海洋测绘成争夺地缘影响力新战线
2024-04-01 06:56阅读:

海道测量学即绘制水体及周围沿海情况的地图,这个领域现在是争夺在印度洋影响力的新战线。印度、中国和其他国家在绘制国际水域以及该地区各国专属经济区地图方面的竞争越来越激烈。
海道测量学不仅对商船和私人船只的海上安全至关重要,而且对水面舰艇和潜艇等舰只的海上行动,以及新型商业活动——比如海底采矿——必不可少。
印度洋是海图绘制最少的地方。事实上,该地区许多国家仍然经常使用19世纪时的绘图。
现在,在大国竞相对在这一领域几乎没有能力或没有专业知识的国家提供海道测量服务的情况下,海道测量正成为地缘政治的焦点。
印度长期以来一直试图将自己定位为一个地区性海道测量服务提供国。它拥有大约七艘海道测量船,并进行了大约100次国外海道勘测,包括最近几年在马尔代夫、毛里求斯、肯尼亚、坦桑尼亚、缅甸、斯里兰卡和塞舌尔等国进行勘测。印度还着力打造本地能力,包括为来自印度洋、亚洲和非洲各国的大约800名外国公民提供培训。
对于该地区的许多国家来说,接受海道测量援助是有意义的,因为这些国家可能拥有大片专属经济区,但却对如何开发这些地区知之甚少。
现在,中国正成为向许多国家提供海道测量服务的又一个国家。
海道信息不仅是一个安全问题,也是一个经济问题。通过重新获得对其海道数据的控制权,斯里兰卡政府希望借助向每天通过斯里兰卡海域的数百艘船只提供电子航海图获得可观的利润。为了实现这一目标,斯里兰卡需要发展自身海道测量能力。美国和澳大利亚正在考虑为其提供援助。
附近的马尔代夫也出现了类似的情况。作为一个人口不多的小岛国,马尔代夫有着大范围的海上管辖权。去年12月,马尔代夫新政府宣布,它不会与印度续签一项由印度对马尔代夫海域进行海道勘测的协议。这给马尔代夫的海道测量需求带来了一
个真空。
斯里兰卡和马尔代夫的这些事态发展可能只是第一步,以后可能成为对重要海道信息所有权和控制权的更大范围内的地区争夺。澳大利亚将需要与其伙伴合作,帮助该地区管理自己的海域,包括控制自己的海道数据。
Mapping the oceans is the new front in the battle for
influence in the Indian Ocean
DAVID BREWSTER
Ruling the waves means first understanding what lies beneath. Enter
the geopolitics of hydrography.
Hydrography, the mapping of bodies of water and surrounding coastal
details, is the new front in the battle for influence in the Indian
Ocean. There is growing competition among India, China and others
to chart international waters as well as the exclusive economic
zones of countries around the region. Smaller nations are pushing
back, wanting to build their own sovereign capabilities and control
over information about their maritime domain. Australia can play a
useful role in finding ways to build local capabilities and
ameliorate this new source of strategic competition.
More than just crucial for the safely at sea of commercial and
private boats and ships, hydrographic data is also essential for
naval operations, including surface vessels and submarines, as well
as emerging commercial activities such as seabed mining.
It’s said that humanity knows more about the surface of the Moon
than the ocean floor. This is particularly the case in the Indian
Ocean, which is among the least charted oceans in the world. During
the search for the missing Malaysian Airlines MH370 in 2014 it
became evident that we had little idea of what the ocean floor
looked like. Indeed, many countries in the region still often use
colonial-era charts from the 19th century.
Hydrography is now assuming a geopolitical focus with major powers
competing to provide hydrographic services to countries with few
capabilities or little expertise in this area. This is used to
demonstrate regional leadership and, more importantly, gain access
to data vital for military purposes such as submarine operations.
Underlying this are important issues of sovereignty. Who should own
or control information about the sea, particularly in areas of
national jurisdiction?
India has long sought to position itself as a regional provider of
hydrographic services. It has a fleet of about seven hydrographic
vessels and has conducted approximately 100 foreign hydrographic
surveys, including in Maldives, Mauritius, Kenya, Tanzania,
Myanmar, Sri Lanka and Seychelles just in the last few years. India
also builds local capabilities, including training for around 800
foreign nationals from countries throughout the Indian Ocean, Asia
and Africa.
Accepting hydrographic assistance makes a lot of sense for many
countries in the region that may have large exclusive economic
zones with little idea of what is down there. But what was once
considered to be uncontroversial is now much more fraught.
China is now offering itself as an alternative provider of
hydrographic services to many countries. Chinese agencies operate
more than 30 oceanographic surveillance and research vessels, many
of which also have electronic surveillance capabilities.
But while Chinese offers of assistance can be tempting for many,
letting them map areas of national jurisdiction has become highly
controversial. India, in particular, has significant concerns about
China’s research activities in the Indian Ocean, particularly near
the Bay of Bengal where India’s nuclear submarine fleet is
based.
These issues have come to a head in Sri Lanka. The presence of
Chinese research vessels in Sri Lankan waters, most recently the
Shi Yan 6 in October 2023, drew loud protests from New Delhi.
Shortly after, Sri Lanka announced an effective 12-month moratorium
on research by all foreign research vessels while it worked out
what to do about the issue. The Sri Lankan government later moved
to cancel an agreement between a Chinese institute and a local
university under which China gained easy access to Sri Lanka’s
waters, and its hydrographic data. The government also created a
new agency under the Ministry of Defence to supervise hydrographic
research.
Controversy was reignited after a German research vessel was
allowed to dock in Colombo for replenishment last week.
Hydrographic information is not only a security issue but also an
economic one. Through regaining control over its hydrographic data,
the Sri Lankan government hopes to make considerable profits from
providing electronic charts to the hundreds of ships that pass Sri
Lankan waters every day. To achieve this, Sri Lanka needs to
develop its sovereign hydrographic capabilities. The United States
and Australia are considering what assistance can be
provided.
Similar controversies are unfolding in nearby Maldives, an island
state with a tiny population but a huge maritime jurisdiction. In
December last year, the newly elected Maldives government announced
that it would not renew an agreement with India under which India
was undertaking hydrographic surveys of Maldives waters. This has
created a vacuum in Maldives hydrographic needs.
In February, the Chinese research vessel Xiang Yang Hong 03 docked
in Maldives’ capital after undertaking three weeks of hydrographic
surveys just outside the exclusive economic zones of Maldives, Sri
Lanka and India. (From the location of the survey it’s probable
that its main purpose was for future People's Liberation Army Navy
submarine and anti-submarine operations.) Days later, Maldives
signed a defence cooperation agreement with China. Its terms
haven’t been disclosed but is understood to involve the supply of
riot control equipment. Following this agreement, Beijing is
pushing hard to expand its security role in the country, which,
among other things, will be to allow Chinese vessels to map
Maldives waters and possibly even establish a marine research
station in the country’s north.
United States, Britain and Australia are now scrambling to find
ways to help build Maldives’ sovereign national hydrographic
capabilities. Maldives may be well advised to follow Sri Lanka’s
example by declaring a moratorium on visits by all foreign research
vessels to give it time to build a level of national capabilities
to the extent possible. In time, Maldives may also need to find
ways of bringing in outside assistance in a way that mitigates
sovereignty concerns, for example, through working with coalitions
of international partners.
These developments in Sri Lanka and the Maldives are the first
steps in what is likely to become a wider regional struggle over
ownership and control of critical hydrographic information.
Australia will need to work with its partners to help the region
govern its own seas, including through control of its own
hydrographic data.