美西方“下注”印度，但它替代不了中国
2024-06-04 06:01阅读：
'印度永远不会成为西方所希望的样子。”《日经亚洲》（Nikkei
Asia）6月3日以此为题刊发澳大利亚印度裔前银行家萨提亚吉特·达斯（Satyajit
Das）的评论文章，直言美国及其盟友为“对冲中国的崛起”故意拉拢印度，这一算盘最终会以失望收场，“印度无法取代中国”。
在达斯眼中，这些国家的行为是一种拙劣的尝试，以弥补西方军事实力的下降、经济的疲软、工业竞争力的减弱、人口的老龄化以及社会政治的分裂。
而印度的轴心战略建立在“敌人的敌人就是朋友”的简单前提之上，在经济和战略上都是不连贯的。
目前，印经济规模约为3.7万亿美元，是全球第五大经济体，排在美国、中国、日本和德国之后。
印度总理经济顾问委员会成员桑亚尔（Sanjeev
Sanyal）表示，印度在2024至2025财年（第一年4月1日至下一年3月31日）经济规模有望达到4万亿美元。印度财政部长西塔拉曼（Nirmala
Sitharaman）则称，预计印度会在2026年2027财年初超越日本和德国，成为世界第三大经济体。
不过作者指出，按购买力平价计算，印度的国内生产总值（GDP）不到中国的 40%，因此无法替代中国成为全球增长引擎。
当地时间2023年8月3日，印度Haringhata，当地电商公司Flipkart的员工在配送中心工作。
当地时间2023年8月3日，印度Haringhata，当地电商公司Flipkart的员工在配送中心工作。
近来，印度的经济增长率近来持续攀升，许多机构上调印度本财年的经济增长率。联合国《世界经济形势与前景》报告日前将印度2024年国内生产总值增长率预测从原先的6.2%上调至6.9%，理由是公共投资稳固和私人消费强劲。国际货币基金组织
（IMF）也将印度国内生产总值增长率上调至6.8%，并称之为全球经济充满挑战背景下的一个亮点。
然而，在达斯看来，与其说印度的市场实力在不断增强，不如说这是为了消除疫情时期的紧缩影响，也是政府大规模基础设施支出的结果。
作者认为，印度面临一系列不利因素，包括不断增长的公共和私人债务、不稳定的经常账户赤字。“裙带资本主义”、难以根治的腐败问题都有据可查。
当地时间2023年4月8日，印度北方邦，在马瓦纳路的斯坦福板球工业工厂内，一名员工正在为板球缝制皮革缝。密鲁特是该国著名的体育用品制造中心之一。
当地时间2023年4月8日，印度北方邦，在马瓦纳路的斯坦福板球工业工厂内，一名员工正在为板球缝制皮革缝。密鲁特是该国著名的体育用品制造中心之一。
“事实证明，将制造业务转移到印度以减少对中国生产的依赖是困难的。虽然印度的劳动力成本比中国低三分之二，但这并不能弥补教育水平低、生产率低和产品质量不佳的不足。”达斯写道，因此，印度无法以廉价、充足和有能力的工人来抵消中国人口下降的影响。
印度现在是世界上人口最多的国家，25岁以下人口占总人口的40%以上，但总和生育率（TFR）低于世代更替水平（2.1）。此外，印度劳动力参与率仅为55%，只有约三分之一的印度妇女参加工作，而中国的这一比例则接近三分之二。
“印度也无法取代中国作为西方产品市场的地位。”达斯解释说，印度的平均收入水平只有中国的五分之一，即使不考虑新德里对进口的怀疑态度，印度的需求也因此受限。
印度与美国、日本、澳大利亚构建的“四方安全对话”（QUAD）日渐式微，由此可见，防务合作不切实际。
达斯强调，西方无法通过与印度结盟来回避正视中国实力的现实。
美国所珍视的单极世界已成为过去，新兴的多极世界也并非完美无缺。但没有合作与共存，气候变化、资源匮乏、军事对抗等紧迫的生存问题就无法得到解决。没有中国和印度的共同参与，减少全球碳排放的努力也将失败。
印度和西方之间必然会趋同的假设最终可能是错误的。植根于过时的世界观，西方对印度的推进可能会以痛苦告终。
India will never be all the West wants it to
be
Country cannot fill in for China as production base or market
Satyajit Das
Satyajit Das, a former banker, is the author of 'A Banquet of
Consequences: Reloaded' and 'Fortune's Fool: Australia's
Choices.'
The courtship of India by the U.S. and its allies in recent years,
intended to offset the rise of China, is a clumsy attempt to
compensate for the West's declining military potency, economic
weakness, flagging industrial competitiveness, aging population and
sociopolitical divisions.
Founded on the simplistic premise that 'My enemy's enemy is my
friend,' the Indian pivot is economically and strategically
incoherent.
