易量。
按价值计算，超过20%的机械机器、煤炭、天然气和石油等矿物燃料以及稀有金属或矿物都要经过马六甲海峡。类似的数字也适用于南海，而东海也位居前列。这三条通道中每一条的运量都超过巴拿马运河和苏伊士运河，只有英吉利海峡和直布罗陀海峡具有类似的重要性。
这些亚洲航道面临的风险未必局限于战争。目前战争正影响苏伊士运河——胡塞武装向途经红海的船只发射导弹，战争也在使取道土耳其博斯普鲁斯海峡的贸易放缓，这一航道承载着来自黑海的货物运输，而乌克兰正在黑海与俄罗斯发生冲突。
一场干旱——像影响巴拿马运河水量的那场干旱——不会使南海或马六甲海峡干涸。但是，还有很多其他灾难可能会对海上运输造成冲击。想想地震及其引发的海啸和台风，以及化学品泄漏和核事故，还有森林火灾。
最重要的是，就目前的结构而言，全球物流和运输体系过于依赖仅占地球表面极小一部分的少数世界热点地区的平稳有序运输。只有21.5%的全球贸易没有通过上述13个要道中的任意一个。我们需要做好准备，以防地球遭遇重大事件。对港口营运、全球制造业和能源安全的连锁反应可能是毁灭性的。
Canals not the biggest shipping choke
points
By TIM CULPAN
WHEN traffic through the Suez Canal ground to a halt in 2021, the
extraordinary cost and disruptions to global commerce seemed
overwhelming.
But 8,000km from the canals of Suez and Panama lie even more
important shipping lanes, choke points that could cripple global
trade should any disaster befall them.
More than a quarter of goods transport passes through the Malacca
Strait, a 40km-wide stretch of water that separates Indonesia to
the south-west from Singapore and Malaysia to the north-east.
By value, the 27.9% of merchandise sent around the world that
traverses this body of water far exceeds the 16.6% that moves along
the Suez Canal in Egypt, according to research by Professor Lincoln
Pratson at Duke University’s Nicholas School of the
Environment.
In a paper published in December in the journal Communications In
Transportation Research, Prof Pratson painstakingly details trade
patterns, shipping routes and the shortest paths across the oceans
to assess the potential impact of closing any of the 13 choke
points he identified around the world.
He used 2019 data as that is the most recent year in which trade
could be considered “normal” before the Covid-19 pandemic disrupted
global commerce, and ran the analysis on commerce between
non-neighbouring countries because those that share a border are
likely to use land routes.
Around 1,600km north-east of the Malacca Strait, swathes of the
South China Sea are claimed by no fewer than seven nations, making
military conflict the most obvious risk.
“The choke points estimated to carry the most trade in terms of
both total value and total weight are the Malacca Strait and South
China Sea,” Prof Pratson writes.
The South China Sea alone carries trade equivalent to 5% of global
gross domestic product, which would make it the fourth-largest
economy in the world.
Exactly how much trade transits the South China Sea is a much
debated point.
The Washington-based Centre for Strategic and International Studies
estimated the value at US$3.4 trillion for 2016, 36% less than
other assessments for the same time period.
Prof Pratson puts it at US$4.1 trillion for 2019, with US$3.9
trillion going via the Malacca Strait.
There is some overlap, because goods pass through multiple sea
lanes on the way to their final destination.
The precise number does not really matter.
What is important for shippers, manufacturers and governments is to
understand the severity of the impact should a disaster
happen.
The ripple effect from the complete closure of any waterway can be
felt thousands of kilometres away.
When the Ever Given cargo ship shut down the Suez Canal three years
ago, it added around nine days to a Taiwan-Netherlands trip, Prof
Pratson notes, with the cost to global trade climbing close to
US$10bil per day.
The 32km-wide Ombai Strait, 11,200km away – between Indonesia’s
Alor Island and Timor – would suffer a 90% drop in traffic from a
Suez closure.
Even the Gibraltar Strait that separates Europe and Africa –
3,200km north-west of the Suez – would lose 28% of shipping flows,
by value.
But perhaps the biggest impact would be from a closure of the
Malacca Strait or South China Sea.
Should maritime passage get halted here, the nearby and
little-known Lombok-Makassar Strait – north of Bali – would see a
14-fold rise in trade flow.
We have yet to see whether this stretch of water has the capacity
to carry such volume safely.
More than 20%, by value, of all mechanical machinery, electrical
equipment, mineral fuels like coal, gas and oil, and rare metals or
minerals pass through the Malacca Strait.
Similar figures apply to the South China Sea, while the East China
Sea – connecting Taiwan with Japan, South Korea and China’s
north-east – also ranks high.
Each of these three passages surpasses Panama and Suez, with only
the English Channel and Gibraltar Strait holding similar
importance.
The risks to these Asian waterways need not be confined to war –
currently impacting the Suez Canal as Houthi rebels in Yemen fire
missiles at ships passing through the adjoining Red Sea, and
slowing trade through Turkiye’s Bosphorus, which takes traffic from
the Black Sea where Ukraine is fending off a Russian
invasion.
A drought, like the one that is hurting Panama Canal flows, will
not dry up the South China Sea or Malacca Strait. But there are a
multitude of other disasters that could hit maritime
transport.
Think earthquakes and their resultant tsunamis; typhoons, which are
common to the region; chemical spills and nuclear accidents that
force ships to change course; or forest fires sending plumes of
thick smoke across the waters, impacting navigation.
Even without one-time incidents, the region is already the most
treacherous in the world.
A quarter of all ships lost in 2022 were in the area spanning South
China through to Indonesia, according to analysis by Allianz
Group.
