欧洲人有个好笑的地方，认为自己也应参与美国大选投票
2024-08-30 17:18阅读：
前德国驻美国大使、慕尼黑安全会议主席伊辛格日前在《纽约时报》发表了一篇题为《为什么欧洲人如此关注美国大选》的文章。
伊辛格说：“在美国总统大选期间，身为欧洲人有一个好笑的地方，那就是我们相信自己也应该参与投票。这能怪我们吗？许多欧洲人正确地认为，椭圆形办公室的主人是谁对欧洲大陆的福祉和安全至关重要。”
因此，即使欧洲正在爆发一场战争，克里姆林宫一再发出核威胁，欧洲媒体对美国竞选进展的关注却比以往还要多，这也就不足为奇了。考虑到乌克兰战争、中东爆发更大规模战争的风险等，欧洲自冷战结束以来从未如此需要美国。而且美国仍然拥有一项独特而宝贵的资产，是它日益增加的竞争者和对手们所不具备的，那就是在欧洲的可靠盟友和伙伴。
他在文章中说：“我曾经领导了国际安全论坛慕尼黑安全会议超过14年。多年来，该会议积累了一长串跨大西洋事务清单。其核心是美国和欧洲需要面对的三大战略挑战，无论谁在11月的美国大选中获胜。我们如何应对这些挑战，将决定跨大西洋联盟是继续保持我们过去75年来所熟知的紧密伙伴关系，还是走向解体。”
伊辛格强调：“美国要是真的希望欧洲对欧洲大陆的安全承担更多责任，就应该鼓励欧洲伙伴在欧洲开发和采购更多武器，并以多方协调的方式进行。如果我们统一行动，在欧盟和欧洲北约伙伴之间共用与分享更多资源，我们每年可以节省大约150亿欧元或更多资金，并将其用于更多更好的系统，以及更多的弹药。”
他还强调，俄乌战争和加沙战争使得西方的集体信誉受到了打击，也削弱了西方的集体能力。所有这些挑战都很复杂，不容易解决。欧洲不应抱任何幻想，不能指望两位美国总统候选人中的任何一位能创造奇迹。尽管如此，许多欧洲人还是希望哈里斯担任总统后能延续拜登的做法
，能够比特朗普更愿意倾听欧洲的担忧，而在跨太平洋问题上，特朗普的表现是不利于持续性和谐的。他在担任总统期间和卸任后对北约所表达的疑虑，至今仍萦绕在许多欧洲领导人的心头。尽管如此，在经济、贸易、投资和技术方面，与哈里斯领导的白宫进行跨大西洋讨论，可能会与第二届特朗普政府的讨论一样艰难。
无论是谁在11月胜选，美国新总统和欧洲领导人都应该提醒自己，要注意这一至关重要的关系所带来的真正好处——并让对话继续下去。
To Whom It May Concern: America and Europe Need Each
Other
An illustration of an eagle flying over a group of men with
binoculars.
By Wolfgang Ischinger
The funny thing about being a European during American presidential
elections is the belief that you, too, should be allowed to vote.
And can you blame us? Who gets to occupy the Oval Office is
correctly seen by many in Europe as a decision of existential
significance for the well-being and security of the
continent.
No surprise, then, that even with a war raging in Europe involving
repeated nuclear threats by the Kremlin, the developments in the
U.S. campaigns have received even greater attention in the European
press than usual. Given the war in Ukraine, the risks of a larger
war in the Middle East and China’s accelerating challenge to
American primacy, Europe needs the United States more than it has
since the end of the Cold War. And America still has a unique and
valuable asset that its growing list of rivals and adversaries
don’t: reliable allies and partners in Europe.
Over the years, the Munich Security Conference, the international
security forum that I led for 14 years, has tallied a long list of
trans-Atlantic to-dos. At its core are three strategic challenges
that America and Europe will need to face, regardless of who wins
the U.S. election in November. How we deal with them will decide
whether the trans-Atlantic alliance will continue as the tight-knit
partnership we have known for the past 75 years or unravel.
First: We need to talk about China. Unlike the European Union,
which defines China as a partner, competitor and systemic rival,
America appears to have concluded, in a rare show of bipartisan
agreement, that China is now not only its key rival but also its
main long-term adversary in terms of global political and military
power and influence. Trans-Atlantic discord about how best to deal
with China is already visible, and it seems bound to get
worse.