With less than 40% of China's gross domestic product on a
purchasing power parity basis, India cannot provide a meaningful
alternative to the Middle Kingdom as a global growth engine.
True, India has been posting higher rates of growth than any other
major economy, with the International Monetary Fund forecasting a
6.8% expansion this year. But rather than reflecting growing market
prowess, India's rising output is more about undoing the effects of
COVID-era retrenchment and a function of massive government
infrastructure spending.
Nagging concerns include growing public and private debt and a
volatile current account deficit. Crony capitalism, multifarious
obstacles to business and persistent corruption are well-documented
issues.
The relocation of manufacturing operations to India to reduce
reliance on Chinese production has proved difficult. Although labor
costs are two-thirds lower in India, this has not compensated for
poor education levels, low productivity and indifferent output
quality.
India thus cannot offset China's demographic decline in terms of
cheap, abundant and able workers. While now the world's most
populous country with over 40% of its population under the age of
25, India's fertility rate has fallen below the replacement level
of 2.1 births per woman. And labor force participation is just 55%
as only around one third of Indian women are in the workforce
versus almost two thirds of their Chinese counterparts.
Nor can India realistically take China's place as a market for
Western products. The average income level is a fifth that of
China, limiting demand even aside from New Delhi's skeptical stance
toward imports.
Defense cooperation is relatively fanciful as can be seen with the
declining profile of the Quad security arrangement that brought
India together with the U.S., Australia and Japan. India's military
is large but lacks adequate training and equipment. Its arsenal is
substantially Russian, complicating interoperability.
India's security focus is on its 6,800 kilometers of land frontiers
with China and Pakistan. For the U.S., the priority is to get
Indian assistance in protecting Indian Ocean transport routes
crucial for Washington's East Asian allies. But New Delhi's
blue-water naval capabilities are untested.
India must also deal with ongoing domestic civil conflicts. A lack
of sufficient quality jobs for up to 12 million new job seekers
each year could further foment social instability.
The notion that the relationship between India and the West rests
on shared values is disingenuous. The V-Dem Institute, a Swedish
democracy research group, classifies India as an 'electoral
autocracy,' setting aside the tired cliche about the country being
the 'world's largest democracy.'
Politically motivated prosecutions of opponents, the persecution of
religious minorities, curtailment of press freedoms and judicial
interference have been on the rise. To be clear, though, such
practices did not start with Prime Minister Narenda Modi.
Mahatma Gandhi himself was famously equivocal about Western
civilization. The ideology of Modi's Bharatiya Janata Party is
aimed at establishing Hindu hegemony, which would be fundamentally
inconsistent with secular democratic values.
In blatant disregard of U.S. and EU sanctions, India has become a
top importer of discounted Russian oil, much of which it refines
and reexports, generating substantial profit.
At the same time, Western pandering and official propaganda has
encouraged Modi and ordinary Indians to believe that they are
indispensable globally. As a result, India's ever-uncertain
enthusiasm for economic reform has faded, especially in relation to
agriculture, business regulation, subsidies, labor markets and
foreign investment.
India could also become more highhanded in its dealings with
neighbors, particularly Pakistan, which may accelerate a regional
arms race or worse. A sense of impunity already prevails as
evidenced by alleged government complicity in murder plots against
Sikh separatist leaders in North America. India has also allegedly
engaged in spying in Australia despite the two nations' ostensible
alliance.
The West, especially the U.S., believed for decades that building
ties with China would lead to economic and political
liberalization. Instead, this outreach created an economic and
geopolitical competitor.
The same could happen with India, which like China has always been
ambivalent toward the West. Consequently, a more transactional
approach, rooted in realpolitik, would be more appropriate.
On the economic front, the opening of the Indian market, in terms
of encouraging freer trade and capital flows, would benefit all
parties.
During India's most significant period of liberalization, between
1991 and 2014, the country's average import tariff fell from 125%
to 13%. Under BJP rule since then, the average tariff has climbed
to 18%. Under a monitoring system launched in November, importers
must register shipments of laptops and other electronics and might
later have to secure licenses to bring in such products.
Progress on Asian security will require adequate investment in
military capabilities to deter threats. It will also ultimately
require recognition of spheres of influence, dialogue, negotiated
settlement of disputes and difficult concessions and compromises.
The West cannot avoid facing up to the reality of Chinese power by
tying up with India.
The unipolar world cherished by the U.S. is now past. The emerging
multipolar world is not perfect. But without cooperation and
coexistence, urgent existential problems like climate change,
resource scarcity and military confrontation cannot be
addressed.
Without China and India both taking part, efforts to reduce global
carbon emissions will fail. Access to critical raw materials for
the energy transition also requires pragmatism on trade.
The assumption of an inevitable convergence between India and the
West could ultimately be as misplaced as was the earlier one about
China. Rooted in an outmoded worldview, the West's advances toward
India could end just as bitterly.
