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美国的恐华情绪已失控,阻碍了进步之路

2024-03-30 18:57阅读:
美国的恐华情绪已失控,阻碍了进步之路
美国的恐华症全面爆发——我一般不会轻易使用“恐华症”这个强烈的词。美政府实施出口管制,切断中国获得先进半导体的渠道;中国的电动汽车、建筑和码头装卸起重机以及TikTok,都被认为构成风险……这种害怕不仅限于技术领域。美政府将多边问题——与一百多个国家的贸易逆差——“误诊”为双边问题,并用关税惩罚中国。随着南海和台海紧张局势加剧,华盛顿对“中国军事威胁”的夸大有时近乎歇斯底里。
当然,中国也有“恐美症”。尽管存在这种针锋相对的指责,但我认为,我们有充分的理由担心这种有毒的恐惧症在美国日益失控。威斯康星州的政客、众议员加拉格尔作为众议院“中国问题特别委员会”主席,带头提出一系列针对中国的毫无根据的指控。加拉格尔将于今年4月从国会退休,但他留下的东西会继续。
美国的一连串指控都是披着国家安全外衣、未经证实的恐惧的表现。相关证据都不能直接表明中国日益具有侵略性。这其实就是两党将演绎推理政治化。例如,美国商务部长雷蒙多要求我们“想象一下”,如果中国电动汽车在美国高速公路上被武器化,会发生什么。联邦调查局局长克里斯托弗·雷警告称“如果当中国决定动手时”,其恶意软件可能使美国的关键基础设施瘫痪。美国前反间谍官员还将中国制造的起重机上的传感器比作特洛伊木马……还有许多“如果”和荒谬类比。
为什么中国令美国产生如此恶毒的反应?长期以来,美国一直不能容忍相互竞争的意识形态和其他治理体系。“美国例外论”的观念似乎迫使我们将自己的观点和价值观强加于人。冷战时期如此,今天依然如此。对中国的过度恐惧,容易掩盖美国自身造成的许多问题。广泛的多边贸易逆差更多源于美国长期的预算赤字。同样,科技威胁也暴露出美国的研发投入和理工高等教育的不足,但美国政客不认真自我反思,反而指责中国。
随着恐华症滋长,与中国发生意外冲突的危险随之加剧。在这些焦虑驱使下,美国有可能挑起正想要阻止的那种结果。在1933年的就职演说中,美国时任总统罗斯福强调了这种危险病态的巨大风险,说了一句令人难忘的话:“我们唯一应该恐惧的是恐惧本身。”面对今天的恐华症,这句话值得被铭记。
Sinophobia in the US is off the rails and blocking paths to progress
-Myths and exaggerated claims about China are pervasive in American political discourse, with growing anxieties about technology and trade
-Instead of focusing on self-reflection, politicians adopt an aggressive stance on China out of expediency but risk inciting accidental conflict
Stephen Roach
The current wave of anti-Chinese sentiment in the United States has been building for years. It started when US policymakers raised national security concerns about Huawei. China’s national technology champion, the market leader in developing new 5G telecommunications equipment, was accused of deploying digital back doors that could enable Chinese espionage and cyberattacks.
But Huawei was just the start. The US has since spiralled into a full-blown outbreak of Sinophobia – a strong word that I don’t use lightly. The Oxford English Dictionary defines phobia as an “extreme or irrational fear or dread aroused by a particular object or circumstance”.
Indeed, China threats now seem to be popping up everywhere. The US government has imposed export controls to cut off China’s access to advanced semiconductors – part of its concerted effort to stymie the country’s artificial intelligence ambitions. The Department of Justice has just indicted a state-sponsored Chinese hacking group for allegedly taking aim at critical American infrastructure. Much has also been made of the purported risks of Chinese electric vehicles (EVs), construction and dock-loading cranes, and now TikTok.
Nor are the fears confined to technology. The US government misdiagnosed a multilateral problem – a trade deficit with more than 100 countries – as a bilateral problem and punished China with tariffs. Others have warned that Washington’s exaggerated claims of the Chinese military threat have, at times, bordered on hysteria as tensions mount in the South China Sea and Taiwan Strait.
Of course, this is only half the story. China is equally guilty of its own strain of “Ameri-phobia” – demonising the US for its accusations of Chinese economic espionage, unfair trading practices and human rights violations. Both phobias are related to the profusion of false narratives that I address in my most recent book, Accidental Conflict.
Notwithstanding this tit-for-tat blame game, my point now is different: there is good reason to worry about an increasingly virulent strain of this phobia spinning out of control in the US.
Not since the red-baiting of the early 1950s has America so vilified a foreign power. Back then, a two-pronged congressional approach, led by US Senator Joseph McCarthy of Wisconsin and the House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC), spearheaded an assault on alleged Communist sympathisers under the guise of protecting Americans from Soviet espionage and influence.
Today, another politician from Wisconsin, Representative Mike Gallagher, led the charge as chair of the House Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party, which, in an eerie parallel to the dark days of HUAC, has levelled a series of unsubstantiated charges against China. While Gallagher will retire from Congress in April, his legacy will live on, not just as co-sponsor of a bill that could lead to an outright ban of TikTok, but also as the leader of a congressional effort that has cast a long shadow over those who support almost any form of engagement with China.
The litany of US allegations is a manifestation of unproven fears wrapped in the impenetrable cloak of national security. Yet there is no “smoking gun” in any of these cases. Instead, it is all about circumstantial evidence of an increasingly aggressive China. At work is an unmistakable bipartisan politicisation of deductive reasoning.
For example, US Secretary of Commerce Gina Raimondo, a leading Democrat, asks us to “imagine” what could happen if Chinese EVs were weaponised on American highways. FBI director Christopher Wray, a Donald Trump appointee and member of the conservative Federalist Society, warns that Chinese malware could disable critical US infrastructure “if or when China decides the time has come to strike”.
A former US counter-intelligence officer has compared sensors in Chinese-made cranes to a Trojan horse. There are many “what ifs” and mythical parallels, but no hard evidence on intent or verifiable action.
What is it about China that has generated this virulent US reaction? The US has long been intolerant of competing ideologies and alternative systems of governance. The claim of “American exceptionalism” seemingly compels us to impose our views and values on others. That was true in the Cold War, and it is true again today.
Excessive fear of China conveniently masks many of America’s own self-inflicted problems. Bilateral trade deficits may well reflect the unfair trading practices of individual countries – China today, Japan 35 years ago – but broad multilateral trade deficits stem more from chronic US budget deficits that lead to a deficiency of domestic saving.
Similarly, the technology threat is not only an outgrowth of the alleged Chinese theft of US intellectual property; it also represents underinvestment in research and development and shortfalls in STEM-based higher education. Rather than taking a long, hard look in the mirror, it is politically expedient for US politicians to blame China.
As Sinophobia feeds on itself, fear starts to take on the aura of fact and the dangers of accidental conflict with China intensify. By acting on these anxieties, America risks inciting the very outcome it wants to deter.
The US can and must do better. Rather than excusing the excesses of Sinophobia as justifiable reactions to the China threat, US leaders need to think more in terms of being the adult in the room. Global leadership requires nothing less.
In his first inaugural address in 1933, US president Franklin Roosevelt underscored the ultimate risk of this dangerous pathology with the memorable line, “The only thing we have to fear is fear itself”. Amid today’s Sinophobic frenzy, that message is well worth remembering.

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