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海洋测绘成争夺地缘影响力新战线

2024-04-01 06:56阅读:
海洋测绘成争夺地缘影响力新战线
海道测量学即绘制水体及周围沿海情况的地图,这个领域现在是争夺在印度洋影响力的新战线。印度、中国和其他国家在绘制国际水域以及该地区各国专属经济区地图方面的竞争越来越激烈。
海道测量学不仅对商船和私人船只的海上安全至关重要,而且对水面舰艇和潜艇等舰只的海上行动,以及新型商业活动——比如海底采矿——必不可少。
印度洋是海图绘制最少的地方。事实上,该地区许多国家仍然经常使用19世纪时的绘图。
现在,在大国竞相对在这一领域几乎没有能力或没有专业知识的国家提供海道测量服务的情况下,海道测量正成为地缘政治的焦点。
印度长期以来一直试图将自己定位为一个地区性海道测量服务提供国。它拥有大约七艘海道测量船,并进行了大约100次国外海道勘测,包括最近几年在马尔代夫、毛里求斯、肯尼亚、坦桑尼亚、缅甸、斯里兰卡和塞舌尔等国进行勘测。印度还着力打造本地能力,包括为来自印度洋、亚洲和非洲各国的大约800名外国公民提供培训。
对于该地区的许多国家来说,接受海道测量援助是有意义的,因为这些国家可能拥有大片专属经济区,但却对如何开发这些地区知之甚少。
现在,中国正成为向许多国家提供海道测量服务的又一个国家。
海道信息不仅是一个安全问题,也是一个经济问题。通过重新获得对其海道数据的控制权,斯里兰卡政府希望借助向每天通过斯里兰卡海域的数百艘船只提供电子航海图获得可观的利润。为了实现这一目标,斯里兰卡需要发展自身海道测量能力。美国和澳大利亚正在考虑为其提供援助。
附近的马尔代夫也出现了类似的情况。作为一个人口不多的小岛国,马尔代夫有着大范围的海上管辖权。去年12月,马尔代夫新政府宣布,它不会与印度续签一项由印度对马尔代夫海域进行海道勘测的协议。这给马尔代夫的海道测量需求带来了一
个真空。
斯里兰卡和马尔代夫的这些事态发展可能只是第一步,以后可能成为对重要海道信息所有权和控制权的更大范围内的地区争夺。澳大利亚将需要与其伙伴合作,帮助该地区管理自己的海域,包括控制自己的海道数据。
海洋测绘成争夺地缘影响力新战线
Mapping the oceans is the new front in the battle for influence in the Indian Ocean
DAVID BREWSTER
Ruling the waves means first understanding what lies beneath. Enter the geopolitics of hydrography.
Hydrography, the mapping of bodies of water and surrounding coastal details, is the new front in the battle for influence in the Indian Ocean. There is growing competition among India, China and others to chart international waters as well as the exclusive economic zones of countries around the region. Smaller nations are pushing back, wanting to build their own sovereign capabilities and control over information about their maritime domain. Australia can play a useful role in finding ways to build local capabilities and ameliorate this new source of strategic competition.
More than just crucial for the safely at sea of commercial and private boats and ships, hydrographic data is also essential for naval operations, including surface vessels and submarines, as well as emerging commercial activities such as seabed mining.
It’s said that humanity knows more about the surface of the Moon than the ocean floor. This is particularly the case in the Indian Ocean, which is among the least charted oceans in the world. During the search for the missing Malaysian Airlines MH370 in 2014 it became evident that we had little idea of what the ocean floor looked like. Indeed, many countries in the region still often use colonial-era charts from the 19th century.
Hydrography is now assuming a geopolitical focus with major powers competing to provide hydrographic services to countries with few capabilities or little expertise in this area. This is used to demonstrate regional leadership and, more importantly, gain access to data vital for military purposes such as submarine operations. Underlying this are important issues of sovereignty. Who should own or control information about the sea, particularly in areas of national jurisdiction?
India has long sought to position itself as a regional provider of hydrographic services. It has a fleet of about seven hydrographic vessels and has conducted approximately 100 foreign hydrographic surveys, including in Maldives, Mauritius, Kenya, Tanzania, Myanmar, Sri Lanka and Seychelles just in the last few years. India also builds local capabilities, including training for around 800 foreign nationals from countries throughout the Indian Ocean, Asia and Africa.
Accepting hydrographic assistance makes a lot of sense for many countries in the region that may have large exclusive economic zones with little idea of what is down there. But what was once considered to be uncontroversial is now much more fraught.
China is now offering itself as an alternative provider of hydrographic services to many countries. Chinese agencies operate more than 30 oceanographic surveillance and research vessels, many of which also have electronic surveillance capabilities.
But while Chinese offers of assistance can be tempting for many, letting them map areas of national jurisdiction has become highly controversial. India, in particular, has significant concerns about China’s research activities in the Indian Ocean, particularly near the Bay of Bengal where India’s nuclear submarine fleet is based.
These issues have come to a head in Sri Lanka. The presence of Chinese research vessels in Sri Lankan waters, most recently the Shi Yan 6 in October 2023, drew loud protests from New Delhi. Shortly after, Sri Lanka announced an effective 12-month moratorium on research by all foreign research vessels while it worked out what to do about the issue. The Sri Lankan government later moved to cancel an agreement between a Chinese institute and a local university under which China gained easy access to Sri Lanka’s waters, and its hydrographic data. The government also created a new agency under the Ministry of Defence to supervise hydrographic research.
Controversy was reignited after a German research vessel was allowed to dock in Colombo for replenishment last week.
Hydrographic information is not only a security issue but also an economic one. Through regaining control over its hydrographic data, the Sri Lankan government hopes to make considerable profits from providing electronic charts to the hundreds of ships that pass Sri Lankan waters every day. To achieve this, Sri Lanka needs to develop its sovereign hydrographic capabilities. The United States and Australia are considering what assistance can be provided.
Similar controversies are unfolding in nearby Maldives, an island state with a tiny population but a huge maritime jurisdiction. In December last year, the newly elected Maldives government announced that it would not renew an agreement with India under which India was undertaking hydrographic surveys of Maldives waters. This has created a vacuum in Maldives hydrographic needs.
In February, the Chinese research vessel Xiang Yang Hong 03 docked in Maldives’ capital after undertaking three weeks of hydrographic surveys just outside the exclusive economic zones of Maldives, Sri Lanka and India. (From the location of the survey it’s probable that its main purpose was for future People's Liberation Army Navy submarine and anti-submarine operations.) Days later, Maldives signed a defence cooperation agreement with China. Its terms haven’t been disclosed but is understood to involve the supply of riot control equipment. Following this agreement, Beijing is pushing hard to expand its security role in the country, which, among other things, will be to allow Chinese vessels to map Maldives waters and possibly even establish a marine research station in the country’s north.
United States, Britain and Australia are now scrambling to find ways to help build Maldives’ sovereign national hydrographic capabilities. Maldives may be well advised to follow Sri Lanka’s example by declaring a moratorium on visits by all foreign research vessels to give it time to build a level of national capabilities to the extent possible. In time, Maldives may also need to find ways of bringing in outside assistance in a way that mitigates sovereignty concerns, for example, through working with coalitions of international partners.
These developments in Sri Lanka and the Maldives are the first steps in what is likely to become a wider regional struggle over ownership and control of critical hydrographic information. Australia will need to work with its partners to help the region govern its own seas, including through control of its own hydrographic data.

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