美国为了保住霸权，使中东更加动荡
2024-08-31 09:30阅读：
美国坚持维持其全球霸主地位，已经成为学术界、记者甚至社交媒体讨论的主要话题。面对崛起的中国，美国维持其霸权的努力是国际关系中的稳定因素，还是不稳定因素？更具体地说，这与中东局势有什么关系？
总的来说，美国一直声称自己是一个促进该地区和平与安全的国家，因此也促进了稳定。然而，在所有这些层面上，华盛顿过去20年的行为都远没有兑现其言辞。美国在推进和平以及由此产生的自由主义价值观方面一直是有选择性的。它在提供安全方面一直不可预测，而且它的行动通常加剧了不稳定。
以色列-加沙战争是破坏美国在这些方面形象的最新例子。在10个月的大规模屠杀之后，拜登政府不愿强制停火，这本身就是华盛顿表里不一的证据。它声称希望停火，但没有动用任何权力工具来结束冲突。事实上，美国的武器已经在加沙造成了可怕的生命损失，美国近几十年来几乎没有为以巴和谈创造成功的环境。
加沙战争也不仅仅是另一场中东战争。许多国家将这场冲突视为挑战美国全球霸主地位的一个窗口，而美国对加沙遭受的苦难负有极大责任这一事实强化了一些国家的观点，即这种霸主地位必须结束。
一些人可能会说，地区安全的一个主要组成部分是打击恐怖主义，美国在领导打击“伊斯兰国”组织时成功地做到了这一点。也许是这样的，但这也为许多不稳定奠定了基础，随着美国与库尔德武装联手打击“伊斯兰国”组织，此事在过去和现在都被土耳其视为一种生存威胁。
如果美国同意与中国合作，那么地区稳定将大大增强。中国是另一个对这种稳定感兴趣的大国。然而，美国的首要任务是限制中国在中东的影响力。去年在北京的斡旋下，沙特与伊朗的和解协助缓和了地区紧张局势。这使得中东国家更加积极地看待中国的角色，相反，它们更加批判地看待美国的角色。
美国的立场模棱两可，这在很大程度
上揭示了它的意图。自奥巴马政府以来，美国一直表示不想在中东扮演至高无上的角色。然而，与此同时，它对中国发挥更大的作用并不抱有好感，也不希望看到自己的众多优势受到挑战。
这种不确定性令人困惑，损害了美国在该地区行动的正当性。为了保住自己的霸权（以及以色列等盟友的霸权），美国使该地区变得更加动荡，远不如以前和平。在推行自己的安全优先事项时，华盛顿与其他有自己安全优先事项的国家发生了冲突。在反对中国崛起的过程中，美国人放弃了一种可能有价值的合作，而这种合作可以化解地区敌意。
The US made the Middle East more volatile by wanting to
preserve its supremacy
Michael Young
America’s insistence on maintaining its global supremacy has become
a major topic of discussion among academics, journalists and even
on social media. With Washington facing a rising China, is the US
effort to sustain its hegemony a stabilising factor in
international relations, or a destabilising one? More particularly,
how does this relate to the situation in the Middle East?
Generally, the US has claimed to be a country that advances peace
and security in the region, and therefore also stability. Yet on
all these levels, Washington’s behaviour in the past two decades
has come up well short of its rhetoric. The US has been selective
in advancing peace, and the liberal values deriving from this; it
has been unpredictable in providing security, and its actions have
generally exacerbated instability.
The Israel-Gaza war is the most recent example undermining
America's image of itself in these categories. The administration
of President Joe Biden’s unwillingness to impose a ceasefire after
10 months of mass killing is proof alone of Washington’s duplicity.
It purports to want a ceasefire, but has used none of its
instruments of power to bring the conflict to an end. Indeed, US
weapons have caused the horrific loss of life in Gaza, even as the
Americans have done very little in recent decades to create an
environment in which peace negotiations between Israelis and
Palestinians could succeed.
Nor is Gaza just another Middle Eastern war. It comes at a time
when the US is increasingly competing with a rising China, so the
resentment Gaza has created is playing into this contest. Many
states view the conflict as a window through which to challenge US
global dominance, and the fact that the US is complicit in Gaza’s
suffering has reinforced a view among several countries that such
dominance must end.
The same holds for the values accompanying peace. If peace, in the
US view, provides an ideal context to advance liberal, humanitarian
principles, Washington’s perfunctory attempts at ending the war in
Gaza reveal that its commitment to these principles is
superficial.
What about security? The US presence in the Middle East has not
really strengthened security at the regional level much. The
Americans have provided security to some allies, but at a systemic
level they haven’t. And even there the record is spotty. When Saudi
Arabia’s Abqaiq oil facility was hit by Iranian drones in 2019, the
US did nothing, though protecting Saudi oil was a strategic
constant of the US presence.
Some might argue that a major component of regional security is
combating terrorism, which the US did successfully at the head of
the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS. Perhaps, but this also laid
the groundwork for much instability, as the US alliance with
Kurdish forces against ISIS was and is regarded as an existential
threat by Turkey.
At the same time, the US inability or unwillingness to develop any
regional or international solution for ISIS prisoners and their
family members has only produced an explosive situation that makes
a revival of the organisation more likely.
Regional stability would be greatly enhanced if the US agreed to
work with China – another major actor with an interest in such
stability to guarantee the continued flow of oil for its economy.
Yet the US priority is to limit China’s reach in the Middle East.
The paradox is that the Saudi-Iranian rapprochement mediated by
Beijing last year, for instance, helped to calm regional tensions.
This led countries in the Middle East to look more positively at
China's role, and, by contrast, more critically at America’s.
There is ambiguity in the US position that reveals a great deal
about its intentions. Since the Obama administration, the US has
indicated it does not want to maintain a paramount role in the
Middle East. Yet at the same time, it does not look benignly on a
larger Chinese role, nor does it want to see its myriad advantages
challenged.
This uncertainty is confusing, and harms justifications for US
actions in the region. In wanting to preserve its supremacy (and
therefore that of allies such as Israel), the US has made the
region more volatile and far less peaceful. In imposing its own
security priorities, Washington has clashed with other states who
have security priorities of their own. And in opposing China’s
rise, the Americans have forsaken a potentially valuable
collaboration that could defuse regional hostilities.
Certainly, the Americans are damned if they do, and damned if they
don’t. Backing one ally, Israel, may lead to instability, while
failing to back another, Saudi Arabia, may, equally, have generated
instability. The problem is that the US appears to have no
overriding strategy to iron out the incongruities. To a great
extent this stems from the fact that Washington resists rethinking
its pre-eminence in the Middle East.
Sooner or later, the Americans will realise that just as decades
ago a detente with the Soviet Union helped appease global
antagonism, some form of acceptance of China’s role will be
necessary to do the same in the future. This is especially true in
the Middle East, where the Chinese, even more than the Americans,
have little interest in new wars and where both countries have the
capacity to resolve conflicts by acting in unison.
