[转载]2012-3-7 经典翻译-巴菲特致股东的信 1961年 Catherin
2022-04-01 10:59阅读：
翻译：燕子 校对：Catherine
Our performance in
1961:
I have consistently told
partners that it is my expectation and hope (it’s always hard to
tell which is which) that we will do relatively well compared to
the general market in down or static markets, but that we may not
look so good in advancing markets. In strongly advancing markets I
expect to have real difficult, keeping up with the general
market.
我们在1961年的表现
我不断的告知各位合伙人，我的预期和期望（通常我们
很难区分是预期还是希望）就是：在下跌或者盘整的市场中，我们的投资业绩会相对好于总体市场水平，但是在激进的市场中我们的表现就没有那么好了。在强劲上涨的市场中，我预期会很难赶上总体市场水平。
Although 1961 was certainly a
good year for the general market and, in addition a very good year
for us on both an absolute and relative basis, the expectation: in
the previous paragraph remain unchanged.
尽管1961年毫无疑问是总体市场表现很好的年份，而且我们的绝对或者相对收益也都表现的很好，但我上述的预期仍然保持不变。
During 1961, the general market
as measured by the Dow-Jones Industrial Average (hereinafter called
the “Dow”) showed an over-all gain of 22.2% including dividends
received through ownership of the Dow. The gain for all partners
operating throughout the entire year, after all expenses of
operation, but before payments to limited partners or accrual to
the general partner, averaged 45.9. The details of this gain by
partnership are shown in the appendix along with results for the
partnerships started during the year.
在1961年，以道琼斯工业平均指数（下文中成为道琼斯）衡量的总体收益为22.2%，这个收益包含了道琼斯工业指数股东获得的红利。所有合伙人通过整年的运作获得的收益平均水平为45.9%，该收益扣除了营业费用，但未扣除对有限责任合伙人和普通合伙人的支付。该收益的详情和该年新加入的合伙人的经营结果请查看附录。
We have now completed five full
years of partnership operation, and the results of these five years
are shown below on a year-by-year basis and also on a cumulative or
compounded basis. These results are stated on the basis described
in the preceding paragraph; after expenses, but before division of
gains among partners or payments to partners.
我们现在已经完成了五年的合伙人公司运作，这五年中每年的投资结果或者累积复合计算结果如下表。这些投资结果是基于上面描述的方法：扣除了营业费用，但是没有扣除合伙人的红利和利息支付。
Partnerships
Dow-Jones
Year
operating
partnership
Industrials
Entire year
gain
Gain*
1957
3
10.4%
-8.4%
1958
5
40.9
38.5
1959
6
25.9
19.9
1960
7
22.8
-6.3
1961
7
45.9
22.2
* including dividends received
through ownership of the Dow.
年份
合伙企业数量
合伙企业收益
道琼斯工业指数收益
1957
3
10.4%
-8.4%
1958
5
40.9
38.5
1959
6
25.9
19.9
1960
7
22.8
-6.3
1961
7
45.9
22.2
*
包括道琼斯工业平均指数股东获得红利分配。
On a compounded basis, the
cumulative results have been:
Partnership
Dow-Jones
Year
gain
Industrials
gain
1957
10.4%
-8.4%
1957-8
55.6
26.9
1957-9
95.9
52.2
1957-60
140.6
42.6
1957-61
251.0
74.3
在复合计算基础上，累积收益为：
年份
合伙人收益
道琼斯工业平均指数收益
1957
10.4%
-8.4%
1957-8
55.6
26.9
1957-9
95.9
52.2
1957-60
140.6
42.6
1957-61
251.0
74.3
These results do not measure
the gain to the limited partner, which of course, is the figure in
which you are most interested. Because of the varying partnership
arrangements that have existed in the past, I have used the
over-all net gain (based on market values at the beginning and end
of the year) to the partnership as being the fairest measure of
over-all performance.
该投资结果没有衡量有限责任合伙人的收益，当然，这个数字是你最感兴趣的。因为过去存在多种多样的合伙人制度安排，我采用合伙人的综合净收益（基于年初和年末的市场价值计算）作为总体表现的最公平的衡量方法。
On a pro-forma basis adjusted
to the division of gains entailed in our present Buffett
Partnership, Ltd. Agreement, the results would have
been:
Year
Limited Partners’ Gain
Dow Gain
1957
9.3%
-8.4%
1958
32.2
38.5
1959
20.9
19.9
1960
18.6
-6.3
1961
35.9
22.2
COMPOUNDED
1957
9.3%
-8.4%
1957-8
44.5
26.9
1957-9
74.7
52.2
1957-60
107.2
42.6
1957-61
181.6
74.3
按照我们现在的巴菲特合伙有限公司的协议，以预先估计的方式对收益的分配进行调整，结果如下：
年份
有限责任合伙人收益
道琼斯工业平均指数收益
1957
9.3%
-8.4%
1958
32.2
38.5
1959
20.9
19.9
1960
18.6
-6.3
1961
35.9
22.2
复合累积收益
1957
9.3%
-8.4%
1957-8
44.5
26.9
1957-9
74.7
52.2
1957-60
107.2
42.6
1957-61
181.6
74.3
A word about par
The outstanding item of
importance in my selection of partners, as well as in my subsequent
relations with them, had been the determination that we use the
same yardstick. If my performance is poor, I expect partners to
withdraw, and indeed, I should look for a new source of investment
for my own funds. If performance is good, I am assured of doing
splendidly, a state of affairs to which I am sure I can
adjust.
