为“遏制中国”，美西方颠覆国际法和国际准则
2023-12-06 09:15阅读：
印度洋-太平洋上有许多海峡和通道，有些是地区战争的潜在爆发点，有些则不太为人所知，却在军事通行和补给及高科技间谍活动方面具有重要战略意义。因此，美国一直忙于加固所谓的第一、第二甚至第三岛链，构筑针对中国的防御。但在某些情况下，美国及其盟友英国和澳大利亚是在无视国际法和国际准则、联合国建议与全球共识的情况下这样做的。不妨看看查戈斯群岛、科科斯群岛和大洋洲一些太平洋岛国的案例。
科科斯群岛位于印度洋，比起珀斯距雅加达更近。该群岛是澳大利亚拥有的海外领地之一，正被（澳政府）重新用于国防，并将进行大规模扩建。澳总理上月赴华与中国修好前不久，宣布一项3.79亿美元的计划用于（在该岛）部署军事资产，特别是扩建跑道，以便起降更重的军用飞机。据报道，这将是澳政府为“导弹战”进行军事改造的一部分。科科斯群岛地处战略要地，可监控整个亚洲，尤其是马六甲海峡、巽他海峡和龙目海峡——那里有各种船只、飞行器和潜艇，尤其是中国军方的船只、飞行器和潜艇经过。加上菲律宾北部新部署的军事资产，它们将形成一个地区监视和军事网络，从印度洋延伸到南海。
但在法律和外交方面还存在问题。1984年当堪培拉说服联合国同意科科斯群岛并入澳大利亚时，承诺不会将这些岛屿用于军事目的。这一承诺具有国际法效力。但没关系，美国想要什么，就能得到什么。现在谁还能反对呢？
苏纳克领导的英国政府似乎将拒绝把查戈斯群岛（其最大的迪戈加西亚岛上有美国在印太最重要的军事基地之一）交还给毛里求斯的提议。2019年国际法院要求英国须在6个月内无条件撤出对该地区的殖民管理。随后，联合国大会以116票赞成6票反对的结果支持裁决。国际海洋法法庭2021年又裁定英国对查戈斯群岛没有主权，批评伦敦未将领土交还给毛里求斯。这才是
真正基于规则的国际体系——而它正被大肆宣扬自己“基于规则”的西方所颠覆。
澳媒歇斯底里地宣称中国的“战争威胁”迫在眉睫。与此同时，美国在澳大利亚和新西兰的配合下，忙于将整个大洋洲军事化，这对国际海洋法下的合法边界造成巨大影响。
中国认为根据国际法，外国军队不能在其专属经济区进行军事和情报搜集活动。印度、印度尼西亚、马来西亚和越南也持相同立场。相比之下，美国声称，（美国自己都未加入的）《联合国海洋法公约》允许其他国家行使航行自由，无需在进入对方专属经济区前通报。猜猜看，哪个国家的海军有能力在世界各地航行！当其他国家都受到美国对《联合国海洋法公约》的自私解释的约束时，美国却认为自己不受法律约束。与其他地方一样，美国转向亚洲（或遏制中国）的通篇理念就是“照我说的做，而不是照我做的做”。
How Western allies subvert international law and norms to
'contain' China
The US has been ruthlessly militarising what some Pentagon
strategists have called the island chains of defence in the
Indo-Pacific with quiet 'Five Eyes' help
Alex Lo
There are many straits and passages with unfamiliar names across
the Indo-Pacific. Some are potential flashpoints in the event of a
regional war. The Taiwan Strait is the best known. Others are more
obscure but nevertheless strategically important for military
access and supply as well as hi-tech spying such as penetrating
undersea internet cables.
That’s why the United States has been busy fortifying what some
Pentagon strategists have called the first, second and even third
island chains of “defence” against China.
In some cases, though, the US and its close allies Britain and
Australia are doing it in defiance of international law and norms,
United Nations advisories and/or global consensus.
While Western media incessantly report on Beijing’s aggression in
the South China Sea, their own governments’ activities and
duplicities over much larger regions are rarely mentioned.
Consider the three cases of the Chagos Archipelago, the Cocos
(Keeling) Islands, and some Pacific island states in Oceania.
Together, they cover large swathes of maritime defence for the
Western powers.
Situated in the Indian Ocean, the Cocos are atolls that lie closer
to Jakarta than Perth. They are one of two external territories
possessed by Australia, the other being Christmas Island.
The latter is infamous for its use to detain illegal migrants and
their widely reported abuse and inhumane treatment. You can say
it’s for internal security.
The other, the Cocos or Keeling Islands (12º08´S096º53´E), is being
repurposed for defence, and it’s up for a big expansion under the
Labor government of Anthony Albanese. Shortly before the prime
minister travelled to Beijing to make nice again with the Chinese
last month, a plan was announced worth A$567.6 million (US$379
million) to install military assets, especially the expansion of an
existing runway to allow for heavier military planes.
