With the shift to economic
realism away from the principles of seikei bunri, the Kishida
administration aims to balance economic opportunities with Japanese
national interests in an increasingly complex and uncertain global
environment.
https://www.eurasiareview.com/13102023-kishidas-diplomacy-pushes-back-on-seikei-bunri-analysis/