The rub, then, is in being sure
that we all have the same ideas of what is good and what is poor. I
believe in establishing yardsticks prior to the act;
retrospectively, almost anything can be made to look good in
relation to something or other.
关于标准
我选择合伙人的一个重要的条件，也是我随后和他们友好相处的准则，就是我们共用一套标准。如果我的业绩很差，我希望合伙人撤回投资，而且事实上，我将为我的基金寻找新的投资渠道。如果我的业绩良好，我会做的更好，我保证能把事情调整到良好的状态。困难在于必须确定我们对于表现好坏的区分有同样的标准。我认为应该在投资前建立一套标准；回顾过去，几乎任何事情都可以相对其他一些事情看起来还不错。
I have continuously used the
Dow-Jones Industrial Average as our measure of par. It is my
feeling that three years is a very minimal test of performance, and
the best test consists of a period at least that long where the
terminal level of the Dow is reasonably close to the initial
level.
我一直用道琼斯工业平均指数作为我们的业绩衡量标准。我认为三年的时间是可以用来检验投资业绩的最短的时间段，最好的检验期限应该足够长，在这段时间内道琼斯工业平均指数的最终水平能够基本接近于初始水平。
While the Dow is not perfect
(nor is anything else) as a measure of performance it has the
advantage of being widely known, has a long period of continuity,
and reflects with reasonable accuracy the experience of investors
generally with the market. I have no objection to any other method
of measurement of general market performance being used, such as
other stock market averages, leading diversified mutual stock
funds, bank common trust funds, etc.
尽管道琼斯工业平均指数作为业绩的衡量标准并不完美（其他任何事情也都不完美），但是它的优势是广为人知，存续的时间很长，能够比较精确的反应投资者在股市的一般经验。我并不反对其正在用的衡量总体市场表现的标准，比如其他股市平均指数，主要的多样化的共同股票基金，银行共同信托基金等等。
You may feel I have established
an unduly short yardstick in that it perhaps appears quite simple
to do better than an unmanaged index of 30 leading common stocks.
Actually, this index has generally proven to be a reasonably tough
competitor. Arthur Wiesenberger’s classic book on investment companied
lists performance for the 15 years, 1946-60, for all leading mutual
funds. There is presently over ＄20 billion invested in mutual funds, so
the experience of these funds represents, collectively, the
experience of many million investors. My own belief, though the
figures are not obtainable, is that portfolios of most leading
investment counsel organizations and bank trust departments have
achieved results similar to these mutual funds.
你可能觉得我已经建立了一套不适当的短期标准，按照这套标准或许超越30种非托管的主要的普通股票非常简单。事实上，超越这个指数已经被证实是一件相当困难的事情。Arthur Wiesenberger
的关于投资公司的经典书籍列出了所有主要共同基金在1946到1960期间15年的业绩。目前，有超过200亿美元的资金投资于共同基金，因此这些基金的经验总体的代表了许多百万以上规模投资者的经验。尽管这些数据不能取得，我认为最主要的投资顾问机构和银行信托部门的投资组合的业绩与这些共同基金的业绩相差无几。
Wiesenberger lists 70 funds in
his “Charts ﹠Statistics” with continuous records since 1946. I have
excluded 32 of these funds for various reasons since they were
balanced funds (therefore not participating fully in the general
market rig specialized industry funds, etc. of the 32 excluded
because I felt a comparison would not be fair), 31 did poor than
the Dow, so they were certainly not excluded to slant the
conclusions below.
Wiesenberger
在他的图表和数据部分列出了70只基金自1946年以来的持续的投资记录。由于种种原因我排除了其中的32只均衡基金（因为不能充分的参与到整个股票市场，或者属于专门的工业基金等等，对于这32只被排除的股票是因为我觉得与他们比较不公平），有31只表现不如道琼斯工业指数，因此他们肯定不会被排除以得出下面的带有倾向性的结论。
Of the remaining 38 mutual
funds whose method of operation I felt was such as make a
comparison with the Dow reasonable, 32 did poorer than the Dow, and
did better. The 6 doing better at the end of 1960 had assets of
about ＄1
billion and the 32 doing poorer had assets of about
＄6-1/2 billion.
None of the six that were superior beat the Dow by more than a few
percentage points a year.
剩下的38只共同基金的运作方式我觉得和道琼斯工业平均指数进行比较还算合理，其中32只表现不如道琼斯工业指数，但有时候做的好点。6只在1960底业绩优于道琼斯工业平均指数，这六只基金拥有的资产规模为10亿美元，32只业绩差的拥有的资产规模为65亿美元。这六只业绩比较好的基金今年都仅仅超过道琼斯工业平均指数少许。
Below I present the
year-by-year results for our period of operation (excluding 1961
for which I don’t have exact data, although rough figures indicate
no variation from the 1957-60 figures) for the two largest common
stock open-end investment companies (mutual funds) and the two
largest closed-end investment companies.
Mass.Inv.
Investors
Limited
Year
Trust
Stock
Lehman
Tri-Cont.
