意大利面临中等强国困境
2024-08-28 09:59阅读：
8月初，意大利“加富尔”号航母与法国、德国、西班牙、英国一起在澳大利亚参加“漆黑24”军事演习。这种高强度训练旨在加强与国际盟友的互操作性。演习结束后，这个意大利航母战斗群前往关岛和日本，然后将首次通过南中国海、前往菲律宾。
Italy's Middle Power Dilemma
Rome would be served well by sharpening its strategic objectives
and understanding the limits of its cababilities.
by Gabriele Natalizia and Lorenzo Termine
Recently, the Italian aircraft carrier ITS Cavour joined France,
Germany, Spain, and the United Kingdom in Exercise Pitch Black 24
in Australia. This high-intensity training aims to boost
interoperability with international allies. Following the exercise,
the Italian carrier strike group will head to Guam, Japan, and
then, for the first time, it will transit through the South China
Sea headed to the Philippines.
This comes a
s the Italian Parliament greenlights over forty military operations
for 2024, including new missions in Italy’s “Enlarged
Mediterranean,” an EU-led naval mission in the Red Sea (Aspides),
and a humanitarian mission in Palestine (Levante). Personnel-wise,
Italy stands out as the top contributor to UN military operations
and the second-largest to both NATO and EU missions.
These moves reflect a dual-track foreign policy expansion initiated
under the Draghi government (2021–22) and accelerated by the Meloni
administration. Italian foreign policy has broadened beyond its
traditional Atlantic, European, and Mediterranean perimeters.
First, Italy is stretching the concept of the “Enlarged
Mediterranean,” extending its reach from the Sahel region of Africa
to the Black Sea, including the Horn of Africa and the Arabian Sea.
Here, Italy is concerned with and aims to strengthen fragile
states, which are susceptible not only to crime and terrorism but
also to influence from China and Russia. These powers used economic
aid and military support not just for resource extraction but to
exert control over Europe through strategic points, resources, and
migration routes. To counter this, among other goals, Italy
launched the Mattei Plan. It secured several African states’
endorsements at the Italy-Africa Summit (January 28–29) as well as
G7’s blessing at the Borgo Egnazia Summit (June 13–15). The plan
targets nine critical countries—Algeria, the Democratic Republic of
Congo, Ivory Coast, Egypt, Ethiopia, Kenya, Morocco, Mozambique,
and Tunisia—with pilot projects.
Second, Italy’s participation in Pitch Black 24 highlights its
growing engagement in the Indo-Pacific in the wake of other
European middle powers. Italy joined the Global Combat Air Program
(GCAP) with Japan and the UK. Still, it didn’t renew its Memorandum
of Understanding (MOU) with China, signed a strategic partnership
with Japan, and strengthened ties with India. Italy is also ramping
up its military presence in the Indo-Pacific, underlining its
commitment to Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs) despite not
joining US-led initiatives of the sort.
The six-month deployment of the Italian Navy’s Thaon di Revel-class
ship Francesco Morosini in 2023, followed in 2024 by a five-month
deployment of the Cavour aircraft carrier group and a similar
cruise by the off-shore patrol ship Montecuccoli, showcases this
shift. These missions are about naval diplomacy, promoting Italian
industry, and engaging with NATO allies and local forces to promote
interoperability—particularly with Japan. Italy also participated
in the Rim of the Pacific exercise (RIMPAC), the world’s largest
maritime warfare exercise, for the first time with a vessel.
Despite this growing effort, Italy has yet to formalize a national
security strategy defining its interests, objectives, resources,
threats, and defense capabilities. As the only G7 country without
such a document, Italy may be pressured to develop one soon if
recent signals from high-level institutions are any
indication.
Adopting a national security strategy would require Rome to clearly
define its actions and manage constraints. This is crucial as
Italy’s middle power status brings two major implications.
From a positional standpoint, a middle power is defined by its
ability. Given this, Italy should focus its foreign policy
primarily on the “Enlarged Mediterranean.” This approach helps
avoid both the risk of overextending commitments with limited
resources and the challenge of justifying increased exposure in a
region like the Indo-Pacific to a domestic public that is often
resistant to higher defense spending.
As middle powers can defend their interests mostly in their
regions, Italy is pressured to focus on the “Enlarged
Mediterranean” and avoid overextension of commitments. This is also
crucial as the Italian audience is highly skeptical of foreign
military deployments.
However, middle powers are dangerously exposed to great power
competition’s externalities. When confrontation among the most
powerful actors ramps up, middle powers are pushed to alignment
with their stronger ally as freedom of maneuver shrinks. As a
result, Rome is now paying more attention to Washington’s calls for
a more robust European engagement with the Indo-Pacific. This move
is supposed to benefit relations with Washington, as Rome can
leverage the growing commitment in Asia to keep the Americans
committed to Euro-Mediterranean security, at least to a reasonable
extent.
Italy faces this middle-power dilemma. On one hand, the
Mediterranean is a powder keg, urging Rome to focus resources on
its stabilization. On the other, the United States will
increasingly pivot toward the Indo-Pacific and pull some allies
with it. In this context, formalizing a national security strategy
could enhance Italian standing, especially if it contains a global
outlook, as well as promote greater executive coordination.
However, it might also constrain foreign policy flexibility as the
document puts commitments down on paper. Alternatively, not
adopting one could be a strategic choice for retaining greater
freedom of maneuver and adaptability. Alas, it might also limit
Italy’s future role on the global stage for two reasons. First,
Washington and some allies could feel that Rome was not keeping up
with the shifting balance of power. Second, national executive
coordination could fall short, especially in the face of growing
great power competition.
