贸易战与制裁导致“慢球化”挑起者终将付出代价
2024-04-18 05:13阅读：
鉴于过去几年来全球贸易的增长，人们可能会认为地缘政治驱动的贸易壁垒对经济的影响微乎其微。尽管国际贸易体系看上去富有韧性，但关税和其他限制性措施带来了巨大成本。一个将贸易与地缘政治分离开来的开放式多边贸易体系，在推动二战后的经济发展方面发挥了关键作用。但随着贸易政策越来越多受到地缘政治因素的影响，一种新模式正在显现。
这一趋势始于2018年美国前总统唐纳德·特朗普对中国进口商品加征关税，乔·拜登政府维持了这一做法，此举还导致中国以牙还牙对从美国进口的商品加征关税。在2022年俄乌之后冲突，七国集团和欧盟对俄罗斯实施了全面经济制裁，大力禁止对俄出口和从俄罗斯进口商品。
这些贸易壁垒和限制性措施并没有像许多人预期的那样导致全球贸易下降，只是放慢了全球化步伐，使其变成了“慢球化”。值得注意的是，尽管发生了乌克兰战争和过去几年的供应链中断，贸易占国内生产总值的比例仍在2022年创下历史新高，凸显国际贸易体系的韧性。自2022年以来集装箱装运价格的上涨，可归因于全球货物运输量的意外激增。
全球贸易具有韧性的观点可能会产生误导。虽然贸易量增加，但诸多壁垒带来了巨大代价。
乍一看，关税可以促进贸易的说法似乎很矛盾。但美国自2018年以来实施的几乎所有关税和贸易限制措施都是专门针对中国的，来自其他国家的进口并未受影响。因此，来自中国的进口急剧下降，而来自越南等国的进口却在激增。许多运往美国的消费品现在都在越南和其他东南亚国家组装。
但这些进口产品仍然依赖于来自中国的中间输入。因此，贸易量增长的原因是：虽然美国从亚洲进口的消费品保持不变，但中国向亚洲邻国出口的中间输入品增加了。同样，墨西哥已经超过中国成为对美主要商品出口国，但自2018年以来，来
自中国的进口猛增近40%。
欧盟也在经历类似的转变。在西方对俄罗斯实施制裁后，欧洲对土耳其以及哈萨克斯坦和吉尔吉斯斯坦等中亚国家的出口激增。同时，这些国家与俄罗斯之间的贸易量也在激增。
这种规避制裁或歧视性关税的方法导致生产和物流成本上升，因为货物现在必须先运到中间国家然后才能运到美国。因此，制裁和歧视性关税会增加贸易，降低福祉。
这些有害后果凸显长期以来作为全球贸易体系基石的“最惠国”原则的重要性。各国为实现贸易自由化而做出的共同努力(首先是通过关贸总协定，随后通过世界贸易组织)因其非歧视的方式而增加了贸易量和整体福祉。相比之下，如今由地缘政治驱动的歧视性关税和贸易壁垒，则明确针对被视为敌对或构成潜在威胁的特定国家。
谁会付出代价？经济学理论(和常识)给出明确答案：实施歧视性贸易限制措施的国家最终要承担代价，世界其他国家则从中受益。因此，美国和中国要受到关税战的负面影响，越南和墨西哥则因充当中间商而获益。同样，土耳其和中亚国家从西方针对俄罗斯的制裁中获益，欧盟却要为此买单。
如果美国继续与中国打贸易战，它的损失会最大。
The hidden costs of 'slowbalisation'
Instead of causing global trade to fall, trade barriers and
restrictive measures merely slowed down globalisation, turning it
into “slowbalisation”
BY DANIEL GROS/BRUSSELS
The emergence of an open multilateral trading system that separated
trade from geopolitics played a pivotal role in driving the
post-World War II economy. But with trade policies increasingly
shaped by geopolitical considerations, a new paradigm is becoming
visible.
This trend started with the tariffs that former US president Donald
Trump imposed on Chinese imports in 2018, which President Joe
Biden’s administration has maintained, and which caused China to
impose its own tariffs on imports from the US.
Then, in 2022, following Russian President Vladimir Putin’s
invasion of Ukraine, G7 countries and the European Union imposed
sweeping economic sanctions on Russia, effectively prohibiting
exports to Russia and imports of Russian goods.