Dow
partners
1957
-12.0%
-12.4%
-11.4%
-2.4%
-8.4%
+9.3%
1958
+44.1%
+47.6
+40.8
+33.2
+38.5
+32.2
1959
+8.2
+10.3
+8.1
+8.4
+19.9
+20.9
1960
-0.9
-0.1
+2.6
+2.8
-6.3
+18.6
(From
Moody’s
Banks﹠Finance Manual, 1961)
COMPOUNDED
Mass.Inv. Investors
Limited
Year
Trust
Stock
Lehman
Tri-Cont.
Dow
partners
1957
-12.0%
-12.4%
-11.4%
-2.4%
-8.4%
+9.3%
1957-8
+26.8
+29.3
+24.7
+30.0
+26.9
+44.5
1957-9
+37.2
+42.6
+34.8
+40.9
+52.2
+74.7
1957-60
+36.0
+42.5
+38.3
+44.8
+42.6
+107.2
下面我列出了我们运作期间两大普通股开放基金投资公司（共同基金）和两大封闭式基金投资公司每年的投资结果（排除1961年，因为我没有准确的数据，尽管粗略的数字表明与1957到1960年的数字没有多大差异）。
Mass.Inv.
Investors
有限责任
年份
Trust
Stock
雷曼
三角洲
道琼斯
合伙人
1957
-12.0%
-12.4%
-11.4%
-2.4%
-8.4%
+9.3%
1958
+44.1%
+47.6
+40.8
+33.2
+38.5
+32.2
1959
+8.2
+10.3
+8.1
+8.4
+19.9
+20.9
1960
-0.9
-0.1
+2.6
+2.8
-6.3
+18.6
(摘自穆迪银行金融共同基金，1961)
复合累积收益
Mass.Inv. Investors
有限责任
年份
Trust
Stock
雷曼
三角洲 .
道琼斯
合伙人
1957
-12.0%
-12.4%
-11.4%
-2.4%
-8.4%
+9.3%
1957-8
+26.8
+29.3
+24.7
+30.0
+26.9
+44.5
1957-9
+37.2
+42.6
+34.8
+40.9
+52.2
+74.7
1957-60
+36.0
+42.5
+38.3
+44.8
+42.6
+107.2
Massachusetts Investors Trust
has net assets of about ＄1 billion; Tri-Continental Corporation
about ＄0.5
billion; and Lehman Corporation about
＄350 million; or a
total of over ＄3.5 billion.
马萨诸塞州投资信托的净资产大约为10亿美元；三角洲公司约为5亿美元；雷曼兄弟控股公司约为3.5亿美元；或者说四只基金的总资产超过35亿美元。
I do not present the above
tabulations and information with the idea of indicting investment
companies. My own record of investing such huge sums of money, with
restrictions on the degree of activity I might take in companies
where we had investments, would be no better, if as good. I present
this data to indicate the Dow as an investment competitor is no
pushover, and the great bulk of investment funds in the country are
going to have difficulty in bettering, or perhaps even matching,
its performance.
我展示上述表格和信息不是要控诉这些投资公司。如此大规模的资金，还有很多行动条款的限制，由我来运作如果能一样好，也不见的能更好。我提供上述数据是为了证实道琼斯工业平均指数作为衡量标准想超越并不是件容易的事，而且大量的投资基金超越甚至达到该指数的水平都不容易。
Our portfolio is very different
from that of the Dow. Our method of operation is substantially
different from that of mutual funds.
我们的组合不同于道琼斯工业平均指数。我们的运作方式也与上述共同基金有很大差异。
However, most partners, as an
alternative to their investment in the partnership would probably
have their funds invested in a media producing results comparable
to the Dow; therefore, I feel it is a fair test of
performance.
然而，大多数合伙人，作为他们在合伙公司的一个投资替代选择，可能把他们的基金投资于获利水平与道琼斯水平相当的媒介；因此，我觉的这是一个相对公平的业绩检验标准。
Our method of
operation
Our avenues of investment break
down into three categories. These categories have different
behavior characteristics, and the way our money is divided among
them will have an important effect on our results, relative to the
Dow, in any given year. The actual percentage division among
categories is to some degree planned, but to a great extent,
accidental, based upon availability factor.
我们的操作方式
我们的投资方法分为三类。相对于道琼斯指数，在任何给定的年份，这些不同的类别有不同的行为特征，而且我们的资金在这些类别之间的分配对我们的投资结果有很大影响。
The first section consists of
generally undervalued securities (hereinafter called “generals”)
where we have nothing to say about corporate policies and no
timetable as to when the undervaluation may correct itself. Over
the years, this had been our largest category of investment, and
more money has been made here than in either of the other
categories. We usually have fairly large positions (5% to 10% of
our total assets) in each of five or six generals, with smaller
position in another ten or fifteen.
第一部分包含了通常意义上的价值低估的证券（下文中称作“一般证券”），对这部分证券我们既不能影响公司的政策，也不能制定低估的价值得以回归的计划表。这么多年来，这一类投资占有最大的份额，而且获得的收益也比其他两类更多。我们通常对五六种一般价值低估的证券分别投入相当大比例的资金（总资产的5%到10%），而在其他十到十五只股票投入相对少的资金。
Sometimes these work out very
fast; many times they take years. It is difficult at the time of
purchase to know any specific reason why they should appreciate in
price. However, because of this lack of glamour or anything pending
which might create immediate favorable market action, they are
available at very cheap price. A lot of value can be obtained for
the price paid. This substantial excess of value creates a
comfortable margin of safety in each transaction. This individual
margin of safety, coupled with a diversity of commitments creates a
most attractive package of safety and appreciation potential. Over
the years our timing of purchases has been considerably better than
our timing of sales. We do not go into these generals with the idea
of getting the last nickel, but are usually quire content selling
out at some intermediate level between our purchase price and what
we regard as fair value to a private owner.