Still, though tragic, the rare sunk or stranded ship will not much
affect the trajectory of global trade.
What matters most is that the global system of logistics and
transport, as it is now structured, is overly dependent on smooth
and orderly flows in just a few of the world’s hot spots that make
up a tiny fraction of the earth’s surface.
Just 21.5% of global trade does not pass through one of the 13
choke points.
This has not been a problem, so far. Supply chains have been
resilient enough, with sufficient spare capacity along shipping
routes, to allow the sector to get through relatively small crises
unscathed.
But we need to be ready in case the planet encounters a major
event.
The knock-on effects for port operations, global manufacturing and
energy security could be devastating.
The canals include the Panama Canal, Strait of Gibraltar, English
Channel, Strait of Denmark, Bosporus Strait, Suez Canal, Bab el
Mandeb Strait, Strait of Hormuz, Strait of Malacca, Lombok-Makassar
Strait, Ombai Strait, South China Sea, and East China Sea.
Red Sea crisis: Suez Canal is not the only 'choke point'
that threatens to disrupt global supply chains
Sarah Schiffling,
Matthew Tickle
The air strikes against targets in Yemen by the US and UK military
have not been without criticism. They aim to keep the Houthis from
attacking merchant vessels in the Bab el-Mandeb strait. Less than
30 ships have been attacked by Houthis since they seized the
Israeli-linked Galaxy Leader vessel in November. It’s a relatively
small number, compared to the thousands of ships that have passed
through the area since.
Unlike the 2021 Suez Canal blockage, traffic is still moving along
the shortcut between Asia and Europe. While it adds one to two
weeks of travel time and around US$1 million (£786,000) in cost,
ships can also go around Africa.
In response, container prices have increased sharply, but are not
at the levels reached at the height of the COVID-19 pandemic. Even
if the path through the Red Sea to the Suez Canal becomes unusable,
this is hardly unprecedented. The Suez Canal was closed due to war
from 1967 to 1975.
But the reasons for the strikes carried out to protect global trade
are likely to lie deeper than this. Global supply chains have
become a lot more important for everyday life since the 1970s, so
the impact of disruptions in the Red Sea is now much bigger. Also,
crucially, Bab el-Mandeb is only one of several maritime choke
points that are vital for world trade.
Transport choke points
Choke points are narrow parts of main trade lanes, usually straits
or canals. As the geopolitical weaponisation of supply chains
increasingly becomes a part of economic statecraft, their
vulnerability grows. As the Houthis have shown, disrupting global
trade at one of these choke points, does not require huge military
power.
Disabling the biggest choke points could have severe global
consequences. While about 12% of global trade passes the Suez
Canal, more than twice as much goes through the Malacca Strait
between Indonesia and Malaysia. The Malacca Strait regularly has
issues with piracy.
Disruptions at choke points potentially have much larger effects
around the world, as they affect traffic going to and from many
countries. Alternative routes to them are difficult, if not
impossible, to find. This was maybe most impressively demonstrated
by the 2021 Suez blockage when a container ship was wedged across
the canal and held up US$9.6 billion in trade per day for nearly a
week.
Today is not 2021. Ships continue to use the Suez Canal and the Red
Sea is not closed to shipping, the volume of shipping containers
passing through Suez fell drastically from 500,000 per day in
November 2023 to 200,000 per day in December 2023. Demand is not
nearly as high as it was back then. Indeed, there has been
over-capacity on many shipping routes over the past year. This can
now serve as a buffer when vessels spend more time on longer
routes.
Running out of routes
But another of the main choke points is currently suffering severe
disruptions. The Panama Canal, which connects the Atlantic and
Pacific, is experiencing an intense drought. Now water levels in
the Panama Canal are so low that shipping capacity is severely
limited. Shipping giant Maersk recently shifted cargo to the
railway line running in parallel to the canal. Before the current
crisis, some ships took a ten-day detour on their journeys between
Asia and the US east coast by going through the Suez Canal.
Alternatives for the route through the Bab el-Mandeb and the Suez
Canal are limited. The Panama Canal is not a viable option at the
moment. The Northern Sea Route is 40% shorter than the alternative
via the Suez Canal for connecting Asia to Europe. But ice makes it
navigable for no more than five months per year and there are
concerns about the impact of ships on the fragile Arctic
ecosystem.
The railway line linking China to Europe has seen significant
growth in freight transport in recent years. But both rail and
Northern Sea Route connection are affected by sanctions on Russia.
What is left for most who are keen to avoid the Red Sea is the long
detour around Africa.
Strait of Hormuz
The original military mission in the Red Sea was aptly called
“Operation Prosperity Guardian”. Countries involved in the White
House’s announcement regarding the strikes on Yemen include major
exporters such as Germany and South Korea, Denmark, the home of
affected shipping line Maersk and others, as well as countries such
as Australia and Canada. This is an indication of the profound
global effects this disruption is having. After Houthi attacks
continued despite warnings, the military actions have sent a signal
that free navigation will be protected despite the high cost.
They can also be understood as a signal that countries are ready to
defend other choke points. The most likely target for this is what
a former chief economist of the Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD) called called “a horrible and
inevitable progression that could see the situation in the Red Sea
spread to the strait of Hormuz”.
At least one-fifth of global oil and gas transports is shipped
through the 39km wide stretch of sea between Oman and Iran. Iran
backs the Houthis in Yemen, as well as other groups in the Middle
East. The Strait of Hormuz has a long history of tensions. By
blocking this choke point, Iran could throw the global economy into
serious disarray.
However, experts also highlight the likelihood of a severe global
backlash to any such action – doing more harm to Iran than good.
The justification for the current military actions against the
Houthis is likely to also contain a nod to this.