Instead of causing global trade to fall, as many expected, these
trade barriers and restrictive measures merely slowed down
globalisation, turning it into “slowbalisation.”
Remarkably, despite the war in Ukraine and the supply-chain
disruptions of the past few years, trade as a percentage of GDP
reached a record high in 2022, underscoring the resilience of the
international trading system. In fact, the increases in
container-shipment prices since 2022 can be attributed to an
unexpected surge in the volume of goods being shipped
globally.
But while it may be tempting to argue that geopolitically motivated
measures have had a negligible economic impact, the perceived
resilience of global trade can be misleading. Although the recent
trade barriers led to higher trade volumes, many of them carry
significant costs.
At first glance, the notion that a tariff could boost trade may
seem paradoxical. But almost all the tariffs and trade restrictions
imposed by the US since 2018 have been specifically aimed at China,
leaving imports from other countries untouched. Consequently,
imports from China have fallen sharply, while imports from
countries like Vietnam have surged. Many consumer products shipped
to the US are now assembled in Vietnam and other Southeast Asian
countries.
But these imports still rely on intermediate inputs from China.
Consequently, trade volumes have grown because, while US imports of
consumer goods from Asia have remained consistent, China’s exports
of intermediate inputs to its Asian neighbours have increased.
Similarly, although Mexico has overtaken China as the leading
exporter of goods to the US, its own imports from China have surged
by nearly 40% since 2018.
The electric-vehicle (EV) market illustrates how discriminatory
practices can boost trade. Tariffs on Chinese EVs are approaching
30%, and US regulations disqualify EVs containing components
produced or assembled in designated “entities of concern” from
receiving tax credits, effectively excluding Chinese manufacturers
from the American market. By contrast, European EVs are subject to
a significantly lower tariff of 2.5% and qualify for a $7,500
subsidy under the Inflation Reduction Act when leased.
Consequently, Chinese EV exports have shifted to Europe, while
European automakers have found success in the US.
Meanwhile, the EU is undergoing a similar shift. In the wake of
Western sanctions on Russia, European exports to Turkey and Central
Asian countries such as Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan have skyrocketed.
At the same time, trade volumes between these countries and Russia
have soared.
Such methods of circumventing sanctions or discriminatory tariffs
result in higher production and logistics costs, as goods must now
be shipped to intermediate countries before being transported to
the US. Sanctions and discriminatory tariffs can thus boost trade
and reduce welfare.
These harmful consequences underscore the importance of the
“most-favoured nation” principle that has long been the cornerstone
of the global trading system. The concerted efforts to liberalise
trade, first through the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade,
and subsequently through the World Trade Organisation, have
increased trade volumes and overall welfare thanks to their
non-discriminatory approach. By contrast, today’s
geopolitically-driven discriminatory tariffs and trade barriers
explicitly target specific countries viewed as hostile or as
potential threats.
Who pays the price? Economic theory (and common sense) provides a
clear answer: countries that impose discriminatory trade
restrictions end up bearing the costs while the rest of the world
benefits. Consequently, the US and China are negatively affected by
their tariff war, while Vietnam and Mexico gain by serving as
intermediaries. Similarly, Turkiye and Central Asian countries
benefit from sanctions against Russia, while the EU foots the
bill.
This distribution of costs and benefits helps explain the limited
international opposition to Trump’s China tariffs. After all, the
EU, Mexico, or Vietnam have little incentive to object to a US
policy that benefits their own industries. Consequently,
international pressure is unlikely to deter major powers like the
US or China from prioritising geopolitical strategies over trade
liberalisation. To counter this tendency, it is crucial to make
political leaders aware of the adverse effects of trade
barriers.
As the most open and least geopolitically ambitious of the world’s
major economic powers, the EU is likely to recognise this first.
But the stakes are much higher for the US and China. The US, in
particular, stands to lose the most if it continues its trade war
with China. To prevent this outcome, it must change course and
return to the non-discriminatory principles that have long
underpinned global trade policies.
https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/new-globalization-paradigm-offers-more-trade-but-less-welfare-by-daniel-gros-2024-04?barrier=accesspaylog