When it comes to handling Russia, Europe and the United States have
had an elaborate consultation and coordination mechanism for the
past seven decades: NATO. With China, there is nothing comparable.
Why wasn’t Europe consulted when the United States decided to deny
certain semiconductor chips from being exported to China? Is there
any agreed strategy on Taiwan? As seen from Europe, the
increasingly popular idea in Washington that America should focus
on China and leave Ukraine for the Europeans to deal with is
outright dangerous. Many Europeans feel that China may very well
interpret declining U.S. support for Ukraine as a sign of weakness.
(Remember Afghanistan?)
The creation of a fully staffed body focused on coordinating on
China and the Asia Pacific region should be high on our common
agenda. An enlarged Group of 7 that includes Australia, South Korea
and potentially other regional powers could be one option, though
maybe not a sufficient one.
Next, we need to start talking like grown-ups about paying our
defense bills. The biggest long-term irritant in NATO has all but
disappeared: Europeans are no longer refusing to carry a fair share
of the common defense burden. Defense budgets everywhere have
grown; alliance members’ 2014 pledge to spend 2 percent of national
G.D.P. has been fulfilled by most. So what’s the problem? In short,
we in Europe spend our defense euros incredibly inefficiently
because we cannot agree on where and how to produce our weapons or
what to buy. As of 2016, the United States used about 30 major
military systems, from aircraft to frigates, compared with
approximately 180 systems among the European allies.
Worse still, Europeans do more than two-thirds of their military
procurement in the United States, starving European companies of
much-needed investment. This is great news for the American defense
industry, but it is politically unsustainable in Europe in the
longer term. Senators in Washington are happy when lots of defense
production employment happens in their state. European politicians
are no different.
If America truly wants Europe to be more responsible for the
security of its continent, Washington should encourage European
partners to develop and buy more arms in Europe and do it in a
coordinated manner. If we got our act together and did more pooling
and sharing among E.U. and European NATO partners, we could save
around 15 billion euros or more each year and spend it on more and
better systems, as well as on more ammunition.
Finally, we need to talk about our common Western values. Isn’t the
one major difference between us and authoritarian or dictatorial
regimes our commitment to human rights, to the rule of law, to
decency in this age of impunity, as David Miliband, the former
British foreign secretary, once called the current global disorder?
We can and we should be proud of this commitment. The problem is
that the Western world — and in particular the United States — is
being accused of applying double standards in dealing with wars,
conflicts, and human rights abuses.
This is, of course, not a new point of contention. (During the
recent pandemic, many developing countries thought they had been
promised vaccines as soon as vaccines became available. In reality,
many had to wait until everybody in Brussels or Miami had been
vaccinated.) But the simultaneous wars in Ukraine and Gaza have
made the problem a lot worse — and practically unmanageable.
Western nations expect the world to support our resolutions
condemning Russian behavior in Ukraine, but we find it difficult to
reciprocate regarding the conduct of the war in Gaza.
As a result, our collective credibility has suffered a blow. It is
a blow to our identity, but it also reduces our collective ability
to counter the growing advances of authoritarianism and the open
and growing disregard of international law. Is there an easy recipe
for eliminating this credibility gap? No, but collectively and
solemnly recommitting ourselves to the rule of law and to the
United Nations Charter in our approach to international conflicts
and crises could be a first step.
All of these challenges are complex and not easily solved. Europe
should have no illusions: Neither one of the two U.S. presidential
candidates can be expected to produce miracles. Many Europeans
nevertheless hope that a Kamala Harris presidency would, following
in Joe Biden’s footsteps, be more inclined to listen to European
worries about Russia and China, and about trans-Atlantic security,
than Donald Trump, whose trans-Atlantic track record was not one of
continued harmony. The doubts he expressed about NATO during and
after his presidency are still very much on the minds of many
European leaders. Still, the trans-Atlantic discussion with a
Harris White House might be just as tough as it would be with a
second Trump administration when it comes to the economy, trade,
investment and tech.
No matter who wins the White House in November, the new American
president and European leaders should remind themselves of the very
real benefits of this centrally important relationship — and keep
the conversation going.