有时候这类证券价值回归需要的时间很短；很多时候则需要好多年。我们在买入时很难确切知道为什么某只股票将会在现有价格水平上增值。然而，由于缺少任何关于将会产生有利的市场变动的答案，因此我们可以在任何相对便宜的价格买入。在该价格上买入将会获得很多价值收益。价值大大高于价格的那部分可以为我们的交易提供很舒适的安全边际。单只股票的安全边际，加上投资的多样化，就会给我们带来一组安全、有升值潜力的非常有吸引力的证券组合。这么多年来，我们买入时机的选择要远好于卖出时机的选择。我们投资这类价值低估的证券并不是为了赚取能够赚到的每一美分，能够在买入价格和私人投资者眼中比较合理的价格之间的某个价格水平卖出我们就很满足了。
The generals tend to behave
market-wise very much in sympathy with the Dow. Just because
something is cheap does not mean it is not going to go down. During
abrupt downward movements in the market, this segment may very well
go down percentage-wise just as much as the Dow. Over a period of
years, I believe the generals will outperform the Dow, and during
sharply advancing years like 1961, this is the section of our
portfolio that turns in the best results. It is, of course, also
the most vulnerable in a declining market.
价值低估的证券逐渐被市场所认可的趋势和道琼斯工业平均指数变动方向相一致。不要以为某只股票便宜就认为它不会下跌。在市场突然下跌期间，我们该类股票下跌的幅度也会和道琼斯指数相一致。多年来，我相信价值低估的股票的表现会超过道琼斯股票指数，而且在急剧上涨的年份如1961年，这部分投资在我们的投资组合中表现最好。当然，这部分也是在下跌市场中也最容易遭受损失。
Our second category consists of
“work-outs”. These are securities whose financial results depend on
corporate action rather than supply and demand factors created by
buyers and sellers of securities. In other words, they are
securities with a timetable where we can predict, within reasonable
error limits, when we will get how much and what might upset the
applecart. Corporate events such as mergers, liquidations,
reorganizations, spin-offs, etc, lead to work-outs. An important
source in recent years has been sell-outs by oil producers to major
integrated oil companies/.
我们的第二类投资由“特殊事件股票”组成，这类证券的投资结果取决于公司的经营活动，而不是由买卖双方产生的供求因素决定。换句话说，这些证券存在一个我们可以预测的时间表，在合理的误差限度内，我们可以知道什么事件会影响并在多大程度上影响股价。公司事件如合并、清算、重组和资产分割等等，都会导致这类股票的产生。近几年，这类投资的一个来源是石油生产商被大量出售给石油综合公司。
This category will produce
reasonably stable earnings from year to year, to a large extent
irrespective of the course of the Dow. Obviously, if we operate
throughout a year with a large portion of our portfolio in
work-outs, we will look extremely good if turns out to be a
declining year for the Dow or quite bad if it is a strongly
advancing year. Over the years, work-outs have provided our second
largest category. At any given time, we may be in ten to fifteen of
these; some just beginning and others in the late stage of their
development. I believe in using borrowed money to offset a portion
of our work-out portfolio since there is a high degree of safety in
this category in terms of both eventual results and intermediate
market behavior. Results, excluding the benefits derived from the
use of borrowed money, usually fall in the 10% to 20% range. My
self-imposed limit regarding borrowing is 25% of partnership net
worth. Oftentimes we owe no money and when we do borrow, it is only
as an offset against work-outs.
这类投资会每年都会产生合理而稳定的收益，并在很大程度上与道琼斯指数的变化无关。显然，如果我们整年运作的投资组合的很大比例进行这种投资，我们在道琼斯下跌的年份的投资业绩会相当好，而在强力上涨的年份，会相当的差。这么多年来，该类股票一直是我们的第二大类投资。在任何时候，我们都拥有十到十五中该类股票；有些刚开始投资，有些则是在投资发展的末期。我认为可以运用借入的资金来补充一部分该类投资，因为这种投资不管是最终结果还是投资期间的市场表现，都非常安全。我们这类投资的结果，扣除运用借入资金获得的收益，通常会降到10%到20%的范围内。我自己对于借入资金的使用限制在合伙人净资产的25%之内。通常我们都没有使用借入资金，即使我们使用，也只是用来弥补这类投资上资金的不足。
The final category is “control”
situations where we either control the company or take a very large
position and attempt to influence policies of the company. Such
operations should definitely be measured in the basis of several
years. In a given year, they may produce nothing as it is usually
to our advantage to have the stock be stagnant market-wise for a
long period while we are acquiring it. These situations, too, have
relatively little in common with the behavior of the Dow.
Sometimes, of course, we buy into a general with the thought in
mind that it might develop into a control situation. If the price
remains low enough for a long period, this might very well happen.
If it moves up before we have a substantial percentage of the
company’s stock, we sell at higher levels and complete successful
general operation. We are presently acquiring stock in what may
turn out to be control situations several years hence.
