海湾对美国战略价值或已下降
2024-07-23 19:24阅读：
自从遭受1973年石油禁运的经济影响以来，美国一直认为来自波斯湾的石油的自由流动对其经济和国家安全至关重要。50多年过后，美国目前正在考虑与沙特阿拉伯达成一项安全协议，这一提议至少在一定程度上是由美国获得波斯湾石油的假定重要性所推动的。
华盛顿坚持认为，波斯湾是美国安全利益的核心，原因包括：首先，美国把石油能够安全运出海湾视为一个至关重要的经济和安全问题。其次，主导波斯湾意味着主导海上贸易的三个关键咽喉要道：霍尔木兹海峡、苏伊士运河和曼德海峡。第三，沙特将石油收入盈余投资于美国政府债券，维持了以美元计价的全球石油市场，继而成为维持美元作为全球储备货币地位的核心要素，并确保美国的金融霸权。
在这三个核心原因之外还有第四个原因：如果美国不继续维护其在该地区的主导地位，那么一个与之竞争的大国将寻求把该地区纳入自己的势力范围。然而，自20世纪70年代以来，全球经济发生巨大变化，地缘政治安全动态也是如此。波斯湾对美国安全是否仍然至关重要？值得美国履行额外的安全义务吗？
首先，西方对波斯湾石油的需求，以及1973年石油禁运所引发的恐慌一直是个重要问题。尽管美国自身生产石油，但其经济一直需要额外的石油进口。这种动态赋予沙特阿拉伯和石油输出国组织对美国经济的影响力。然而，自20世纪70年代以来，美国为减少对外国石油的依赖作出重大努力，并且取得成功。此外，现代石油市场更加灵活，这意味着现在的市场更容易适应变化和接纳变化。
其次，三个海上咽喉要道中的两个，即苏伊士运河和曼德海峡，并不是绝对的咽喉。贸易可以绕路非洲南端。这条路线要长得多，而且会扰乱贸易，但这不太可能对经济造成毁灭性影响。
在2021年的“长赐号”货轮事件中，一艘集装箱船堵塞了苏伊士运河，苏伊士运河关闭的直接影响是显而
易见的，但这离经济末日还很远。在当前的中东冲突中，胡塞组织对曼德海峡加以利用，我们再次看到了不便利，而不是灾难。霍尔木兹海峡是该地区唯一真正的咽喉要道，世界每天石油消费量的20%到30%必须取道该海峡、而没有其他替代海上通道。尽管伊朗发出威胁，但许多专家质疑它封锁霍尔木兹海峡的能力。此外，美国以前已经成功应对了伊朗对石油供应的威胁，为什么它需要再次增加对该地区的义务、以便再次做到这一点呢？
第三，有说法称，美国对海湾地区的承诺是必要的，因为要通过石油美元的循环利用来捍卫美元的霸权地位。尽管人们目前在猜测石油美元对全球货币体系的把控正在减弱，但我们实际上并没有观察到美国金融实力的任何严重减弱。出现这种趋势的一大原因是，全球金融体系缺乏令人信服的替代方案。此外，随着未来20年到50年绿色能源的引入，能源市场即将发生变化，这意味着美国应该考虑其对石油美元的命运意味着什么，而不是加倍向石油美元体系作出承诺并对关键投资提供安全保证。
最后，有假设认为，如果美国不能在该地区保持把控并树立一种有力量的形象，那么竞争对手将慢慢开始潜入并扩大其影响力，威胁到前文讨论过的“至关重要的”美国利益。这种担忧使沙特得以在不作出让步的情况下，夸大自己在这种关系中的力量，从而得到想要的东西。
过分夸大波斯湾的重要性导致美国的过度承诺，并令美国的资源持续消耗。重新考虑这一战略肯定是有必要的。
Does the Persian Gulf Still Matter?
The gulf's value to U.S. strategy certainly is not worth additional
defense obligations to the region.
by Sabreena Croteau
Since suffering the economic impact of the 1973 oil embargo, the
United States has considered the free flow of oil from the Persian
Gulf to be of the utmost importance to its economic and national
security. More than fifty years since the events of 1973, the
United States is now considering a security pact with Saudi Arabia,
a proposal driven, at least in part, by the supposed importance of
U.S. access to Persian Gulf oil.
