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霍布斯 利维坦 读书摘要

2013-05-27 14:04阅读:
THE FIRST PART OF MAN
CHAPTER I OF SENSE
CONCERNING the thoughts of man, I will consider them first singly, and afterwards in train or dependence upon one another.
The original of them all is that which we call sense
The cause of sense is the external body, or object

CHAPTER II OF IMAGINATION
THAT when a thing lies still, unless somewhat else stir it, it will lie still for ever, is a truth that no man doubts of. But that when a thing is in motion, it will eternally be in motion, unless somewhat else stay it
When a body is once in motion, it moveth (unless something else hinder it) eternally; and whatsoever hindreth it,
cannot in an instant, but in time, and by degrees, quite extinguish it:
The decay of sense in men waking is not the decay of the motion made in sense, but an obscuring of it
Much memory, or memory of many things, is called experience. Again, imagination being only of those things which have been formerly perceived by sense
The imaginations of them that sleep are those we call dreams.
And seeing dreams are caused by the distemper of some of the inward parts of the body
The most difficult discerning of a man's dream from his waking thoughts is, then, when by some accident we observe not that we have slept
From this ignorance of how to distinguish dreams, and other strong fancies, from vision and sense, did arise the greatest part of the religion of the Gentiles in time past,
The imagination that is raised in man (or any other creature endued with the faculty of imagining) by words, or other voluntary signs, is that we generally call understanding,

CHAPTER III OF THE CONSEQUENCE OR TRAIN OF IMAGINATIONS
BY CONSEQUENCE, or train of thoughts, I understand that succession of one thought to another which is called, to distinguish it from discourse in words, mental discourse.
When a man thinketh on anything whatsoever, his next thought after is not altogether so casual as it seems to be.
This train of thoughts, or mental discourse, is of two sorts. The first is unguided, without design, and inconstant; The second is more constant, as being regulated by some desire and design.
The train of regulated thoughts is of two kinds: one, when of an effect imagined we seek the causes or means that produce it; The other is, when imagining anything whatsoever, we seek all the possible effects that can by it be produced;
A sign is the event antecedent of the consequent
As prudence is a presumption of the future, contracted from the experience of time past
There is no other act of man's mind, that I can remember, naturally planted in him
Whatsoever we imagine is finite. Therefore there is no idea or conception of anything we call infinite.

CHAPTER IV OF SPEECH
THE INVENTION of printing, though ingenious, compared with the invention of letters is no great matter.
The general use of speech is to transfer our mental discourse into verbal, or the train of our thoughts into a train of words,
The manner how speech serveth to the remembrance of the consequence of causes and effects consisteth in the imposing of names, and the connexion of them.
By this imposition of names, some of larger, some of stricter signification, we turn the reckoning of the consequences of things imagined in the mind into a reckoning of the consequences of appellations
But the use of words in registering our thoughts is in nothing so evident as in numbering.


CHAPTER V
OF REASON AND SCIENCE

WHEN man reasoneth, he does nothing else but conceive a sum total, from addition of parcels; or conceive a remainder, from subtraction of one sum from another: which, if it be done by words……
The use and end of reason is not the finding of the sum and truth of one, or a few consequences, remote from the first definitions and settled significations of names; but to begin at these, and proceed from one consequence to another.
By this it appears that reason is not, as sense and memory, born with us; nor gotten by experience only, as prudence is; but attained by industry
To conclude, the light of humane minds is perspicuous words, but by exact definitions first snuffed, and purged from ambiguity; reason is the pace; increase of science, the way; and the benefit of mankind, the end. And, on the contrary, metaphors, and senseless and ambiguous words are like ignes fatui; and reasoning upon them is wandering amongst innumerable absurdities; and their end, contention and sedition, or contempt.
As much experience is prudence, so is much science sapience.
The signs of science are some certain and infallible; some, uncertain.

CHAPTER VI
OF THE INTERIOR BEGINNINGS OF VOLUNTARY MOTIONS, COMMONLY CALLED THE PASSIONS; AND THE SPEECHES BY WHICH THEY ARE EXPRESSED

THERE be in animals two sorts of motions peculiar to them: One called vital, begun in generation, and continued without interruption through their whole life; the other is animal motion, otherwise called voluntary motion
This endeavour, when it is toward something which causes it, is called appetite, or desire
That which men desire they are said to love, and to hate those things for which they have aversion.
But whatsoever is the object of any man's appetite or desire, that is it which he for his part calleth good; and the object of his hate and aversion, evil; and of his contempt, vile and inconsiderable.
As in sense that which is really within us is, as I have said before, only motion, caused by the action of external objects but in appearance;
This motion, which is called appetite, and for the appearance of it delight and pleasure, seemeth to be a corroboration of vital motion, and a help thereunto;
Pleasure therefore, or delight, is the appearance or sense of good;
These simple passions called appetite, desire, love, aversion, hate, joy, and grief have their names for diverse considerations diversified. At first, when they one succeed another, they are diversely called from the opinion men have of the likelihood of attaining what they desire. Secondly, from the object loved or hated. Thirdly, from the consideration of many of them together. Fourthly, from the alteration or succession itself.
Therefore of things past there is no deliberation, because manifestly impossible to be changed;
In deliberation, the last appetite, or aversion, immediately adhering to the action, or to the omission thereof, is that we call the will; the act, not the faculty, of willing.
The forms of speech by which the passions are expressed are partly the same and partly different from those by which we express our thoughts.
These forms of speech, I say, are expressions or voluntary significations of our passions: but certain signs they be not;
Continual success in obtaining those things which a man from time to time desireth, that is to say, continual prospering, is that men call felicity;

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