最后一类投资为“控制权”股票投资，在这种投资中我们或者可以控制公司活动，或者在试图影响公司政策方面有很大的地位。这种操作也需要好多年才能见到成效。在某一年中，这种股票可能不能带来任何收益，这时它会在停滞的价格水平上持续很长时间，这对我们买入这只股票有利。这种投资也和道琼斯工业平均指数的变动没有多大关系。当然，有时候，我们买入一只价值被低估的股票，并认为它有可以发展成一直我们可以控制的股票。如果该股票的价格长期处于较低的水平，这种情况就会发生。如果在我们拥有足够比例的公司的股权之前，该股票价格开始上涨，我们就会在更高的水平卖出，以结束这次对价值低估股票的成功投资。我们现在正在买入几年之后我们会拥有公司控股权的股票。
Dempster
Mill Manufacturing Company
We are presently involved in
the control of Dempster Mill Manufacturing Company of Beatrice,
Nebraska. Our first stock was purchased as a generally undervalued
security five years ago. A block later became available, and I went
on the Board about four years ago. In August, 1961, we obtained
majority control, which is indicative of the fact that many of our
operation are not exactly of the “overnight” variety.
Dempster
Mill 制造公司
我们现在正在逐步增加对位于内布拉斯加的Dempster Mill
制造公司的控制。五年前，我们买入的第一笔投资是作为价值低估的股票买入的。随后又有一批股票可以买入，而且四年前我进入了该公司的董事会。1961年8月，我们获得了主要控制权，这也表明了我们的操作都不是短期性的投资类型。
Presently we own 70% of the
stock of Dempster with another 10% held by a few associated. With
only 150 or so other stockholders, a market on the stock is
virtually non-existent, and in any case, would have no meaning for
a controlling block. Our own, actions in such a market could
drastically affect the quoted price.
现在我们拥有该公司70%的股权，还有10%被一些人联合持有。还有其他150左右的股票持有者，因此这只股票的交易几乎为零，不管怎样，似乎没有必要取得公司的控制权。我们自己在市场中的行为就会彻底的改变公司的报价。
Therefore, it is necessary for
me to estimate the value at yearend of our controlling interest.
This is of particular importance since, in affect, new partner are
buying in based upon this price, and old partners are selling a
portion of their based upon the same price. The estimated value
should not be what we hope it would be worth, or what it might be
worth to an eager buyer, etc. but what I would estimate our
interest would bring if sold under current conditions in a
reasonably short period of time. Our efforts will be devoted toward
increasing this value, and we feel there are decent prospects of
doing this.
因此，我有必要在年末评估一下我们的控股份额的股票价值。这点非常重要，因为，实际上，新的合伙人是基于这个价格买入，而老的合伙人是基于同样的价格卖出了一部分。评估的价值不应是我们期望的股票该有的价值，也不是对于热切的买入者来说合理的价格等，而是我们的股份在比较合理的较短的期限内按照现在的价格出售所能带来的价值。我们将会努力使该价值得到增加，而且我对于实现此目的的前景比较乐观。
Dempster is a manufacturer of
farm implements and water systems with sales in 1961 of
about ＄9
million. Operations have produced only nominal profits in relation
to invested capital during recent years. This reflected a poor
management situation, along with a fairly tough industry situation.
Presently, consolidated net worth (book value) is about
＄4.5 million,
or ＄75 per
share, consolidated working capital about
＄50 per share, and
at yearend we valued our interest at
＄35 per share.
While I claim no oracular vision in a matter such as this, I feel
this is a fair valuation to both new and old partners. Certainly,
if even moderate earning power can be restored, a higher valuation
will be justified, and even if it cannot, Dempster should work out
at a higher figure. Our controlling interest was acquired at an
average price of about ＄28, and this holding currently represents 21% of
partnership net assets based on the
＄35
value.
Sempster
公司是农业器具和灌溉系统的制造商，在1961年的销售额大约为900万美元。近几年，该公司的正常营运获得的利润相对投资资本来说微不足道。这也反映了公司所处行业的困境和本身管理水平较差。现在，公司的净资产总额（账面价值）为450万美元，或者说每股净资产为75美元，总的流动资本（营运资本）为每股50美元，年末我们投资的价值评估为每股35美元。我认为这种投资的前景并不是很难预料，这个价格对新老投资者都比较合理。当然，如果公司能获得比较适度的盈利，我们能够获得更高的价值收益，即使公司不能盈利，他的股票也能以更高的价格卖出。我们持股的成本在大约28美元，按照35美元的价格，现在持股份额占合伙人净资产的21%。
Of course, this section of our
portfolio is not going to be worth more money merely because
General Motors, U.S. Steel, etc., sell higher. In a raging bull
market, operations in control situations will seem like a very
difficult way to make money, compared to just buying the general
market. However, I am more conscious of the dangers presented at
current market levels than the opportunities. Control situations,
along with work-outs, provide a means of insulating a portion of
our portfolio from these dangers.
当然，这部分投资并不会因为通用汽车或者美国钢铁的价格上涨就增值。在狂热的牛市中，相对于直接购买市场股票指数基金，控制权投资操作很难赚到钱。然而，我更关注现在市场水平上存在的风险，而不是机会。控制权投资和“work-outs”这两种方式能使投资组合远离这些风险。
The Question of
Conservatism
The above description of our
various areas of operation may provide some clue as to how
conservatively our portfolio is invested. Many people some years
back thought they were behaving in the most conservative manner by
purchasing medium or long-term municipal or government bonds. This
policy has produced substantial market depreciation in many cases,
and most certainly has failed maintain or increase real buying
power.