Washington maintains that the Persian Gulf is central to U.S.
security interests for several reasons. First, the United States
views the safe transit of oil out of the gulf as a vital economic
and security concern. Second, dominance in the Persian Gulf means
dominance over three critical chokepoints in maritime commerce: the
Hormuz Strait, the Suez Canal, and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. Third,
the investment of the Saudi oil surplus into U.S. government
obligations maintains a global oil market priced in U.S. dollars,
which in turn is a core component in maintaining the position of
the dollar as the global reserve currency and underwrites U.S.
financial supremacy.
These three core reasons are then accompanied by a fourth: If the
United States does not continually assert its dominance over the
region, then a competing great power (formerly the Soviet Union and
now China) will seek to bring the region into its own sphere of
influence. However, the global economy has changed dramatically
since the 1970s, as have the geopolitical security dynamics. Is the
Persian Gulf still as vital to U.S. security? Is it worth an
additional security obligation?
First, there is the ever-important question of the Western need for
Persian Gulf oil and the fear that the 1973 oil embargo instilled.
While the United States has consistently been a top oil producer,
it has also been among the largest oil consumers throughout the
same period. Therefore, despite its own production, its economy has
always needed additional oil imports. As a rising oil power in the
1970s, this dynamic gave Saudi Arabia and OPEC power over the U.S.
economy. However, since the 1970s, the United States has made
significant efforts to decrease its dependence on foreign oil, and
it has successfully done so. Furthermore, the modern oil market is
much more flexible than that of the 1970s, meaning it is much
easier now for the market to adapt and accommodate changes.
Second, two of the three maritime chokepoints, the Suez Canal and
the Bab el-Mandeb Strait on either side of the Red Sea, are not
absolute. Trade can move instead around the southern cape of
Africa. It’s a much longer route and would disrupt trade, but that
impact is unlikely to be economically devastating. In the case of
the 2021 Evergreen incident, when a container ship blocked the Suez
Canal, the direct impact of a Suez closure was observable.
While it was not optimal, it was far from economic doomsday. In the
current conflict in the Middle East, the Houthis have taken
advantage of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, and again, we’ve observed
inconveniences rather than catastrophes. The Strait of Hormuz,
through which 20-30 percent of the world’s daily oil consumption
must pass with no alternative sea route, is the only true
chokepoint in the region. Despite its threats, many experts
question the capability of Iran to blockade the Strait.
Furthermore, the United States has successfully managed Iranian
threats to oil access before, so why would it need to increase its
obligations to the region to do so again?
Then there is the claim that U.S. commitment to the gulf is
necessary to protect dollar supremacy through the recycling of
petrodollars. Despite ongoing speculation about the diminishing
hold of petrodollars over the global currency system, we have not
actually observed any drastic diminishing of U.S. financial power.
A large reason for this trend is that the global financial system
lacks a convincing alternative. The Euro lacks a eurozone-wide
“safe” government-backed asset necessary for a reserve currency,
and the fate of the Yuan is too unpredictable, subject to
government control and potential domestic instability. Furthermore,
impending shifts in energy markets with the introduction of green
energy in the next twenty to fifty years mean that the United
States should consider what that means for the fate of the
petrodollar, not doubling down on its commitment to the petrodollar
system with security guarantees to key investor states.
Lastly, there is the final assumption that if the United States
doesn’t continuously maintain its grip and project an image of
strength in the region, a rival power will slowly start to creep in
and extend its influence, threatening the previously discussed
“vital” U.S. interests. This fear has allowed Saudi Arabia to
overinflate its power in the relationship to get what it wants
without making concessions. The United States has remained
unwaveringly committed to Saudi Arabia, even as the kingdom has
unilaterally cut oil production, waged war in Yemen, and committed
a long string of human rights violations, including the killing of
dissident journalist Jamal Khashoggi.
Overinflating the Persian Gulf’s importance contributes to American
overcommitment and represents a continual drain on U.S. resources.
Washington is concerned about Chinese influence in the region. Yet,
the current situation has China free-riding on U.S. security
costs—China is dependent on the import of Persian Gulf oil to a
much greater extent than the United States. Yet, China is freely
provided with secure access to Persian Gulf oil, courtesy of the
United States military. A rethink of this strategy is surely
warranted