It will be part of the government’s military transformation for
“missile warfare”, according to a report by the state-subsidised
Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC). The expanded runway will
be able to take on P-8A Poseidon aircraft – which, according to the
ABC, are capable of “low-level anti-submarine warfare operations
and hi-tech military surveillance’ – and long-range US military
drones.
The expansive upgrade is, of course, tied closely with Australia’s
A$368 billion Aukus nuclear-powered attack submarine deal with the
US and Britain.
The Cocos are strategically located to monitor and spy over a vast
sweep of Asia, but especially the Malacca, Sunda and Lombok
straits, which are busy with all sorts of ships, craft and
submarines, but especially those of the Chinese military.
Coupled with new military assets in the northern Philippines, they
will form a regional surveillance and military network extending
coverage from the Indian Ocean to the South China Sea through which
more than a fifth of the world’s shipping passes.
There is one slight legal and diplomatic problem, though. In 1984,
when Canberra successfully convinced the United Nations not to
oppose the transfer of the former British possession, it agreed as
part of the Act of Self Determination for Cocos to be integrated
into Australia that the islands would not be converted for military
purposes.
That commitment has the force of international law. But never mind;
what the US wants, the US gets. Who can oppose it now?
The Chagos Archipelago
After some lengthy official consideration, the Tory government of
Rishi Sunak looks set to reject a proposal to hand back the Chagos
Islands – whose largest Diego Garcia island is host to one of the
US’ most important military bases in the Indo-Pacific – to
Mauritius.
In 2019, the International Court of Justice issued an advisory that
the United Kingdom must unconditionally withdraw its colonial
administration from the area within six months.
Then the United Nations General Assembly voted to adopt a
resolution in support of the court’s judgment. The vote counts?
They were 116 in favour, six against (Australia, Hungary, Israel,
Maldives, United Kingdom, United States), with 56
abstentions.
The UN called on the UK to “enable Mauritius to complete the
decolonisation of its territory as soon as possible”.
Then, again in 2021, the International Tribunal for the Law of the
Sea ruled that Britain had no sovereignty over the Chagos Islands
and criticised London for its failure to hand the territory back to
Mauritius.
Well, that’s the REAL rules-based international system in action;
and it’s being subverted by the very loud West for its own
“rules-based” claims.
Recently, the British foreign office was examining the possibility
of complying with the UN demands. But under intense pressure from
the US, the defence department seems to have overruled it. This is
despite a long-standing offer from Mauritius that the US could
continue to operate its military base on Diego Garcia with total
control.
Island states in Oceania
To calm turbulent waters, Liu Jianchao, head of the Central
Committee’s international department, told an audience in Sydney
last week that China did not seek to challenge Australia’s
influence among the Pacific island states. It was a tacit
acknowledgement of Australia’s unspoken sphere of influence. So
much for the hysteria, year after year, of the Australian press
about the imminent war threat from China.
Meanwhile, the US, with full cooperation from Australia and New
Zealand, has been busy fortifying the entire Oceania and
militarising it, with enormous implications for maritime defence
and legitimate boundaries under the international law of the
sea.
In Western news media and many think tanks, it’s almost always
claimed that China maintains that, under international law, foreign
militaries are not able to conduct military and
intelligence-gathering activities, such as reconnaissance flights,
in its exclusive economic zone (EEZ).
But China is hardly the only one that maintains this
interpretation. India, Indonesia, Malaysia and Vietnam – all of
which have territorial or maritime disputes with China – share the
same position that independent states have the right to limit
access to foreign militaries for security purposes within their
EEZs.
By contrast, the United States claims that the UN Convention of the
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which the US has not even signed, allows
other countries to exercise freedom of navigation without the need
to notify before entering someone’s EEZs; and that covers military
craft as well. Guess which country has the naval capabilities to
sail everywhere in the world!
Now, new deals negotiated by Washington with Micronesia, the
Marshall Islands and Palau under the so-called Compact of Free
Association can potentially nullify the UNCLOS under a new
doctrine.
Under the old deal, the US already had control of their foreign and
defence policies including territorial access. But under the new
deal, the US military can control access to all three island
states’ EEZs, including preventing others from entering them. This
is not so different from good old colonial
extraterritoriality.
It’s doubtful, as I have argued previously, that such an expensive
doctrine of defence would be confined only to three tiny island
states in the Pacific. Rather the whole idea is that it will be
applicable to all US-protected territories, including continental
America.
The upshot is that while everyone else is bound by its self-serving
interpretation of the UNCLOS, the US considers itself free from its
legal constraints.
The whole idea of the US pivot to Asia (or containing China), as
elsewhere, is to do as I say, not as I do.