保守问题
通过上述对我们的不同领域投资操作的描述，可以看出我们的投资组合有多么保守。几年前，很多人认为购买中长期市政或政府债券的投资方式最保守。这种投资决策在很多时候都会大幅度贬值，大多数情况下都很难保持或者增加投资组合的实际购买力。
Conscious, perhaps overly
conscious, of inflation, many people now feel that they are
behaving in a conservative manner by buying blue chip securities
regardless of price-earning ratios, dividend yields, etc. Without
the benefit hindsight as in the bond example, I feel this course of
action is fraught with danger. There is nothing at all
conservative, in my opinion, about speculating a; to just how high
a multiplier a greedy and capricious public will put on
earning.
对通货膨胀的关注，或许是过度关注，现在很多人认为而购买蓝筹股是一种保守的投资方式，而对市盈率和分红收益等因素并不加以考虑。如果没有债券的例子，我认为这样的行为是充满危险的。在我看来，只要是投机，就没有任何的保守可言。
You will not be right simply
because a large number of people momentarily agree with you. You
will not be right simply because important agree with you. In many
quarters the simultaneous occurrence of the two above factors is
enough to make a course of action meet the test of
conservatism.
仅仅因为暂时很多人与你的看法相同，并不意味着你就是正确的。
一些重要人士同意你的观点也不意味着你就是正确的。在很多时候，上述两个因素同时发生的情况足以让你采取行动来检验是否保守。
You will be right, over the
course of many transactions, if your hypotheses are correct, you
facts are correct, and your reasoning is correct. True conservatism
is only possible through knowledge and reason.
I might add that in no way does
the fact that our portfolio is not conventional prove that we were
more conservative or less conservative than standard method of
investing. This can only be determined by examining the methods or
examining the results.
如果你的假设是正确的，你掌握的事实是正确的，而且你的推理是正确的，那么经过多次交易过程之后，你最终也是正确的。真正的保守型投资只能依靠了解和推理获得。我可能提到，我们投资组合不具传统性并不能并证明我们的投资方式相对标准的投资方式是否更保守。而保守与否只能通过对投资方式或者投资结果的检验来实现。
I feel the most objective test
as to just how conservative our manner of investing is arises
through evaluation of performance in down markets. Preferably these
should involve a substantial decline in the Dow. Our performance in
the rather mild declines of 1957 and 1960 would confirm my
hypothesis that we invest in an extremely conservative manner. I
would welcome any partner’s suggesting objective tests as to
conservatism to say how we stack up. We have never suffered a
realize loss of more than 1/2 or1% of total net assets, and our
ratio of total dollars of realized gains to total realized losses
is something like 100 to 1. Of course, this reflects the fact that
on balance we have been operating in an up market. However, there
have been many opportunities for loss transactions even in markets
such as these (you may have found out about a few of these
yourselves) so I think the above facts have some
significance.
我认为最客观的检验投资方式保守与否的方法是通过在下跌的市场中对投资表现的评估。最好考虑到道琼斯指数的大幅下跌。在1957年和1960年的股票市场的相当温和的下跌中我们的投资业绩更是我坚定的认为我们的投资方式相当保守。我欢迎任何合伙人提议的对我们投资方式的保守性的客观检验。我们的投资遭受的损失从来没有超过所有净资产的0.5%或者1%，而且我们实现的收益与遭受的损失的比例大概为100比1。当然，这也反映了我们总体来说多数是在上涨的市场中运作投资。然而，即使在上涨的市场中，也有很多会带来损失的交易存在（你自己就可以发现很多），因此我认为上述事实具有很重要的意义。
The Question of Size
Aside from the question as to
what happens upon my death (witch with a meta physical twist, is a
subject of keen interest to me), I am probably asked most
often:“what affect is the rapid growth of partnership funds going
to have our performance?”
投资规模的问题
除了被问到我死了之后会怎么样（这个问题与一元物理扭曲一直是我很感兴趣的话题）我被问到的最多的问题就是：“合伙人基金的规模增长会对我们的投资业绩有什么影响？”
Larger funds tug in two
directions. From the standpoint of “passive” investments, where we
do not attempt by the size of our investment to influence corporate
policies, larger sums hurt results. For the mutual fund or trust
department investing in securities with very broad markets, the
effect of large sums should be to penalize results only very
slightly. Buying 10,000 shares of General motors is only slightly
more costly (on the basis of mathematical expectancy) than buying
1,000 or 100 shares.
更大的基金规模对于投资业绩有两个完全相反的影响。从消极的投资角度，我们并不试图利用我们的投资规模来影响公司的政策，更大的规模会损害我们的投资结果。对于共同基金或者投资证券的信托部门，他们的投资标的有广泛的市场，超大规模对投资结果的损害非常小。购买10，000股通用汽车公司的股票的成本只是比购买1，000股或者100股稍微高一点（只是基于数学上的计算）。
In some of the securities in
which we deal (but not all by any means) buying 10,000 shares is
much more difficult than buying 100 and is sometimes impossible.
Therefore, for a portion of our portfolio, larger sums are
definitely disadvantageous. For a larger portion of the portfolio,
I would say increased sums are only slightly disadvantageous. This
category includes most of our work-outs and some
generals.
我们交易的一些证券（并不都是在所有投资方式中）购买10,000股比购买100股要难得的多，有时候甚至都不完全不可能。因此，对于我们的某一部分投资组合，更大的规模存在些许劣势。这些投资组合包括大多数特殊事件投资和一些价值投资。
However, in the case of control
situations increased funds are a definite advantage. A “Sanborn
Map” cannot be accomplished without the wherewithal. My definite
belief is that the opportunities increase in this field as the
funds increase. This is due to the sharp full-off in competition as
the ante mounts plus the important positive correlation that exists
between increased size of company and lack of concentrated
ownership of that company’s stock.
然而，在控制权投资中，增加的基金规模确实具有很大优势。对Sanborn
地图公司的投资，如果没有大量的资金支持就不可能完成。我可以明确指出，在这个投资领域，基金规模的增加会带来更多的投资机会。这一方面是因为资金规模的增加会挤出很大一批竞争对手，另一方面是公司不断增加的规模和公司股权的分散化的正向关系的存在。
Which is more important—the
decreasing prospects of profitability in passive investments or the
increasing prospects in control investments? I can’t give a
definite answer to this since to a great extent it depends on the
type of market in which we are operating. My present opinion is
that there is no reason to think these should not be offsetting
factors; if my opinion should change, you will be told. I can say,
most assuredly, that our results in 1960 and 1961 would not have
been better if we had been operating with the much smaller sums of
1956 and 1957.
这两个方面的影响——消极投资中的不利影响和控制权投资中的有利影响，哪一个更重要呢？对于这个问题我不能给出明确的答案，因为在很大程度上，这要取决于我们投资运作的市场是什么类型的。我现在的观点是：没有理由去思考这些无法补偿的因素；如果的观点发生变化，你肯定会被告知。我可以确定的是，如果我们运用1956和1957年的资金规模运作，我们在1960和1961年的投资业绩也不会变的更好。
And A Prediction
Regular readers (I may be
flattering myself) will feel I have left the tracks when I start
talking about predictions. This is one thing from which I have
always shied away and I still do in the normal sense.
I am certainly not going to
predict what general business or the stock market are going to do
in the next year or two since I don’t have the faintest
idea.
关于预测
我的长期读者（我可能奉承我自己了）可能会觉得讨论预测问题偏离了我的投资轨道。这是一个我一直回避的问题，我仍然这么做。
我肯定不会去预测一般业务或者股票市场在未来一到两年的表现，因为我一点概念也没有。
I think you can be quite sure
that over the next ten years there are going to be a few years when
the general market is plus 20% or 25%, a few when it is minus on
the same order, and a majority when it is in between. I haven’t any
notion as to the sequence in which these will occur, nor do I think
it is of any great importance for the long-term
investor.
我认为你可以确定，将来十年间，一般市场表现会在一些年份上涨20%到25%，一些年份下降同样的幅度，而在大多数年份波动在这两者之间。我不知道这些年份出现的顺序怎样，我也不认为这对长期投资很重要。
Over any long period of years,
I think it likely that the Dow will probably produce something like
5% to 7% per year compounded from a combination dividends and
market value gain. Despite the experience of recent years, anyone
expecting substantially better than that from the general market
probably faces disappointment.
对于任何一个较长的期间而言，我认为道琼斯指数可能会带来大约5%到7%的红利市值年度复合增长率。即使是近几年，任何人抱有收益超过一般市场水平的预期都会失望。
Our job is to pile up yearly
advantages over the performance of the Dow without worry to much
about whether the absolute results in a given year are a plus or
minus. I would consider a year in which we were down 15% and the
Dow declined 25% to be much superior to a year when both the
partnership and the Dow advanced 20%. I have stressed this point in
talking with partners and have watched them nod their heads with
varying degrees of enthusiasm. It is most important to me that you
fully understand my reasoning in this regard and agree with me not
only in your cerebral regions, but also down in the pit of your
stomach.
我们的工作就是在较长的时期内取得超过道琼斯工业指数的业绩水平，而不用担心绝对的投资收益是正是负。我认为，与道琼斯指数和我们的股票都上涨20%的年份想不，在我们的股票下跌15%而道琼斯下跌25%的年份我们的表现更好。我已经与合伙人谈过这一点，而且我发现他们都表现出了不同程度的赞同。对我来说，充分理解我的推理，并且不仅在脑子里，而且从心底赞同我才是最重要的。
For the reasons outlined in my
method of operation, our best years relative to the Dow are likely
to be in declining or static markets. Therefore, the advantage we
seek will probably come in sharply varying amounts. There are bound
to be years when we are surpassed by the Dow, but if over a long
period we can average to ten percentage points per year better than
it, I will feel the results have been satisfactory.
出于在操作方法中描述的原因，相对道琼斯指数，我们最好的投资年份是在下跌或者盘整的市场中。因此，我们的优势大小每年也会不同。我们被道琼斯指数超过肯定需要好多年，但是如果很长时期内我们都能比该指数的收益了高10%，我就很满足了。
Specifically, if the market
should be down 35% or 40% in a year (and I feel this has a high
probability of occurring one year in the next ten—no one knows
which one), we should be down only 15% or 20%. If it is more or
less unchanged during the year, we would hope to be up about ten
percentage points. If it is up 20% or more, we would struggle to be
up as much. The consequence of performance such as this over a
period of years would mean that if the Dow produces a 5% to 7% per
year over-all gain compounded, I would hope our results might 15%
to 17% per year.
特别是，如果道市场水平下降35%到40%的年份（我认为在未来的十年内很可能有一年会跌到这种程度——但是没人知道是哪一年），我希望我们的投资只下降15%到20%。如果该年的市场水平基本没有变化，我希望我们的收益能达到10%。如果市场上涨20%，我们应该努力达到相同的增幅。一定期限内的类似上述的投资结果表明：如果道琼斯指数的每年复合总收益为5%到7%，那么我希望我们的每年收益能达到15%到17%。
The above expectation may sound
somewhat rash, and there is no question but that they may appear
very much so when viewed from the vantage point of 1965 or 1970. It
may turn out that I am completely wrong. However, I feel the
partners are certainly entitled to know what I am thinking in this
regard even though the nature of the business is such as to
introduce a high probability of error in such expectations. In any
one year, the variations may be quiet substantial. This happened in
1961, but fortunately the variation was on the pleasant side. They
weren’t all be!
上述预期可能听起来有点草率，但是没有什么问题，如果从1965或者1970年的有利点来看，这很可能会出现。或者最后证实我完全错了。但是，我认为合伙人有权知道我在这方面的想法，即使投资业务的本质使得做出这样的预期很有可能会犯错误。在1961年确实出现了这种情况，但幸运的是，投资结果是向好的一面发展。其他情况下，未必都会这样！
Miscellaneous
We are now installed in an
office at 810 Kiewit Plaza with a first-class secretary, Beth
Henley, and an associate with considerable experience in my type of
securities, Bill Scott. My father is sharing office space with us
(he also shares the expenses) and doing a brokerage business in
securities. None of our brokerage is done through him so we have no
“vicuna coat” situation. Over-all, I expect our over-head,
excluding interest on borrowings and Nebraska Intangibles Tax, to
run less than .5 or1% of net assets. We should get our money’s
worth from this expenditure, and you are most cordially invited to
drop in and see how the money is being spent.
其他一些问题
我们现在的办公室位于Kiewit
Plaza的810号，并配有一流的秘书——Beth Henley，
以及一个助手Bill
Scott，他对于我的投资类型有着丰富的经验。我的父亲与我们共享这个办公司（当然也分担费用），他从事证券经纪业务。我们的所有经纪业务都与我父亲无关。总之，我希望我们的管理费用——不包括借款利息和内布拉斯加州的无形资产税，能够低于净资产的0.5%或者1%。我们应该尽量减少这类开支，欢迎你们前来查看我们的开支情况。
With over 90 partners and
probably 40 or so securities, you can understand that it is quite a
welcome relief to me to shake loose from some of the
details.
我们有超过90名合伙人，和大约40只证券，你可以理解如果能从这些细节琐事中抽身将对我是一种怎样的解脱。
We presently have partners
residing in locations from California to Vermont, and net assets at
the beginning of 1962 amounted to $7,178,500.00. Susie and I have
an interest in the partnership amounting to $1,025,000.00, and
other relatives of mine have a combined interest totaling
$782,600.00. The minimum for new partners last year was $25,000,
but I am giving some thought to increasing it this
year.
我们现在的合伙人来自不同的地方，从加利福尼亚到福蒙特，在1962年初的资产净值合计为7,178,500美元。苏珊和我在合伙企业中的份额为1，025,000美元，
我们的亲属在合伙企业中的资产总额为782,600美元。去年新加入的合伙人的最低资产额为25，000美元，我正在考虑今年提高这个额度限制。
Peat, Marwick, Mitchell&
Company did an excellent job of expediting the audit, providing tax
figures much earlier than in the past. They assure me this
performance can be continued.
Peat, Marwick, Mitchell&
Company在加快审计这方面一直做的很出色，而且提供的税务数据比以前早了很多。他们保证优秀的工作效率会保持下去。
Let me hear from you regarding
questions you may have on any aspects of this letter, your audit,
status of your partnership interest, etc. that may puzzle
you.
对于这封信的任何方面存在问题，或者你的审计结果和合伙人权益状态有任何不明白的地方，请向我提出来。
Cordially
Warren E.
Buffett
APPENDIX（附录）
Partnerships Operating
Throughout 1961（1961年合伙人的运营结果）
1/1/61Capital
Over-all Gain
Percentage
Partnership
at Market
in 1961*
Gain
（合伙人）
（61-01-01资本）
（1961总收益）
（收益率）
Buffett Associates
$ 486,874.27
$ 225,387.80
$
46.3%
Buffett Fund
351,839.29
159,696.93
45.4
Dacee
235,480.31
116,504.47
49.5
Emdee
140,005.24
67,387.28
48.1
Glenoff
78,482.70
39,693.80
50.5
Mo-Buf
325,844.71
149,163.71
45.8
Underwood
582,256.82
252,951.26
43.3
$ 2,200,783.34
$ 1,009,785.25
45.9%
Partnership Started in
1961（1961年新加入的合伙人）
Over-all Gain
Percentage
Partnership
Paid-in
in 1961
Gain
（合伙人）
（缴纳资金额）
（1961总收益）
（收益率）
Ann investments
$ 100,100(1-30-61)
$ 35,367.93
35.3%
Buffett-TD
250,100($200,100
70,294.08
28.1
on 3-8-6,$50,000
on 5-31-61)
Buffett-Holland
125,100(5-17-61)
16,703.76
13.3
* Gain in net assets at market
values plus payments to limited partners during year.
*
该年的净资产价值收益加上对有限责任合伙人的支付。
